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The virtues are central to our understanding of character-based morality and in the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition at least, prudence is considered the first of all 
cardinal virtues – vital and necessary to the virtuous life. Similarly, the claim of this 
study is that prudence is a central feature of Proverbial wisdom and, as such, the 
book of Proverbs is a useful biblical source to allow Scripture to enrich our 
understanding of the virtuous life and of prudence in particular. In this vein, this 
thesis engages in a correlative study between an understanding of prudence informed 
by Thomistic thought and prudential wisdom found in the book of Proverbs. Part of 
this correlative study also takes in the broader context of the virtuous moral life, 
including notions such as the natural law and the virtues in general. This study 
highlights that wisdom as portrayed in the book of Proverbs can inform 
contemporary theological understandings of prudence, especially those with their 
roots in the Thomistic tradition. Further, the Thomistic understanding of the virtue of 
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1. Overview:  Moral Theory, Scripture and Virtues 
1.1 Scripture and the Moral Framework of Virtue Ethics 
1.1.1 Overarching Approach to Scripture and Morality 
Though the Second Vatican Council was not called in response to specific polemics 
or specific moral predicaments of the day, the Council Fathers nevertheless called for 
the renewal of moral theology that has helped shape moral enquiry significantly in 
the decades since. Part of that call was that greater stress be given to role of Scripture 
in moral theology.1 This is most notably expressed in Dei Verbum2 and, even more 
explicitly, in Optatam Totius which stated that moral theology should be ‘nourished’ 
by scriptural teaching as indeed the Bible sits as the “soul of all theology.”3 This 
leaning has continued through to more recent times where, for example, the 
Pontifical Biblical Commission’s document The Bible and Morality reminded 
theologians that “Holy Scripture is not only a source of revelation on which to 
ground one’s faith, it is also an indispensable reference point for morality.”4  
An immediate question follows: how and in what manner can Scripture serve moral 
theology? This question is especially complex as any contemporary and reasonable 
analysis of Scripture quickly ascertains that the bible does not provide any ‘clean’ 
systematic moral construct or a tidy synthesis of principles and precepts.5 As such, 
the appropriate and beneficial use of Scripture in moral theology is not always as 
straightforward as it may seem. Further, the historical-critical scholarship of biblical 
literature has highlighted the distinct gap between our modern issues and contexts 
and that of both the Old and New Testaments. As the Pontifical Biblical Commission 
                                                 
1 As Curran notes, the greater stress on Scripture in moral theology was a movement that pre-dates the 
Council. Nevertheless, Vatican II brought such sentiment into even greater focus in the Catholic 
context and the endorsement of the Council is regarded as a key moment in Catholic moral theology. 
Charles E. Curran, "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," in The Use of 
Scripture in Moral Theology, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, Readings in Moral 
Theology, vol. 4 (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 179. 
2  Second Vatican Council, "Dei Verbum: Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in The 
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (New York: Guild Press, 1966), §21. 
3 Second Vatican Council, "OT," §16. 
4  Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), preface (p. 5). 
5 Josef Fuchs discusses this notion in relation to the call of the use of Scripture by Vatican II. See 
Human Values and Christian Morality, trans., M. H. Heelan et al. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 
28-29. Curran’s discussion on the use of Scripture in moral theology highlights this issue substantially 
in "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," 178-212. 
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indicates, even a casual reading of Scripture illuminates the difficulties in applying 
biblical writings to contemporary moral situations given that they “were redacted at 
least nineteen hundred years ago and belong to epochs in which life conditions were 
very different from those of today.”6  
The response to such issues in regard to the use of Scripture in moral theology starts 
with an appreciation for the need of sound exegetical scholarship which helps one to 
navigate the Scriptures and to understand them in their own situational contexts. 
Certainly, many scholars interested in the field of Scripture and morality note such a 
necessity.7 As such, a significant part of this project will utilise such tools of modern 
scholarship. However, it will not remain there. The aim is not simply to unpack 
historical data on selected texts as such, but to allow Scripture to illuminate truths 
that can help shape understandings of at least certain aspects of the moral life.8   
To do so, however, one needs to ask a further question. The question on the use of 
Scripture in this or any other work of moral theology is not simply how a moral 
theory can use Scripture but, more accurately, what paradigm is witnessed in 
Scripture (in whole or in part) and, thus, able to most fruitfully speak to the moral 
life. In this sense, often the use of Scripture is bound to the prior paradigm of moral 
understanding that one brings to its reading. For example, one commonly understood 
paradigm is essentially deontological and sees Scripture providing certain 
articulations on moral norms and rules. Certainly under the heavily legalistic model 
employed by the ‘moral manuals’ between Trent and Vatican II, the use of Scripture 
was primarily in proof text fashion to support arguments on the sinfulness or 
otherwise of particular acts. 9  
                                                 
6 Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality, preface (p. 6). See also Servais Pinckaers’ 
discussion on application of Scripture to ethical issues of today, "Scripture and the Renewal of Moral 
Theology," in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and 
Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 59-62.   
7 The aforementioned Fuchs being an example, Human Values and Christian Morality, 27.  
8 This follows Pinckaers who notes that both a ‘positivist’ method of exegeses, which focuses on 
“facts” of historicity and related data, and the more interpretive “truthfulness” of the text itself are 
needed if Scripture is to engage successfully with moral deliberation, Servais Pinckaers, The Sources 
of Christian Ethics, trans., Mary Thomas Noble, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 73-74. 
9  See Curran, "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," 179-180. On the 
development  of the ‘moral manuals’ see John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: The Study 
of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 1-36. 
It should be pointed out that I do not want to suggest that Scripture cannot or should not be used for 
articulating moral norms or precepts but, rather, exclusively doing so, particularly in a strictly 
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More recently, other moral frameworks have come to the fore including virtue or 
character-based ethics. The revival of virtue-based ethics is often marked by the 
writings of such figures as Elizabeth Anscombe and various critics such as William 
Frankena, Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre10  while figures such as Stanley 
Hauerwas11 and James Keenan12 have performed a similar role in the more overtly 
theological context. They themselves base much of their understanding on Aristotle 
and Aquinas. Under such influence, many moral thinkers have found value in 
changing the fundamental basis of moral reflection away from acts as a means to a 
‘utilitarian’ end or in considering the purity of the particular act itself (typical of 
deontological ethics) to the broader concept of character and virtues – a movement 
that focuses on the “kind of person one’s actions exhibits and requires one to be.”13 
Within such a framework, there is a greater acknowledgment that actions do not sit 
as isolated and independent entities apart from the context of the fuller motivations 
and lived experiences of the agents who perform them. Such a paradigm holds that 
morality is better understood as one ‘being’ good rather than simply ‘doing’ good. 
As Klaus Demmer states in his defining of the moral life:  
First and foremost, morality concerns the reality of our being good; in 
this sense, any good action represents a derivative dimension, the 
expression of a more fundamental condition … Moral theologians are 
increasingly aware of the fact that actions are grounded in personal 
attitudes, that there exists something like permanent dispositions for 
whose cultivation the agent bears a particular responsibility.14 
                                                                                                                                          
deontological framework, is not the fullest means in which the Scriptures can be utilised to inform the 
moral life. 
10 The impetus for such philosophers to return to virtue-based ethics was essentially in response to 
dissatisfaction with the condition of modern moral philosophy built primarily on deontological or 
utilitarian frameworks. Harold Alderman, "By Virtue of Virtue," in The Virtues: Contemporary 
Essays on Moral Character, ed. Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth, 1987), 47. MacIntyre in particular brought this dissatisfaction into sharp focus in his 
seminal work After Virtue where he illustrates the limitations of attempting to resolve moral dilemma 
based on competing rational arguments in the contemporary context. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: 
A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 6-22 
and passim. 
11 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame: Fides 
Publishers, 1974), this being a seminal publication, though many more have followed since.  
12 His first work being: James F. Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992).  
13 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002), 115. 
14 Klaus Demmer, Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology, trans., Roberto Dell'Oro 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 2, 53.  
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It is in this context that an understanding of virtues (and corresponding vices) are 
framed, namely it is those traits that constitute the character of a person. They are 
classically understood, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, as being dispositions 
which express the “pattern of choices an individual makes.”15 As such, a particular 
virtue not only renders good outcomes but “makes good he who has it.”16  
This understanding of morality resting in the character of a person with their virtues 
and vices is one that is most suited to the Scriptures in general and to the wisdom 
literature in particular. In this vein, despite the traditional reliance on Scripture to 
articulate a deontological framework, particularly in the use of certain parts of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, 17  the revival of virtue-based morality finds a corresponding 
renewal in biblical scholarship in general and wisdom literature in particular. 
William Brown makes the point that “concern for ethical character runs throughout 
the Bible … but finds its most immediate home within a frequently neglected part of 
the biblical canon, the wisdom literature.”18  So though wisdom literature may 
struggle to supply “hard and fast principles” or codified laws on which moral norms 
can be based, it does supply “characterisations of character, that is to say, profiles of 
character embodied in certain lives of virtue.”19 Similarly Rodd, in his discussion of 
Proverbs, notes that as moral discussion is able to move beyond concepts such as that 
of the Kantian categorical imperative and the utilitarianism of Mill, so are we able to 
better capture the ethical framework of the Hebrew Scriptures more broadly. Rodd 
                                                 
15 William P. Brown, Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old 
Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996), 9. This sentiment is tied to 
notion of ‘habits’ to describe the enduring quality a person exhibits. The term habit is itself taken from 
the Latin habitus and Greek hexis and denotes more than mindless repetitive activity which the 
contemporary use may imply. The classic source for such understanding is found in Book II & III of 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1999). (Hereafter NE). Thomas Aquinas’s discussion on the same can be found in his Summa 
Theologiae, trans., English Dominican Fathers (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I-II, 49-54. 
(Hereafter ST). See also brief discussion in 3.3.1 below. 
16 Jean Baechler, "Virtue: Its Nature, Exigency and Acquisition," in Virtue, ed. John W. Chapman and 
William A. Galston, Namos, vol. 34 (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 27. 
17 Baumann, for example, notes the tendency of studies in Old Testament morality to focus on Israel’s 
confessions (the Decalogue or Law in general) or the prophetic texts. Gerlinde Baumann, "Wisdom 
and Ethics: The Contribution of Sapiential Ethics for Old Testament Ethics," Verbum Et Ecclesia JRG 
30, no. 1 (2009): 16-17.  
18 Brown, Character in Crisis, viii. 
19 Brown, Character in Crisis, 19. Citing Richard Bondi, "The Elements of Character," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 12, no. 2 (1984): 205. 
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states categorically that “the Greek concern for virtue, which seems to be receiving 
renewed interest among moral philosophers, is closer to the Old Testament ethics.”20  
With the above in mind, the aim of this project is to draw on two traditions and bring 
them into dialogue in a particular area of study – the teaching of Proverbial wisdom 
on the one hand and the virtue tradition informed by St. Thomas Aquinas and his 
interpreters on the other. As such, this project follows Aquinas himself who 
suggested that just as “other moral teachings of the Old Testament centred on the 
Ten Commandments and on their purpose, so it was appropriate that later books of 
the Old Testament should instruct us on the activity of prudence, which is about the 
things serving this purpose.”21 Of these “latter books” that Aquinas refers to, the 
current study’s specific concern is the book of Proverbs. Naturally the wisdom 
tradition is broader than this one work and one could draw on wisdom genre found 
throughout the Hebrew Scriptures. Nevertheless, Proverbs is the primary work of 
focus and its concerns help provide a boundary to this project. Proverbs is chosen for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is regarded as a foundational piece of the wisdom tradition; 
well organised and extensive in its focus and influence. 22  Moreover, and this 
represents the central proposition of this thesis, there is an expression of morality 
within Proverbs that most readily speaks to a contemporary discussion on the virtue 
of prudence and its moral framework as found in the Thomistic tradition. What 
follows is an unpacking of this position. 
1.1.2 Recent Approaches to Virtue-Based Ethical Exploration in Proverbs 
and the Virtue of Prudence 
As alluded to above, attention given to the role of biblical wisdom in contemporary 
moral theology has increased in recent times, but is still relatively thin especially 
when compared to focus given to other parts of Scripture. The previously cited 
Biblical Commission’s The Bible and Morality is a reasonable illustration of this. In 
its second chapter which focusses on the Hebrew Scriptures and “the norms of 
human conduct,” the wisdom books are treated as somewhat of a footnote (covered 
in §39-40) to the broader discussion which itself is centred on the covenantal 
                                                 
20 Cyril S. Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land: Studies in Old Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2001), 277. 
21 ST, II-II, 56.1 ad 3. 
22 Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life: An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature, 3rd ed. (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), 15. 
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relationship between God and humanity (§14-38).23 Further, the sections referring to 
the wisdom books use Qoheleth and Ben Sira as their illustrative sources and 
Proverbs is given only a passing comment. 24  This is so because the Biblical 
Commission’s document, as with many other examinations of Old Testament 
morality, tends to focus on the covenantal expressions of the Torah and the prophetic 
traditions which back them up. Proverbs, in this regard, struggles to have a natural 
influence as it has very little reference to Israel’s national or cultic traditions.25 
Nevertheless, theological focus on Proverbs and related material has certainly 
increased in recent times. For example, Richard Clifford opened his Book of 
Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom with a discussion on the lack of regard for 
Proverbs,26 but within a decade of its publication most major scholarly commentaries 
had published significant works (or reworkings) on Proverbs.27 In addition, over the 
same period “an embarrassment of riches” of articles and monographs on the wisdom 
genre including Proverbs has emerged.28  
With renewed interest in Wisdom literature in general and Proverbs in particular, 
there has naturally been a greater focus on the moral framework therein. As will be 
noted throughout this thesis, much scholarship has identified Proverbial wisdom with 
‘practical wisdom’ which itself is akin to prudence as it is understood in the 
Thomistic virtue tradition. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little explicit 
exploration of this notion. There are some notable exceptions to this that, though not 
                                                 
23 Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality, Part 1, Ch. 2, §14-40. 
24 It should be pointed out that, by its own admission, the Biblical Commission had no intention of 
presenting a complete biblical moral theology (Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and 
Morality, §3.), and where specific criteria are referred to, they are “representative rather than 
exhaustive” (p. 9). Nevertheless, it does illustrate how a significant discussion on biblical moral 
theology can be had with little reference to wisdom literature in general and to Proverbs in particular. 
25 An introduction to this is articulated in Tomas Frydrych, Living Under the Sun: Examination of 
Proverbs and Qoheleth (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1-3. See 1.2.3 and 2.2.2 below for fuller discussion. 
26 Richard J. Clifford, Book of Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1995), 1-2. 
27 For example: Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs: Introdction, Commentary and 
Reflections," in The New Interpreter's Bible (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997); Michael V. Fox, 
Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, vol. 18A  
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, vol. 18B  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009).  Catholic scholars responsible for reputed commentaries include Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs: 
A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999); Roland E. Murphy, Proverbs, Word 
Biblical Commentary, vol. v. 22  (Dallas: Word Books, 1998).  Such works are obviously invaluable 
to this present study and will be frequently drawn upon. 
28 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2010), 2. Crenshaw provides a comprehensive list of contemporary scholarship on biblical 
wisdom; Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 1-3. See also R. N. Whybray, The Book of Proverbs: A 
Survey of Modern Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). 
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addressing prudence in the context of the Thomistic tradition explicitly, comes close 
to doing so or at least approaches Proverbs from a perspective that allows for direct 
correlation with the Thomistic notion of prudence. Two works of note are the already 
cited William Brown’s Character in Crisis, which sees the moral dimension of 
Proverbs being essentially “a book of virtues” intent on forming the character of the 
young in particular,29 and Ellen F. Davis who draws a direct dialogue between the 
work of Proverbs and the virtue of prudence as expressed in Thomistic thought.30  
Davis’ work, though not extensive, bears the most correlation to the study presented 
here. In her essay she articulates the resurgence of virtue-based moral thought, its 
value to theological deliberation in general and, most notably, the value in drawing a 
virtue-based morality from the book of Proverbs in particular.31 In so doing, Davis 
notes the virtues of prudence and temperance are those given the most attention in 
the book of Proverbs,32 and it is the former that is due particular attention due to the 
conceptual relationship discernible between the ‘wise one’ of Proverbs and the virtue 
of prudence (and their opposite vice of folly). Davis, albeit briefly, expounds on this 
notion and draws some particular references and understandings from Proverbs that 
express notions of prudence as found in the Thomistic moral tradition. Various 
notions are touched on including an understanding of prudence that moves beyond 
‘self-referential care’, as well as classical notions of docilitas and sollicitudo.33 These 
later notions are taken directly from Thomistic thought and are identified as key 
elements of developing true cognisance of reality, what can be termed ‘truthful 
vision’34 and, thus, prudential living.  
Similarly, the regard for ‘truthful vision’ or ‘seeing reality rightly’ is the heart of 
Davis’ deliberations suggesting that the moral life is built on an ability to 
comprehend and participate in the created order as has been laid down by God and 
which is perceptible in creation itself. She does so by drawing on various parts of 
                                                 
29 Brown, Character in Crisis, 22-49. 
30  Ellen F. Davis, "Preserving Virtues: Renewing the Tradition of the Sages," in Character & 
Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002). 
31 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 183-189. 
32 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 186-187. 
33 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 190-192. 
34 A term drawn from Paul J. Wadell’s Becoming Friends: Worship, Justice, and the Practice of 
Christian Friendship (Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing, 2002), 120-130. It pertains to seeing reality 




Proverbs, but most specifically on the cosmological expressions of 3:19-26 and in the 
words of ‘Woman Wisdom’ in chapter 8. Davis notes, for example, that “Virtue … 
entails seeing ourselves as part of the pattern that God has woven into creation, and 
valuing ourselves accordingly.” 35  Thus, the teaching of Proverbs includes 
encouraging the reader to properly grasp the majestic reality of creation and to 
prudently act (in the particular circumstances of the day) in accordance with such 
vision. According to Davis, this has direct correlation to the classical understanding 
of prudence stating that “prudence means investing ourselves properly in creation, 
making decisions that demonstrate steady reflection on what God has done.” 36 
Conversely, citing Proverbs 14:8, Davis notes that the heart of folly is deception.37 
Deception, or more specifically a poor grasp of reality in its broadest sense, is the 
heart of imprudence in particular and immorality in general. Similarly, Aquinas 
states the danger of ‘false prudence’ which is evident “when the purpose of reason is 
directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance … or in order to 
obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but 
fictitious and counterfeit.”38 Thus, according to both Proverbs and Aquinas, though 
one may have certain skills or abilities akin to prudence, such as shrewdness 
(astutia), unless one is able to hold ‘right vision’ of both the ends and the particulars 
of given circumstances, then one’s character is prone to fall to folly rather than 
prudence and thus to sin rather than to the healthy moral life. This notion will be 
revisited more closely later, particularly in section 3.1, but it is worth noting that 
Davis provides some key themes that will be taken up below. 
Stepping away from prudence specifically, mention should also be made of studies in 
the linking of proverbs with virtue-based morality more broadly. In this regard, 
Christopher B. Ansberry recently published article is of significant value.39 Ansberry 
references recent scholarship in virtue-based approaches to interpreting proverbs,40 
but draws special attention to virtue-based ethics in the Greek moral tradition and 
particularly as expressed by Aristotle. Ansberry does so by first examining a key 
                                                 
35 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 197. 
36 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 198. 
37 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 200. 
38 ST, II-II, 55.3.  
39 Christopher B. Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens? The moral vision of the 
book of Proverbs and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics," Hebrew Studies 51, no. (2010). 
40 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 157, fn. 2. 
16 
 
work in this field produced by Michael V. Fox.41 Fox notes a correlation between 
Platonic moral concepts and that expressed in Proverbs on three levels; 1) virtue is 
knowledge, 2) no one does wrong willingly, and 3) all virtues are one.42 Ansberry, 
however, notes that a more fruitful hermeneutical approach is found in drawing 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics into dialogue with the writings of Proverbs.43 The 
heart of Ansberry’s article asks the question concerning the degree to which 
Aristotle’s approach to ethics compares with the ethics of Proverbs.44 The outcome 
of which is that “Nicomachean Ethics serves as a useful heuristic guide for 
understanding the moral vision of Proverbs. Similar to Aristotle’s ethical theory, 
character and intellect are fundamental to the ethical vision of Proverbs.” 45 
Moreover, Ansberry notes that, unlike Fox’s use of Plato who equates knowledge to 
virtue, 46  Aristotle articulates that the morally sound person needs more than 
‘knowledge of the good’ in and of itself. As Ansberry states it, Aristotle emphasises 
an: 
Organic relationship between moral and intellectual virtues … Virtue is 
an activity that includes a person’s moral and intellectual capacities: 
moral virtue identifies the goal, while practical wisdom determines the 
means for achieving the goal of virtuous activity in a particular 
situation.47   
Similarly, Ansberry notes, Proverbs articulates that the acquisition of wisdom (as 
knowledge) is a pre-condition for virtue, but must be accompanied by a ‘virtuous 
disposition’.48 The finer detail of Ansberry’s study is not taken up at this point, but it 
is an important essay on two accounts. Firstly, though Ansberry does not tackle 
Thomistic prudence in particular, the reliance of Aquinas on Aristotle in building his 
moral framework provides for relevant material for the proposed study. Secondly, the 
heuristic model of comparing Aristotelian virtue-based ethics to Proverbs provides a 
valuable methodological insight for the current study of comparing Thomistic virtue 
                                                 
41 Michael V. Fox, "Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs," Hebrew Studies 48, no. (2007): 75-
88; Proverbs 10-31, 934-945.  
42 Fox, "Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs," 75. 
43 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 159-166. 
44 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 166. 
45 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 172. 
46 Fox, "Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs," 77-78. Cf. Plato, Protogoras, 352c-355d 
47 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 159. What Ansberry translates as 
‘practical wisdom’ is more typically translated as prudence (from phronesis) based on his references 
to NE, 1142b33; 1144a7–9; 1144b15–18.  
48 Ansberry, "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?," 161. 
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of prudence with Proverbs. In simple terms, whereas Ansberry asks the question of 
the degree to which Aristotle’s approach to ethics compares with the moral theology 
of Proverbs, this thesis will be asking the question of the degree to which the 
Thomistic virtue of prudence and the underlying moral framework compares with 
that of Proverbs.  
Given that, and returning to the starting point of this section, this comparative 
relationship between the wisdom of Proverbs and the virtue of prudence, as indicated 
above, hopes to provide a viable outworking (among many) on how Sacred Scripture 
might nourish moral theology, but it also helps build a bridge between earlier 
Thomistic thought that many have felt needed abandoning in the Post-Vatican II 
environment and scripturally nourished moral thought that has been encouraged 
since. There are a number of reasons why this has occurred at least in some circles. 
Most notable among them has been suspicion of the centrality placed in the role of 
natural law in Thomistic moral theology. More specifically, the particular 
understandings of natural law that has tended to marginalise the virtues on the one 
hand while exaggerating the notion of voluntarism and divine command theory (and 
a subsequent overemphasis on precepts and moral laws) on the other has tended to 
dominate such concerns. Further, there has been another level of suspicion of moral 
deliberation in the Thomistic tradition particularly in a theological context, that being 
that it leaves little room for particular Christian notions including, for example, the 
role of grace and revelation. These concerns, as will be demonstrated, are unfounded 
and are taken up presently. Doing so also opens up an overarching comparative 
framework between the virtue of prudence and the teachings of Proverbs (interpreted 





1.2 The Virtues in the Thomistic Tradition and a Comparative Look 
at Biblical Wisdom 
1.2.1 The Backdrop to Virtues: The Premise of Natural Law and 
Providential Creation 
The aim of this section is to be able to identify the broad framework in which the 
virtue of prudence sits. To do so we need to trace, albeit briefly, the context, that 
being the notion of natural law, within which the notion of virtues in the Thomistic 
tradition sits. As will become apparent, this is not only useful for understanding 
prudence in itself, but gives a comparative basis for the teaching of Proverbs; both its 
cosmological and anthropological foundation on which right living and wisdom is 
based.  
As alluded to above, in the post-Vatican II era, there was a sense that Thomistic 
moral thought, built primarily on a particular scholastic notion of natural law, needed 
to be abandoned if one was to engage fully with the broader resource of Christian 
revelation and speak intelligibly to our contemporary times. It is for this reason when 
entering into a discussion on moral matters that includes natural law, particularly that 
shaped by a Thomistic heritage, one needs to offer some clarification. Primarily this 
is so because there has been a shifting understanding of natural law theory built on 
the Thomistic tradition over time and, on this basis alone, one needs to explicate 
what one means by natural law theory – what are the main tenets one is holding 
when engaging with the notion.  This ‘shifting understanding’ is chiefly so because 
there has been a highly refined engagement with Aquinas’s notion of natural law 
developed through the scholastic period and then the enlightenment period and, in 
many circles, a subsequent rejection of such notions on many counts. This rejection, 
as scholars such as Porter would suggest, is based on a limited utilisation and, at 
times, a misreading of Aquinas’s concept of natural law such that, for many, it has 
become a rather suspicious notion.49 Typical of these suspicions is the idea that there 
                                                 
49 Porter traces the development of natural law theory through the pre-medieval period and beyond in 
a number of works. Particularly useful is Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the 
Tradtion for Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Novalis, 1999), 29-61; Nature as Reason: A Thomistic 
Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2005), 1-52. Another 
useful resource that informs this research is Craig A. Boyd, A Shared Morality: A Narrative Defense 
of Natural Law Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Publishing Group, 2007). Boyd traces the 
development and various guises of natural law theory from its pre-Christian origins through the 
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is a universal, ubiquitous and essentially unchanging notion of human nature from 
which the conception of the moral good can be derived. This rigid notion of the 
human person in the abstract sense with little or no reference to the dynamism of the 
person in history and in culture is one that concerns many moral theorists, 
theological and otherwise.50 Further, in a specifically Christian context, Porter also 
highlights the issue that many have with this ‘traditional’ reading of natural law 
theory that leaves little room for key Christian notions, this critique is found most 
prominently in the post-reformation Protestant tradition which “tended to view the 
doctrine of the natural law as an expression of human pride, an effort to establish 
human righteousness apart from God’s law and God’s grace.”51  
Porter refers to Karl Barth’s strong position on such but also to more recent thinkers 
such as Stanley Hauerwas.52 The latter provides a particularly noteworthy perspective 
on the ‘rejection’ of Thomistic natural law theory. As Boyd discusses, Hauerwas’ 
critique of natural law is not based on the theory in its entirety or on Aquinas’s 
formation of it but, rather, on “its Enlightenment (post-Grotius) manifestations.”53 
More specifically, Hauerwas’ critique is based primarily on two notions, firstly that 
morality must be understood within the particularity of the communities in which 
people live and the virtues they aspire to rather than precepts based on a universal 
rationality typical of Enlightenment thinking. Secondly, that if natural law is truly 
universal and a self-sufficient theory of morality, then it leaves no room for 
particular notions of grace.54 The fear being that if we understand natural law to be 
entirely discernible through the power of human reason then morality, so developed, 
becomes an exercise bereft from any theological position properly speaking. 
                                                                                                                                          
Catholic Scholastic development of the theory to the contemporary philosophical responses, Boyd, A 
Shared Morality, 35-77. 
50 Clifford Kossell, for example, when discussing this and other objections notes the works in Robert 
Geroge, ed. Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Claridon, 1992); cited in Clifford G. 
Kossel, "Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90-97)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. 
Pope (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 169-193, see n.18. 
51 Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 30.     
52 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: Notre Dame 
Press, 1983), 50-71. 
53 Boyd, A Shared Morality, 235. 
54 Boyd’s response is to highlight that, though natural law theory necessarily acknowledges that there 
are some ‘goods’ (including virtues in the Thomistic tradition) that transcend particular social 
contexts, this does not preclude particular peoples constructing narratives in different ways 
appropriate to their history that, nonetheless, embody such universal virtues in particular frameworks. 
Boyd, A Shared Morality, 239. As such, there is room for the particular Christian narrative to be 
included in an understanding of the natural law. This is essentially what Aquinas did and what this 
project, at least in part, seeks to unpack. 
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Moreover, and for Barth this was particularly so, such a position is untenable as it is 
hubris to suggest that our human capacity to reason is sufficient without revelation or 
grace to recognise the truly good which only God knows. It is this approach that sees 
moral philosophy as a self-contained human enterprise that is Barth’s (and thinkers 
that follow him) primary concern.55 
It is useful for this project to deal with the latter point here. Though some approaches 
to natural law (and speculation on moral matters more broadly) based on Aquinas 
have developed, by certain counts, as an exercise dominated by practical reasoning in 
and of itself apart from any theological context,56 it is erroneous to suggest that it is, 
firstly, necessarily the case and, secondly, the position held by Aquinas in his 
construal of morality and natural law. It is true that Aquinas holds that the ‘law of 
nature’ cannot be removed from the human person, and this is so because it is 
intrinsic to the very created being of humanity itself.57 However, he still holds that 
sin impacts the human person in the “particular action, in so far as reason is hindered 
from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of 
concupiscence or some other passion.” 58  Further, “because human nature is not 
altogether corrupted by sin” the person can do some good, however “it cannot do all 
the good natural to it.”59 As Aquinas goes on to say, “thus in the state of perfect 
nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength.” 60  As 
McInerny simply puts it, in Thomistic thought, “Grace builds on nature, but without 
grace nature’s ability to attain its end is severely impaired.”61 A fuller discussion on 
                                                 
55  Barth’s particular critique of natural law is found most prominently in Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, trans., G.T. Thomson, vol. II  (New York: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 528-535. However, as 
Porter notes, Barth critiques natural theology broadly speaking throughout his writings. For Porter’s 
discussion of Barth’s position see Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 168-172. 
56 An example in contemporary times is Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law: An 
Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), esp. 116-138. Lisska stresses that Aquinas 
distinguishes between a eudaimonic vision that can be attained in heaven which necessarily requires 
God’s grace from that which can be attained in this life; with the natural law pertaining entirely to the 
latter. This bifurcation of grace and natural law allows Lisska (and others) to see theological 
dimensions as secondary and dispensable in determining what is human nature and, thus, the good that 
serves it. For a brief discussion on this issue regarding Lisska see John I. Jenkins, review of Aquinas's 
Theory of Natural Law: An Analytical Reconstruction by Anthony J. Lisska, The Journal of Religion 
78, no. 2 (1998). 
57 ST, I-II, 94.6. 
58 ST, I-II, 94.6. 
59 ST, I-II, 109.2. 
60 ST, I-II, 109.2. 
61  Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Rev. ed. ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 68.  
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the engagement between grace and nature will be had below,62 but suffice to say here 
that moral theology within the Thomistic tradition certainly holds an elevated vision 
of nature when compared to Barth, but not to the extent that the full expression of the 
human good and moral speculation that aids it necessarily excludes God’s grace.63 
Given that, rather than seeing human nature apart from any theological context and 
deriving the notion of the moral from that philosophical standpoint on the one hand, 
or reverting to an entirely theistic image of the good on the other (leading to a rigid 
divine command theory for example), it is more useful to hold a correlative image of 
how theology relates to the understanding of nature that underpins Thomistic natural 
law. As Porter argues, it is this which characterised the scholastic approach to moral 
enquiry, an approach that was able to understand the possible overlap of Christian 
and secular morality without collapsing one into the other and, moreover, still remain 
fundamentally theological. As she notes, the idea that a sound theological account of 
morality will necessarily be a distinctively or uniquely Christian form of morality:  
Has often been confused as if distinctiveness and theological soundness 
come to one and the same thing. They do not. It is true that the scholastic 
concept of the natural law implies continuities and areas of overlap 
between Christian morality and different forms of secular morality. Yet it 
does so precisely on theological grounds, including a commitment to the 
doctrine of creation and correlatively an insistence on the essential unity 
of revelation in the two Testaments. It is difficult to see how someone 
could argue for the uniqueness of Christian ethics without falling into 
corresponding theological errors: that is, failing to take the doctrine of 
the creation with full seriousness and truncating the scriptural witness to 
God as the one who creates and sustains the natural world.64 
Similarly, Leo Elders when discussing the link between philosophical enquiry and 
theology notes that in Thomistic thought, “faith is non-evident knowledge which 
uses concepts of the natural order to signify supernatural realities. This is possible, 
for there is an analogy between both orders, because God is the author of both.”65 
                                                 
62 See 4.2 below, also 2.2.4. 
63 For a recent discussion on the importance of grace in Aquinas’s moral theology see Wm. Carter 
Aikin, Moved by God to Act: An Ecumenical Ethic of Grace in Community (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2014), 165-183. 
64 Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 166. Later in the same work Porter notes: “the theological concept 
of the natural law included the integrity and the revealed status of Scripture, and more particularly the 
Old Testament, which witnesses to God’s work as Creator and provident Sustainer of the visible 
world.” Natural and Divine Law, 305. 
65 L. Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), viii, n. 3. 
See also pp. 17-24 for broader discussion on this topic. 
22 
 
This analogous relationship between the natural order allows us to speak intelligibly 
about and from within our nature while also holding a thoroughly theological notion 
of the human moral good. 
With that in mind, a certain framework of understanding nature (of human and 
creation as a whole) and its relationship to right reason becomes apparent. One is 
able to come to some sense of the moral right in keeping with human nature through 
reflection on created realities and with the power of reason. However, this is only 
possible if one is able to hold the telos of the human with God on the one hand and 
also recognise that the goodness which serves that end is discernible in the created 
world precisely because the notion of divine wisdom runs through it.  
1.2.2 Morality in the Thomistic Tradition: The Place of the Virtues and 
Prudence 
Touching on the notion of natural law sets the scene in a broad sense, but there is 
another common understanding of Thomistic thought that is worth examination to 
help understand the moral framework in which this thesis is working. As stated 
above, from the Renaissance until the middle of the 20th century, moral legalism 
predominated in both reformed and Roman Catholic moral theology. Catholic moral 
thought in particular employed a notion of natural law of sorts, but did so in such a 
manner that tended to sideline the place of the virtues in the fuller sense that modern 
scholarship has revisited (not to suggest that the virtues were sidelined all together, 
many Catholic scholars and particularly some religious orders maintained an ongoing 
and vibrant focus on the virtues).66 Reference has already been made to the concerns 
of the likes of Barth who see natural law as essentially marginalising theological 
matters. However, there is another movement related to Thomistic thought, that 
being voluntarism, that is worth reflecting on particularly as it forms a contrast to the 
virtue-based morality which concerns this thesis. 
The virtue-based morality that this thesis considers sits on the retrieval of an 
alternative convention to simple obedience to precepts in the categorical sense which 
became highly influential, in part at least, due to the significant contribution of the 
voluntarists during the late scholastic period. Among them is Francisco Suarez 
                                                 
66 As pointed out by Thomas O’Meara in his survey discussion in "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas," Theological Studies 58, no. 2 (1997): 254-258. 
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whose work in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came to influence the later 
course of moral theology significantly.67 Though Suarez did place an emphasis on 
the place of God in relation to the created order and acknowledges the place of the 
virtues in a certain sense, he did so in a manner that shifted the emphasis particularly 
to the role of the will as opposed to intellect within the conception of the moral good 
of rational creatures.  
To briefly expound this notion, I will follow the work of Thomas Hibbs who unpacks 
Aquinas’s teaching by comparing it to moral thinkers who followed, in particular 
Francisco Suarez and, to a lesser degree, Immanuel Kant.68  In doing so, what is 
illuminated is a moderated concept of moral obligation than that expressed by 
Aquinas. As Hibbs states, “Throughout his writings, Thomas subordinates the 
questions of duty to the questions of ends perfective of and naturally pursued by 
human beings.”69 Hibbs proposes that this is discomforting to Suarez who suggests 
that theory of moral obligation is necessary to conceiving the morally sound life, 
something essentially not present in Aquinas’s work.  
Suarez in a voluntarist mode (based on De Legibus, II, VI) suggests that one can 
have knowledge of a precept that is natural and good, but its obligation to obey can 
only derive in God’s will apart from any natural conception. As such Suarez makes a 
distinction between the knowledge of the good and the source of obligation, 
suggesting that judgement of reason regarding the good does not impose obligation.70 
Hibbs suggests that Suarez has Aquinas’s view in mind, for “Aquinas held that this 
judgment [of reason, imperium rationis] was a sufficient basis for the imposition of 
an obligation. Suarez thinks it insufficient.”71  It is insufficient for Suarez because 
commending an action, which the intellect can grasp in the natural, is not the same as 
commanding to action. Moreover, Hibbs states that: 
Suarez couples his analysis of command with the supposition that an 
obligation has some sort of efficacious force attached to it. In contrast to 
                                                 
67 Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, 226. Mahoney’s discussion on ‘The Language of Law’ 
provides valuable background to the discussion being had here in Mahoney, The Making of Moral 
Theology, 224-258.  
68  Thomas S. Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence and the Human Good (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001). 
69 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 65. 
70 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 67, citing Suarez, De Legibus, II, VI, 6. 
71 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor. 
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Thomas, who conceives of action primarily in terms of the final cause, 
Suarez construes human action in terms of efficient causality.72  
To illustrate the point, we can suggest that the command theory of Suarez and, by 
certain extension, the deontological Kantian categorical imperative that would 
develop later, works in compelling the person by pushing them towards a good, 
while Aquinas, who holds no distinction between the obligatory and the good, sees 
the teleological image of the good as the final cause which pulls the agent towards 
right action. One is drawn to good (and thus to right action) by an internal disposition 
towards the good and for the perfective of the agent. This approach to morality is 
important to hold as Proverbs similarly does not seem to rest on command to action 
on God’s behalf, but a recognition of the good (both in a theological and natural 
sense, a notion that will be analysed later in this project) which the agent is called to 
respond to. 
Returning to Aquinas, he posits such a position based on a key feature of his 
conception of natural law which sets the metaphysical and anthropological 
foundation for his position. Aquinas famously remarked that the “natural law is a 
participation of the eternal law.”73 As Hibbs notes, this notion is itself Augustinian in 
origin74 where he argues that “the eternal law is the rational pattern in the divine 
mind of all created things.”75 Further, the eternal law, according to Aquinas, is the 
locus of divine providence:  
Granted that divine providence rules the world, … it follows that divine 
reason governs the entire community of the universe. The pattern itself of 
the governance of things, which exists in the divine mind as in the source 
of the universe, has the nature of law.76 
This providential law is described as “the pattern of divine wisdom, as moving all 
things to their appropriate ends, has the nature of law.”77 However, as Hibbs states, 
divine causality does not erase or supplant secondary causality. Rather,  
                                                 
72 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 68. 
73 ST, I-II, 91.2. 
74 Though due credit should be given to the long tradition of referring to Romans 2:14 as a scriptural 
source of natural law theory. See Porter, Nature as Reason, 3-4ff. See also fn. 103 below. 
75 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 69. 
76 ST, I-II, 93.1. 
77 ST, I-II, 93.1. 
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God moves creatures by creating them and by endowing them with 
inclinations to ends congruent with their nature: “All things participate 
somewhat in the natural law, insofar as from its impression they receive 
inclinations to appropriate acts or ends.”78 
As such, in the Thomistic framework, natural law is not construed in a propositional 
or deontological sense; rather, it is defined in terms of natures and inclinations. These 
inclinations provide at least some trustworthiness in determining the good because, 
fundamentally, creation itself and persons as rational creatures have been created by 
God (the Good) with the good as its proper end.79  
However, as Porter’s reflection on the same passage from the Summa Theologiae (I-
II, 91.2) illustrates, natural inclinations in themselves are not enough, the notion 
simply lays the ground work, as it were, of a fuller understanding of how and why 
the human person can live the moral life in the broadest sense. As Porter states:  
As this passage indicates, the claim that the natural law represents the 
distinctively human mode of participation in the eternal law implies that 
it is also an expression of the principles of action, or the natural 
inclinations, proper to the human person. However, these must be 
pursued in a properly human fashion: that is, in accordance with reason 
or virtue.80 
In Porter’s later work, Nature and Reason, she notes that human persons as rational 
creatures have a particular expression of natural inclination that is mirrored in the 
providential nature of God himself,81 i.e. it is not determinate as it is for non-rational 
creatures. As Porter states, inclinations of the human person:  
Can be expressed in ways that undermine the agent’s attainment of her 
good, as well as in ways that promote it. If the inclinations are to function 
in such a way as to promote the agent’s true good, they must be directed 
by appropriate dispositions toward action – and that is precisely what the 
virtues are.82 
                                                 
78 Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 69. Citing ST, I-II, 91.2. 
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80 Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 164. 
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Importantly for our purposes it is prudence that has a particular place in respect to 
this. As Keenan states it, “prudence functions to perfect a person’s natural 
inclinations through integrating them into a coordinated way of acting and living in a 
right manner.”83  
How this is achieved within the particular virtue of prudence will be unpacked 
below. However, what is important to note here is that the virtues, and the virtue of 
prudence in particular, provide a bridging of a cosmological concept of order that 
underpins Thomistic morality, captured in the notion of natural law as discussed to 
this point, with the anthropological context of moral reasoning as persons experience 
it. Prudence relates to the whole life of a person and, exercised well, recognises the 
true nature of creation and the ends which humans are naturally inclined. As Aquinas 
states, “prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and 
the end of human life.”84 Prudence recognises the end that is the moral good to be 
achieved, but, more importantly, brings that end to realization through virtuous 
activity within the lived reality of the moral agent. In this sense prudence as a virtue, 
simply put, is the virtue by which the other virtues can be acquired and exercised as 
virtues. It is in this vein that prudence is often placed as the first of the four 
classically defined cardinal virtues. As Pieper in his eminent work on virtues notes, 
the primary place of prudence among the virtues is no accident as “prudence is the 
cause of the other virtues’ being virtues at all. For example, there may be a kind of 
instinctive governance of instinctual cravings; but only prudence transforms this 
instinctive governance into the “virtue” of temperance.”85  
As such, when discussing the virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition at least, in 
the background sits a conception of the created order within which the virtues 
necessarily operate.86 Indeed, the heart of the virtue of prudence and its chief feature 
                                                                                                                                          
the virtues as they relate to ‘character’ of the human person more broadly speaking which is more in 
keeping with our biblical theological focus that follows.  
83 James F. Keenan, "The Virtue of Prudence (IIa IIae, qq. 49-70)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 259. Or in the words of Aquinas 
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I-II, 65.1, ad1 (Blackfriars translation). 
84 ST, I-II, 57.4.  
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Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 6. 
86 Keenan articulates a similar approach stating, “prudence is very much in the background of the 
relationship between natural law and virtue. As the principles of prudence are the ends of the moral 
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lies in recognising the truth of things such that one can recognise how the virtuous 
life might rightly operate. Pieper notes: 
The intrinsic goodness of man – and that is the same as saying his true 
humanness – consists in this, that “reason perfected in the cognition of 
truth” shall inwardly shape and imprint his volition and action. In this 
fundamental principle of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole 
doctrine of prudence.87 
More importantly, as Pieper goes on to state, this notion of ‘reason’ being perfected 
in the cognition of truth is all encompassing, not simply an intellectual apprehension 
in its most simplest form (though it would include that). Rather, “‘Reason’ means to 
[Aquinas] nothing other than ‘regard for the openness to reality,’ and ‘acceptance of 
reality.’ And ‘truth’ is to him nothing other than the unveiling and revelation of 
reality, of both natural and supernatural reality.”88 
As can be seen then, though we might begin building an understanding of Thomistic 
morality with a broad understanding of natural law, its outworking need not be in the 
form akin to  Kantian moral law simply speaking nor limited to voluntarist 
precept/command theory that can and has been its outworking. The place of virtues 
and prudence in particular becomes apparent and vital in engaging a fuller vision of 
realising the good in this sense. In this vein the image of natural law need not 
necessarily be bound to precept and command alone but, also, the context within 
which the formation of character is found. As noted above, character-based morality 
is based on the formation of the person as a whole. Drawing from the above 
discussion, and understanding moral formation in a Thomistic sense, such formation 
becomes one where character is formed in the acquiring of prudence which itself 
rests on experiencing and engaging with created reality in its fullest form. 
Holding this approach provides an entryway in how wisdom in Proverbs and the 
Thomistic virtue of prudence can find correlative discourse on a fundamental level. 
As will be discussed in the following section, this understanding of providential 
creation that underpins a notion of natural law can also be found, in a certain sense at 
least, in the wisdom literature including Proverbs. Also found therein is a 
                                                                                                                                          
virtue, so the principles of natural law are the ends of our natural inclinations.” Keenan, "The Virtue 
of Prudence," 261. 
87 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 8. 
88 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 9. 
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commitment to the formation of the virtuous character in concert with this sense of 
providence and created order. William Brown makes the point in the introductory 
sections of his examination of the wisdom literature: 
The role of perception in the definition of character cannot be 
overemphasized, for the subject matter of character is in essence the self 
in relation, in relation to the perceived world, including God, and to the 
history and pattern of one’s choices. The particular orientation espoused 
by the ancient sages involved nothing less than perceiving the world from 
the perspective of all things subject to and ordered by God’s will, be it 
discernible or inscrutable. … It is in appropriating and embodying truth 
rather than simply apprehending it, that creation functioned for the 
ancient sages. Specific creation texts of wisdom literature (e.g. Prov 
8:22-31; Eccl 1:2-11; Job 38-41) are constructed in such a way so as to 
(re)construct the reader’s perception of the world and God in accord with 
certain values, perspectives, and principles, the stuff of ethical 
character.89 
This correlation will be more fully fleshed out in the following. However, at this 
stage what can be held is that natural law, as a conceptual expression of God’s 
creation and providence, provides a framework in which the formation of the human 
person towards the good can be couched and, importantly, it is something achievable 
within the experience of being human. 90  This is important because, as will be 
discussed below, the experience of being human and our relationship to creation is 
the dimension in which the book of Proverbs sits. As such, moral compulsion in 
Proverbs (and the rest of the wisdom literature) is not necessarily found in ‘divine 
command’ typical of much of the rest of the Old Testament. Often moral authority in 
the Hebrew Scriptures is found in special revelation in a Yahwistic sense and is 
typically precept-based or at least interpreted that way. Certainly, if we are to lean on 
a mode of understanding natural law that is voluntarist and deontological in nature, 
then Scripture is limited to supplying the details of ‘the commands’ of moral 
obligation. In contrast, the wisdom literature tends to have very little reference to 
moral obligation being found in that sense. It is with this in mind that we turn to 
                                                 
89 Brown, Character in Crisis, 7-8. 
90 As already noted above, ‘being human’ in this sense is not a non-theological concept because it 
necessarily involves a participation in God’s creation. As Hibbs notes, “Thomas is careful to rule out 
the possibility of any creature creating autonomously. Strictly speaking, no creature creates at all, for 
we always presuppose something in our making. Yet Thomas speaks of stages of salvation history as 
creation, fall, and recreation. Although we could not have had anything to do with our initial creation, 
we can cooperate with God in our re-creation and in the providential re-creation of the natural order.” 
Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 24.  
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Proverbs and the wisdom literature tradition and examine a correlative understanding 
of how notions as discussed above might be found. 
 
1.2.3 Theological Backdrop to Biblical Wisdom and its Relationship to 
Creation 
This understanding of natural law built on the natural order of creation that is 
theologically informed has important correlative significance in our examination of 
the biblical wisdom and the book of Proverbs in particular. This will be unpacked 
more as this work unfolds, but is useful to touch on it here to help set the scene of 
what is to come. Just as moral thinkers using certain aspects of Thomistic teachings 
of virtues and natural law have led to an overemphasis of the capacity of the human 
person to use reason to navigate the good apart from any theological concern (such 
as grace and creation mentioned above), the interpretation of the wisdom literature 
(including Proverbs) in modern scholarship has borne out a similar, though not 
identical, dichotomy. 
In short, there has been a reading of wisdom literature that sees it as inherently 
secular rather than revelatory and thus something of an invalid expression of 
Yahwistic faith that is proper to the Old Testament overall. Such an understanding is 
premised on a number of grounds, but significant among them is the understanding 
that the concerns of much of Proverbs and wisdom literature is in the day-to-day 
matters of the human person and, further, that the wisdom drawn therein can be 
detached from the rest of the Old Testament corpus and still remain intact, as it were, 
as a form of teaching. Moreover, within Proverbs there is very little reference to the 
revealed God found in the history of the people of Israel and the prophetic texts 
which attest to them. This has led to some considering the wisdom literature as a less 
than valid expression of Old Testament faith. Roland Murphy is one of many who 
have discussed this issue. As an example he refers to Horst Preuss as a “vigorous 
exponent of the theological illegitimacy of the Old Testament wisdom.” 91 Preuss’ 
view is built on the understanding that the older parts of the wisdom literature in 
particular (e.g. Prov 10-29) are essentially a foreign import with their focus being on 
                                                 
91  Murphy, The Tree of Life, 121., citing Horst D. Preuss, Einführung in die alttestamentliche 
Weisheitsliteratur, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1987). 
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the successful human life in itself apart from theistic concerns featured in the rest of 
the Scriptures. Preuss acknowledges that there is a divine image of sorts in the 
foreign influence within Proverbs, but it is not in keeping with the revealed Lord 
found in the rest of the Old Testament.  As Murphy describes it, “Preuss considers 
the religion in Prov 10ff. a form of “Polyyahwism,” a contaminated faith in a God 
different from the Lord that is revealed in the rest of the Old Testament.”92  
There is no doubting the foreign influence in the development of Proverbs and 
biblical wisdom literature overall. However, the conclusion typified by Preuss and 
others, that biblical wisdom literature is “strongly secular in flavour” and is only 
“loosely connected with religious faith”93 is only based on an interpretive approach 
which assumes that the only legitimate religious faith expressed in the Scripture (and 
the Old Testament in particular) is one that is revelatory in the Yahwist mode with 
the historical, prophetic and cultic narratives that go along with it. More recent 
responses to such issues in biblical theology has been to recognise a theological 
integrity of wisdom literature in its own right even if it does not hold to the 
revelatory mode in the same way as the rest of the Hebrew tradition. As such, there 
has been a revisiting of understanding wisdom as a theology within biblical 
scholarship in recent times.94  
Firstly, there is a recognition that it is only modern scholarly readings of wisdom 
literature that tend to see it as a distinct aspect of the Israelite experience from that 
found in the Old Testament overall. As Dell notes in regard to how Proverbs is 
perceived in particular: 
The function of the Proverbs is largely seen as education and moral 
formation; and wisdom is seen as an area clearly distinct from other 
concerns of Israelite life such as law, worship, prophecy and story-telling 
                                                 
92 Murphy, The Tree of Life. citing Preuss, Einführung, 60, 161 
93 Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans., J. A. Baker ( Philadelphia: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1967 [Ger. 1933]), 81ff. cited in Murphy, The Tree of Life, 121. See also Katharine 
Dell who similarly opens her work on the Social and Theological context of Proverbs examining the 
tendency in scholarship to stress the distinctive and marginal nature of biblical wisdom literature as a 
theological work. Katharine J. Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-17. She also focuses on Eichrodt as well others, 
Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 10-11. 
94 A useful discussion on the development of this topic is also had by Leo G. Perdue’s recent work 
Wisdom Literature: A Theological History (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 15-36. 
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… while this separation provides a helpful way of categorizing material, 
one wonders how far it was reality in the people’s lives.95 
Further, there has been a heightened focus on the more central place of creation 
theology “whereby historical and ahistorical elements of Israelite faith are being 
recognized,”96 the upshot being that wisdom found and experienced in created reality 
is neither an inherently secular notion nor an appendix to other more ‘legitimate’ 
faith expressions. As Murphy suggests, the wisdom experience is a faith experience 
in its own right, “the shaping of Israel’s views of the world, and of the activity of 
God behind and in it, was done in an ambience of faith, and was characterized by 
trust and reliance on God.”97 So it may well be the case that the teachings of wisdom 
are steeped in the experience of humanity in creation and are also found in the 
experience of those outside of the tradition inherited by Christians and Jews. 
However, there is a recognition that such teachings are not an adjunct to revelation 
but, rather, that they represent a form of revelation in itself – and as with all forms of 
revelation, they rightly call a response from the human person, a calling back to right 
relationship as it were, to the Revealed. Murphy goes on to state: 
Wisdom literature provides a biblical model for understanding divine 
revelation apart from the historical mode (salvation history) in which it is 
usually cast. We have portrayed the dialogue with divinity that takes 
placed essentially via human experience and creation. It is also clear that 
the issues of life and salvation emerge in this dialogue, and especially in 
the invitation of personified Wisdom (Prov 8:35). On this level the 
Israelite encountered the Lord in a vital faith relationship that is as valid 
as the liturgical experience in the Temple, or the Exodus event itself.98  
The question can be asked then, in the context of wisdom writing, in what vein does 
one respond to God revealed in created reality? What mode does it take particularly 
as it relates to moral theology? The most common approach one can make here is to 
                                                 
95 Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 6-7. Dell does acknowledge that 
there is a distinctiveness to the wisdom literature, but argues that the distinction has been overly 
stressed. Even in the earlier wisdom writings (including much of Proverbs) with its ‘secular’ roots, 
Dell argues, there are “seeds of integration” that are not always noticed. See The Book of Proverbs in 
Social and Theological Context, 125-154 for detailed analysis. 
96 Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 11. Examples of influential sources 
that have stimulated discussion on the integrated vision of wisdom and creation theology include 
Walther Zimmerli, "The Place and Limit of Wisdom in The Framework of the Old Testament 
Theology," in Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom, ed. James L. Crenshaw (New York: Ktav Pub. 
House, 1976); Gerhard Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (London: SCM Press, 1972), 62-73. 
97 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 125. 
98 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 126. 
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recognise the place of order within creation that underpins much of the wisdom 
literature but is particularly expressed in Proverbs. As with the notion of wisdom and 
theology discussed to this point, the place of order in relation to wisdom writings has 
not been a settled matter in scholarly circles. However, the general principle is built 
on a recognition that the wisdom enterprise, both in the Hebrew tradition and the 
non-biblical traditions that most likely influenced it, 99  seemed to be steeped in 
finding an ordering within creation (as laid out by God when a monotheistic mode is 
focused on) that, when properly recognised, provided the conduit onto which right 
(wise) living could be based. 
Many scholars have explored such understandings and some, such as the often cited 
Koch for example, interpret Proverbs in a very tight deed/consequence mode where 
God has established creation in such a way that retribution for 
wickedness/foolishness is mechanically accounted for without any further 
engagement on God’s behalf.100 However, most contemporary scholars point out that 
such a mechanistic reading of Proverbs is neither accurate nor in keeping with the 
wider biblical tradition. 101  As Dell states it, “The concept of order is a close 
companion to that of creation and can be held together with that doctrine as long as 
the concept does not become too deterministic.”102 In any case, the concept of order 
as an outworking of creation and the ability for human beings to recognise such order 
and act in keeping with it presents a fundamental plank in understanding the moral 
framework of wisdom and Proverbial wisdom in particular. More the point for our 
purposes, it is not hard to see, then, how such an understanding becomes close to the 
                                                 
99 Particularly the notion of ma’at found predominantly in Egyptian wisdom literature. Though it does 
not have a direct equivalent in the Hebrew, most argue that correlative expressions can be found in 
Proverbs. Ma’at does not translate easily but, as Brueggemann states, it rests on the principle “that 
man is meant for an orderly role in an orderly cosmos. His rightful destiny is to discern that order and 
find his responsible share in it. The order of life is characterized in wisdom in many ways. In Egypt it 
is ma’at. In Israel it may be called integrity (Prov. 10:9), instruction (10:17), fear of the Lord (10:27), 
righteousness (11:6), prudence (12:23), good sense (13:15), and it is referred to by many other terms.” 
Walter Brueggemann, In Man We Trust: The Neglected Side of Biblical Faith (Richmond, Va: John 
Knox Press, 1972), 22-23; Murphy, The Tree of Life, 115-116. See also fn. 212 below. 
100 Klaus Koch, "Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?," in Theodicy in the Old 
Testament, ed. James L. Crenshaw, Issues in Religion and Theology, vol. 4 (London: SPCK, 1983). 
101 For example, Murphy states, “Koch’s interpretation is in harmony with many biblical statements 
about retribution. But one must also recognize the biblical emphasis upon the reaction of God to 
human conduct … In most cases the biblical text does not leave room for a hypothetical reconstruction 
of a mechanical law of retribution.” The Tree of Life, 117. For a detailed study on this subject see also 
Lennart Boström, The God of the Sages: The Portrayal of God in the Book of Proverbs (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990), 90-140. 
102 Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 134. See also Leo G. Perdue, 
Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 46-48.  
33 
 
concept of natural law as discussed above. Indeed, certain scholars have gone as far 
as to recognise this within the wisdom writings and beyond. 
In a sense, this is nothing new. Though not always acknowledged, a close look at the 
natural law tradition does reveal that such thinking has long been informed by 
Scripture. Most notably, places such as Romans 1-2103 as well Genesis 1 have been 
used to affirm natural law from the Patristic through to its more formal development 
in the Scholastic periods and beyond.104 As Boyd in his discussion on the subject 
notes: 
For Christians, the Genesis narrative of creation provides an account of 
the goodness of creation, the importance of human beings in the cosmos, 
and most importantly the idea that the entire created order is the 
contingent creation of a loving and wise God. The creation narrative also 
demonstrates that God has established an order to the creation. While 
Genesis affirms the goodness and orderliness of creation, we find in the 
Epistle to the Romans not only a reiteration of the Genesis account of 
created natures, but also an epistemological affirmation concerning the 
universal accessibility of the natural law.105 
In our contemporary setting, Barr is one in particular who, in a very polemical style, 
makes the point that contrary to Barthian approach (as mentioned in the previous 
section), Scripture itself attests to a natural theology.106 Barr draws on Scripture as a 
whole in building his argument, however he does make a point on wisdom literature 
in particular that is worth noting. He states, for example, that: 
With the Wisdom literature we widen our scope, for we are no longer 
discussing the individual classic passages, long used as evidences for 
natural theology, but are turning to large bands of literature, and few will 
question that, within the Old Testament, the Wisdom literature is the area 
with the largest similarity to the procedures of natural theology.107 
                                                 
103 In particularly Rom. 1:20 and, as mentioned previously, Augustine’s use of Rom. 2:14-15 are key 
texts. ST, I-II, 91 & 93 are notable places where they are used by Aquinas. 
104 For extensive discussion on this see Jean Porter, "Natural Law as a Scriptural Concept: Theological 
Reflections on a Medieval Theme," Theology Today 59, no. 2 (2002); Natural and Divine Law, 121-
146.  
105 Boyd, A Shared Morality, 49. N.B. that both the cited Boyd and Porter use the word ‘affirm’ to 
describe the relationship between such texts and natural law theory. This is so because both are aware 
of the issue where natural law is seen as being read into the Scriptures. Such a caution is noted and 
discussed below. 
106 James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: The Gifford lectures for 1991, Delivered in the 
University of Edinburgh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). In particular 21-102.  
107 Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 91.  
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Of course, interpretations that expose a natural theology are not the same as natural 
law as understood in the Thomistic tradition, but they are closely related.108 Barr 
himself notes that “natural law is in some respects the gateway to into natural 
theology.” 109  However, there have been others who have been more willing to 
identify ethics based on natural law in the Scriptures and name them as such. John 
Barton is one in particular who, on a number of fronts, suggest that:  
Though obedience to God’s expressed will is no doubt present, it is not 
an exclusive view. Natural law, both in the weaker sense of moral 
principles supposed to be common to all men, and in the stronger sense 
of principles built into the structure of things, is also present.110 
More recently Levering is another who, drawing on Barton among others, holds that 
natural theology is a viable concept within biblical theology broadly speaking. 
However, he critiques Barton on one particular ground; that being the over emphasis 
on the anthropocentric outworking of natural law morality that Barton seems to hold. 
Levering is wary of reducing biblically informed natural law to an approach in which 
human-reasoned ethical deliberation is seen in opposition to revealed positive law.111 
In so doing, Levering’s critique helps to highlight the thesis being explored in this 
project. He identifies that achieving an authentically Christian understanding of 
natural law can be informed by scripture by holding in firm view the teleological 
notion found in wisdom literature – one that is built on an image of the Creator’s 
relationship to divine wisdom. Levering relies primarily on the Wisdom of Solomon 
to illustrate the point, and in referring to Wisdom 7:22-8:1 he notes:  
Personified wisdom thus fashions all things and ‘can do all things’ 
because she is ‘a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror of the 
working of God, and an image of his goodness’. Thanks to her, the 
created world that she ‘orders …well’ possesses an intelligible order 
toward its proper flourishing. … As Wisdom of Solomon states, God and 
God's personified wisdom make rationally accessible to human beings 
‘the structure of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning 
and end and middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the 
changes of the seasons, the cycles of the year and the constellations of 
                                                 
108 Porter makes this same point in reference to Barr in Natural and Divine Law, 167. 
109 Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 101. 
110 John Barton, "Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the Old Testament," Journal of Theological 
Studies 30, no. 1 (1979): 13. 
111 Matthew Levering, Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological Approach (Oxford; New 




the stars, the natures of animals and the tempers of wild beasts’ (Wisd. 
7:17–20). Human beings thus discern an intelligible ordering of each 
thing toward its proper flourishing.112 
Such reflections also apply to similar imagery found in Proverbs, particularly Prov 8. 
It points to the notion that there is an anthropological dimension to be had in the 
understanding of natural law, but it is one conceived in participating in created order 
by sharing in God’s wisdom, which itself is discernible because wisdom bears 
witness to the very creation we are in (Prov 8:27-31).113 This is also evidenced in 
Aquinas’s own writing where he cites Prov 8:23 as pointing to the existence of the 
‘eternal law’ 114  before unpacking the notion of natural law which, as discussed 
previously, is a participation in the eternal law. 
As will become apparent in the discussion that follows, the wisdom that persons are 
called to share in is prudential in nature. However, the point that is important to hold 
here is that there is a fundamental framework of the virtues as understood in the 
Thomistic tradition that is also apparent within the wisdom literature including 
within Proverbs. It is a correlation that rests on a view of created order which both 
points to the teleological good (that is the Creator God) and, in certain ways at least, 
is also able to reveal the means to that good as humans experience that same 
creation.  
A point should be made here on terminology and certain boundaries of understanding 
pertaining to natural law and the related notions of natural theology. Though authors 
such as Barton and Levering suggest that natural law is expressed throughout the 
Bible, it is unwise to categorise natural law as witnessed in the biblical literature as 
identical to that used by Aquinas and the moral tradition since. Rodd in his 
examination of Barton’s understanding of natural law poses the question, “is it 
rightly termed ‘natural law’, a concept with a distinguished pedigree in moral 
philosophy, drawing its inspiration form the work of Augustine and Aquinas, and 
reaching back into classical philosophy?”115 Rodd’s own response is that a classical 
                                                 
112 Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 63. 
113 Levering states: “By participating in God's wisdom, human beings are able to understand and do 
what is right. One cannot take this sharing in wisdom for granted; rather, given human tendency 
toward sin and idolatry, one must strive to share in God's wisdom, at whose heart is self‐dispossession 
or ecstasis.” Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 64. 
114 ST, I-II, 91.1. 
115 Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 63. 
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understanding of natural law, in particular its philosophical approach would be “far 
removed from anything which can be found in the Old Testament. The wisdom 
writers were not philosophers in the Greek and modern sense,”116 and though certain 
interpretations of the bible, particularly of the wisdom literature, can reveal elements 
akin to natural law, to describe it as such is “not fully in accord with the normal 
philosophical understanding of the term.”117 In this vein, the caution Rodd offers is 
warranted. Clearly the biblical authors and the Hebraic tradition in which it sits do 
not engage an exact understanding of natural law as classically defined. However, as 
already discussed above and noted by many scholars in the field, there is a 
correlation of a kind and understanding this allows one to find greater avenue in 
which the wisdom writings (and Proverbs in particular for our purposes) is able to 
inform a moral understanding in our contemporary context. 
Murphy offers a similar reluctance in suggesting that the wisdom literature is 
underpinned by a natural theology as put forward by the aforementioned Barr.118 
Murphy’s reluctance rests on a definition which would stress the distinction between 
supernatural and natural such that they are seen in opposition as it can (and has) been 
classically defined.119 Murphy suggests that a better definition to hold is one built on 
the theology of Karl Rahner which sees all of created order as a supernatural order 
within which any concept of the natural would be subsumed. As Murphy states:  
The explicit history of salvation found in the Bible is, for Rahner, a 
special “official” history of revelation. There is no reason why so-called 
“natural theology,” which is only theoretically distinct from theology as 
it is usually understood, does not also have its roots in revelation. What is 
described as “natural” theology in the Bible is the product of supernatural 
revelation that calls for a faith response. It may also be something that 
could be known and apprehended by human reason, but that is irrelevant 
when we exist in a supernatural order.120 
Once again, this reflection has merit and is noted here as a caution. As already 
discussed above, the principle of natural order/theology/law that underpins Proverbs 
                                                 
116 Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 63. 
117 Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 64. 
118 Murphy, 2002, 224-225, 276-277 
119 Murphy describes this succinctly in 2002, 276 
120 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 276-277. Contra to Murphy, it can be argued that such a position as held 
by Murphy is only necessary if one feels that the natural is unnecessarily downplayed in relation to the 
theological (graced) reality of all existence. As will be discussed below (section 2.2.4 and 4.2), such a 
downplaying need not be necessary when examining Proverbs or the virtue of prudence informed by 
Thomistic thought. Cf. Porter, Nature as Reason, 383-398. 
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and the rest of the wisdom literature is necessarily theological and, in some form at 
least, supernatural. As such, it is stretching the concept of natural theology too far to 
suggest the underpinning of order to which one is called in the wisdom tradition can 
be conceived fully and faithfully apart from the Creator and, thus, be conceived as an 
entirely natural (i.e. human) concept. In any case, technicalities of definitions aside, 
the concept of an underpinning created order being party to moral concepts that can 
be gleaned from the wisdom literature is nevertheless valid and Murphy, on this 
level, agrees.121 Moreover, Murphy reminds us that the teachings of the sages are 
built on the experience of engaging in the world and not simply on pondering the 
origins of existence in some abstract sense. As he points out, “the world is the 
showcase for divine activity … It is not a cosmos that works mechanically, but a 
happening that occurs over and over for all its inhabitants (Ps 104). Hence the human 
experience of the world is so important.”122  
Drawing from our starting point of this section, and to summarise, though both the 
sources and teaching of wisdom literature do point to a mode of understanding that is 
found outside of the revealed faith of Israel, this does not preclude a theological 
dimension that then calls a particular response. As with Thomistic notions on natural 
law broadly speaking, there is an understanding prevalent in the wisdom writings, 
particularly in certain parts of Proverbs, that the power of reason allows one to find 
the good apart from theological frameworks explicitly stated, but that does not 
preclude a theological dimension proper to it. In Thomistic language we might say 
that the good found by human reason is only good in the first place because it is 
proper to our nature as God created it. In the language of biblical wisdom, the good 
that is found in the sage exploration of wisdom is only the good/wise in the first 
place because it is proper to God’s creative order. Of course such an expression is 
only illustrative rather than technical and the two frameworks cannot be entirely 
interchanged (except perhaps on a meta-ethical level) but the principle is still 
apparent; that the experience of being human in creation is potentially morally 
                                                 
121 As Murphy states, the “thrust” of Barr’s position is one that he agrees with. The Tree of Life, 224. 
122 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 119. Murphy notes that there are two dimensions to understanding 
creation in wisdom theology. One is as “beginnings” (based on the poems of Wisdom such as that 
found in Prov 8) and the other the “arena of experience.” He suggests that emphasis tends to go with 
the former, however, it is the latter which is ultimately the concern of the wisdom literature. See 
Roland E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation," Journal of Biblical Literature 104, no. 1 (1985): 3-11. 
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trustworthy because one is able to find, within the experience itself, the goodness of 
God. 
Thus the correlation between virtues in the Thomistic tradition and the moral vision 
of wisdom in Proverbs becomes more apparent. As just stated, the experience of 
being human in creation is potentially morally trustworthy, but, according to 
Proverbs, to realise that potential one needs to acquire wisdom. In a similar vein, the 
inclination, apparent in Thomistic anthropological dimension of nature realises its 
potential in the virtues in general which are governed by the virtue of prudence in 
particular.123 What can be held here is, though we might talk of created order or 
natural law setting the framework of moral deliberation in the wisdom writings or 
Thomistic traditions respectively, ultimately the concern in both contexts is most 
fully realised in the anthropological dimension of the formation of person in light of 
and in relation to that order. 
It is this sense that is the concern of Proverbs; it is not interested in understanding the 
world for its own sake but, rather, it is to understand the place of the human person 
within and in relation to creation and it is this notion that sets the moral framework 
of Proverbs.124 The aforementioned William Brown is one who takes this point and 
engages with it by utilising a character-based ethical language. Brown sees Proverbs 
and the other wisdom writings being interested in the formation of character in 
conformity with a fuller worldview. As he states: 
The particular orientation espoused by the ancient sages involved nothing 
less than perceiving the world from the perspective of all things subject 
to and ordered by God’s will, be it discernible or inscrutable. … It is 
within the purposeful context of living, in appropriating and embodying 
truth rather than simply apprehending it, that creation functioned for the 
ancient sages. Specific creation texts of wisdom literature (e.g. Prov. 
8:33-31, Eccl. 1:2-11; Job 38-41) are contextualized in such a way as to 
(re)construct the reader’s perception of the world and God in accord with 
certain values, perspectives, and principles, the stuff of ethical character. 
                                                 
123 As Keenan states it, “Without prudence, the moral virtues are merely “habits” or “inclinations.” It 
is the virtue of prudence that allows the other moral virtues to be actualised as moral virtues at all. 
Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 101. See section 1.2.2 
above for brief discussion in this regard.  
124 As Crenshaw, for example, notes “Israel’s sages seem to have discerned a fundamental order 
hidden within the universe, this ruling principle applied both to nature and to humans. … The primary 
concern, however, is moral development, not knowledge of the universe.” Crenshaw, Old Testament 
Wisdom, 61, 88 n1. 
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Simply put, to alter one’s perception of God and the word is to shape and 
reshape character, the goal of sapiential rhetoric.125  
There are two points that are worth highlighting in Brown’s quote and provides an 
apt way to conclude this section. Firstly, he points to the understanding, as already 
stated, that the wisdom of Proverbs is necessarily prudential. It is so because 
prudence is concerned with forming the agent in such a way that they are able to 
perceive existence accurately. This then allows one to employ the other virtues 
appropriately to the reality of one’s situation as they experience the world. Seeing the 
world rightly, which includes what Aquinas calls ‘sound judgment’,126 is the heart of 
the virtue of prudence. As will be discussed below, and particularly in section 3.1, it 
is in developing this capacity where Proverbs perhaps has the most to teach us in the 
virtue ethics tradition. Secondly, prudence needs to be understood fundamentally as 
resting in the formation of character. Brown uses the terms “appropriating and 
embodying truth rather than simply apprehending it,” and this captures the 
understanding of both the virtues in the Thomistic tradition and the teachings of 
Proverbs well, for they are both concerned with a ‘knowing’ that is not simply 
cognitive in the simplest sense. ‘Smartness’, though undoubtedly valuable, does not 
lead to the full life, to the eudemonic fulfilment of the moral agent. To draw on 
language used above, the virtuous life is essentially tied to the formation of character 
and it is out of a formed character that one moves from an inclination to the good to 
the actuality of the good.  
In this vein, what follows is a close look at Proverbs in particular and the nature of 
prudential wisdom found therein as it pertains to formation of character. The moral 
life in both the Thomistic tradition and in Proverbs does not rest primarily on 
particular laws as legal codes as an expression of natural law or created order 
(though they don’t deny them either), but on the formation of the person in 
harmonious prudential engagement with this order.  
                                                 
125  Brown, Character in Crisis, 8. Another useful example is Sun Myung Lyu’s more recently 
published study on Righteousness in Proverbs. He notes that the concept of righteousness as a biblical 
concept at times suffers from being misconceived in that it can erroneously be considered as “being 
right” by which he means doing right actions. Lyu explains that, “a fundamental difference between 
being right and being righteous is that the former can be applied to describe human actions in isolation 
without considering their contexts whereas the latter refers to the overall characteristic of a person.” 
Sun Myung Lyu, Righteousness in the Book of Proverbs (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 12, see also 
pp.5-9. 
126 ST, II-II, 51.3. 
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2. The Nature of Prudential Wisdom in Proverbs 
The above sets a ‘meta-ethical’ framework of how both Thomistic thought and the 
wisdom of Proverbs can interact in a shared discussion on prudential wisdom. In this 
section the focus shifts to Proverbs in particular before moving more overtly back to 
Thomistic thought in sections 3 and 4 that follow. Though an examination of 
Proverbs using methodology typical of modern biblical scholarship will be had, the 
starting point will be to look at key terms that help identify both significant 
principles of wisdom as it pertains to the virtue of prudence as well as unpacking an 
understanding of the virtue itself. 
2.1 Words for Wisdom 
The understanding of prudence as part of a family of intellectual virtues in the 
Thomistic tradition is one couched in relatively precise technical language, which 
itself sits in a precise understanding of the human person. In contrast, the teachings 
of Proverbs (and the Hebrew Scriptures in general) are not written in the same 
systematic style found in Aquinas or Aristotle and its word usage, particularly with 
key terms such as ‘wisdom’, is loaded in its expressions and uses. Further, as will be 
discussed below, the composition of Proverbs is such that many sources spanning a 
number of times and places have left their mark, further colouring certain 
understandings that might be gleaned. As such, the following examination of the 
words for wisdom is an important focus.  
Here we wish to engage with what Whybray termed the “slippery word” of wisdom 
as found in the Hebrew Scriptures and in Proverbs in particular.127 The ‘slipperiness’ 
of the usage of wisdom in Proverbs is based on two points which in part will be dealt 
with here. Firstly, there is no single Hebrew word that encapsulates its every use. 
Certainly the most common Hebrew term is ḥokmāh,128 but other terms are used and 
examining their lexical meaning helps illuminate the fuller understanding of wisdom 
that Proverbs edifies. Secondly, as is common with many Hebrew concepts, there is 
rarely an English word that can be used to exactly translate a Hebrew equivalent. As 
such, more than one meaning may be construed with any particular term. With this in 
                                                 
127 R. N. Whybray, "Slippery Words: IV. Wisdom," in Wisdom: The Collected Articles of Norman 
Whybray, ed. Katharine J. Dell and Margaret Barker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 6-9. 
128 Whybray, "Slippery Words," 6. 
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mind, I will follow the framework of Fox’s study and touch on a number of key 
terms for wisdom.129 However, unlike Fox I will not examine every term where the 
concept of wisdom might be implied. Rather, for the sake of space, included here are 
only those terms most pertinent to the present study which attempts to elucidate the 
notion of prudence as found in Proverbs.  
2.1.1 Ḥokmāh/Ḥăkam  
Derived from the verb root ḥākām, it is the word translated most commonly to the 
adjective or noun ‘wise’ and, as the verb, to be wise. The meaning of ḥākām, as used 
throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, can be broadly placed into two categories. The 
first is the more general sense referring to a person possessing certain ability, often a 
cognitive one, though not exclusively. In this sense it is often translated to the term 
‘skill’ (e.g. Ez 27:8). In that sense it is ethically neutral. As Frydrych notes, “It 
denotes a proficiency, which can be put to both good and bad use, although the 
former is more common.”130 The second use is better understood in the adjectival 
sense to describe the ‘wise one’. In its plural form (ḥăkāmîm) it is associated with the 
professional position of royal advisors in Israelite and foreign courts (e.g. Jer 
18:18).131 Such uses do tend to have more moral weight implied. For example, it 
includes an ability to understand the implications of situations and interpret signs and 
texts – what could be termed “perceptiveness”, “astuteness” and “reasoning ability” 
(eg. Jer 9:11-12, Ecc 8:1),132 or good judgment in practical and interpersonal matters; 
i.e. “good sense” or “prudence”. As Fox notes, these may not necessarily entail moral 
virtue, but they do overlap into the concept of wisdom as “knowledge of right living 
                                                 
129 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 28-43. Similar examinations are also had by Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 
23-35; Bruce K. Waltke, The Book of Proverbs (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2004), 94-100. Fox’s study itself is based on Nili Shupak, Where Can Wisdom be Found? (Fribourg: 
University Press, 1993).  
130 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 25. 
131 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 25-26. Frydrych here discusses the understanding of the ḥākām in 
the professional sense, finding a middle ground between that held by W. McKane (1965), who 
suggests the term is exclusively associated with the professional court setting, and Whybrary (1974) 
who suggests there not being any professional use of the term as such. In so doing, Frydrych notes 
that the term, particularly when seen in the context of Proverbs, moves the availability of wisdom 
away from the domain of the professional ‘sage’ class to anybody who shows interest. The content of 
Proverbs “is almost generally applicable, with no exclusive focus on any social class or otherwise 
defined group.” Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 27-28. Cf. William McKane, Prophets and Wise 
Men (London: SCM, 1965). R. N. Whybray, The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 1974). See also discussion had below, particularly 2.2.2. 
132 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33. 
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– ‘right’ in both the ethical and pragmatic senses.”133 This understanding finds even 
more purchase when examined in the particular context of Proverbs.  
Some occurrences of ḥokmāh do refer to ‘skill’ but closer examination of its actual 
use in Proverbs renders it significantly tighter to its moral sense. Most occurrences of 
the word in this technical sense are in a context of describing what ḥākām does, i.e., 
the thrust of the book is to define what it means to be wise. The adjective then does 
not designate a person with just any skill, but someone who lives according to the 
principles expressed in Proverbs, and has an understanding of the consequences of 
human actions that agree with its perspective (e.g. Prov 10:14; 13:20; 14:3,16; 15:31-
32). Further, even though ḥokmāh is associated with knowledge (e.g. Prov 10:14), it 
is not so much about intellectual knowledge or abilities but, rather, it is a 
commitment to a way of life, one which is often depicted by the metaphor of walking 
along a path (eg. Prov 4:10-19; 15:10; 23:19). This metaphor captures an important 
characteristic of Proverbial wisdom; for being wise is not merely a present static 
state, but it is a continual dynamic process.134 Fox’s study on the use of the word in 
Proverbs states it as such, “Ḥokmah is not inert knowledge. You could memorize the 
book of Proverbs and not have ḥokmah. Ḥokmah always implies ability to carry out 
what one knows. But it is never an innate talent devoid of knowledge.”135 More 
specifically still:  
Proverbs consistently applies the word ḥokmah to wisdom as manifest in 
the skill and knowledge of right living in the enriched sense. This is 
because the sages are making strong claims for the powers of human 
expertise. Wisdom of this sort may be manifest in numerous aspects of 
behaviour … But these distinctions are matters of emphasis, and usually, 
ḥokmah refers to these qualities all together.136 
This brief analysis shows that there are a number of features of ḥokmāh that are 
prevalent to this study. Firstly, it implies a way of life rather than an articulated set of 
instructions or a particular skill set (though it might include those). One is wise 
(ḥokmāh) in character rather than in arbitrary or even practical knowledge. Related to 
this, one does not drift in and out of ‘being wise’ in this sense. Rather, if one is truly 
ḥākām (a wise one), then it is formed through and out of a fuller sense of the self, i.e. 
                                                 
133 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33. 
134 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 26-27. 
135 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33. 
136 Fox, Proverbs 1-9. My emphasis 
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their character. Secondly, there is an essential link to wisdom and living life well in a 
moral sense. Taking the use of ḥokmāh in Prov 4:10–19 as an example, we see here a 
coupling of the term ḥokmāh with yōšer (righteousness) and how ḥokmāh will thus 
serve the ongoing moral life of listener (if heeded, of course). Thirdly, the one who is 
of wise character is able to hold many aspects of the term in a balance. One is not 
simply wise in particular matters, e.g. in interpersonal matters (Prov 11:30), or 
cleverly aware of their situation (Prov 14:8), or in theological/ethical matters (Prov 
9:10) but, rather, ḥokmāh refers to these and other qualities as a whole, and the 
ability to hold and apply them in right measure. As Fox states in discussing the term, 
“Proverbs teaches that there is a global intellectual power – wisdom – that can be 
called upon in all endeavours that is inherently righteous and almost always 
effective.”137 
As can be seen then, ḥokmāh includes a sense of what we understand as prudence 
held in the Thomistic tradition. It refers to a wisdom that is not purely speculative 
(knowledge for its own sake) but about actively living the moral life. Further, it is 
found in the character of a person and allows one to negotiate the varieties of 
circumstances that life entails. This ability to hold in balance other virtuous notions 
is a key feature of prudence and one that ḥokmāh captures. 
2.1.2 Śēkel/Śākal  
Śēkel is the term that would most resemble prudence in the narrow sense of the term 
and, in Proverbs, is rendered as such numerous times in major translations such as 
the NRSV (e.g. 1:5). On other occasions it is translated as, ‘sense’ (13:15) or ‘good 
sense’ (3:4). When the root Śākal is used, its core meaning is insight; an ability to 
grasp the fuller meaning or implications of situations. TWOT states that:  
In many instances śākal is synonymous with bîn, … but there is a fine 
distinction. While bîn indicates “distinguishing between,” śākal relates to 
an intelligent knowledge of the reason. There is the process of thinking 
through a complex arrangement of thoughts resulting in a wise dealing 
and use of good practical common sense. Another end result is the 
emphasis upon being successful.138 
                                                 
137 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33. 
138  R. L. Harris, Gleason L. Archer, and Bruce K. Waltke, eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old 
Testament, Electronic ed. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1999), 877. 
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Thus, it can be understood not only in terms of good judgment, but more accurately 
what could be understood as discernment; the ability to understand practical matters 
and interpersonal relations and come to good decisions.139 
The term is not always used in a way that implies inherent ethical virtue, however 
most times it is.140  A man’s śēkel gives him patience and allows him to avoid 
unnecessary conflict (Prov 19:11). The prudent person (maśkîl) is one who stores up 
provisions during Summer (Prov 10:5), one who is reserved in speech (Prov 10:19), 
or a good wife (Prov 19:14).141 In the latter reference we also see that encountering 
the maśkîl is akin to a gift from God, something greater than the material wellbeing 
that can be provided by benevolent parents. Interestingly, in later Hebraic writing 
śēkel becomes associated more overtly with intellectual understanding. In Daniel, for 
example, the maśkîl is one able to teach many (Dan 11:33), yet it maintains its moral 
association (e.g. Dan 12:10). In addition, the TDOT’s analysis stresses that śekel is 
strongly associated with successful living.142 As such, it holds the notion of ‘good 
sense’ leading to good outcomes. 
This notion of ‘good sense’ helps flesh out an understanding of practical wisdom that 
Proverbs invites the reader to consolidate into one’s life. Though the term captures 
an intellectual ability of sorts, as with ḥokmāh, it is not a ‘book smarts’ concept but a 
good sense that anybody of good character will exhibit for their own good and the 
good of those around them. The term ‘good sense’ is one that at least one recent 
moral theologian (Herbet McCabe) uses to describe prudence and captures a similar 
notion being described here. A concept of sound intellectual ability is included but, 
moreover, it is an ability to capture the fullness of a situation and find pragmatic 
methods of responding well for the sake of the good.143 As such, śēkel is probably the 
term that most directly resembles prudence in our wider study. However, one should 
still be wary in seeing it as a direct equivalent. As already noted, the tapestry of 
Proverbial wisdom is rich as is the Thomistic concept of prudence. As such, 
                                                 
139 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 36. 
140 Fox suggests, for example, the addition of ṭob (good) in Prov 13:15 implies that śēkel is not always 
used for the best, though such a conclusion is not definitive. Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 36. 
141 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 36. 
142 K. Koenen, "לַכָשׂ," in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. J. Botterweck, Helmer 
Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (2004), 113-127. 
143 Herbert McCabe, God Still Matters (London: Contimuum, 2002), 152-165. 
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prudence as a virtue might be one that includes śēkel, but it would not be limited to 
it.  
2.1.3 Bînāh/Mēbîn 
Bînāh, from the root bîn, refers to the faculty of intellectual understanding as well as 
the outworking of such intelligence in action and in oral discourse. Its etymology is 
particularly associated with ‘distinguishing between’ and so is also associated with 
discernment in that sense. Though it is not necessarily concerned with practical 
matters in itself, in Proverbs in particular it is often placed with tĕbûnâ (also derived 
from the root bîn) which has a notion of pragmatic outworking of good sense. 
Nevertheless, more broadly speaking, as Fox puts it, “the raw faculty of bînāh, 
insofar as it is possessed by an individual apart from application, is similar to the 
modern concept of intelligence.”144 As such, in itself, it does not necessarily hold 
moral significance. However, it is a necessary aspect if one is going to have a sound 
grasp of reality, to perceive it well, which allows one to employ other faculties 
towards prudential living (see section 3 below for further discussion).145 
As such, the mēbîn (understanding, perceptive or intelligent person) is one who is 
able to more readily discern the fullness of a situation. For example, the mēbîn is able 
to see through men’s facades (Prov 28:11) and quickly understands why they might 
face rebuke (Prov 17:10). This latter example also points to the moral standing of a 
mēbîn. They may not necessarily be perfectly sinless and would thus be deserving of 
correction, however, they are virtuous enough to be aware of their limitation and see 
value in holding a teachable spirit.146 
Fox highlights a particular form of bîn in the form of nābôn which typically refers to 
one who has bînāh or tĕbûnâ. However, a key example of its use is in Prov 16:21 
where it is the wise heart (ḥākām lēb) that is called nābôn.147 In other words, what is 
implied is that one is nābôn not because they have a certain knowledge as such 
(though they might), but because they have an astuteness to finding right knowledge 
in the first place (e.g. Prov 14:6). As such, and taking the concept as a whole, 
                                                 
144 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 30. 
145 In this sense bînāh draws some parallel to the part of prudence that Aquinas calls intellectus 
(intelligence or understanding). Prudence is “right reasoning in human deeds” and so the start (though 
not the all) of any prudent activity begins with insight or understanding. ST, II-II, 49.2. 
146 See section 3.3 below. 
147 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 30. 
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bînāh/mēbîn can be understood as both an innate capacity on the one hand, but also a 
character trait that can be developed on the other. 
2.1.4 Tĕbûnâ 
Though related etymologically to bînāh, tĕbûnâ according to Fox has a distinct sense 
of being more practically oriented. He states: 
Tebunah is the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought, operating in the 
realm of action; it aims at efficacy and accomplishment, whereas binah is 
the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought. … Tebunah is the 
competence to deal with the exigencies of life, and it generally implies a 
follow-up action, or at least the expectation of one.148 
Fox cites uses such as in Prov 14:29 and 17:27 where one with tĕbûnâ is patient and 
measured in human relations. He does not engage in folly (Prov 15:21) and conducts 
himself wisely (Prov 10:23). Fox suggests that “these virtues are in the realm of 
attitudes and social skills rather than intellectual penetration and comprehension.”149 
The term is used heavily in Proverbs, more so than anywhere else in the Hebrew 
canon (nineteen times in Proverbs, seventeen more than any other book), and is 
clearly an important feature of what the ‘wise one’ would characterise. It is 
particularly heavily used in ch. 2 where the listener is implored to accept the words 
that follow, to “attend their heart” and “incline their ear to tĕbûnâ” (2:2). If they 
recognise its value (v. 3) they will “find knowledge of God” (v. 5) no less and, 
indeed, it is from God that tĕbûnâ comes (v. 6). The outworking of this is that one is 
able to recognise and actualise moral virtues including righteousness, justice and 
equity and of “every good path” (v. 9). 
This passage will be revisited at a later point,150 but what can be gleaned here is a 
sense that tĕbûnâ is an expression of wisdom that has right vision and right action 
imbued therein.  In this sense, tĕbûnâ has some parallel to the Thomistic virtue of 
prudence which is able to bridge the intellectual virtues which deal with speculative 
knowledge and the moral virtues which seek the perfection of the agent in character 
and action. 
                                                 
148 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 37-38. 
149 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 38. 
150 See 2.2.4. 
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2.1.5 Mĕzimmâ  
The term mĕzimmâ is a curious one in the context of this study. In the wider Hebrew 
canon nominally the notion is used mostly in reference to God who carries out his 
purposes and plans (noun form mĕzimmôt) “against wicked nations or of wicked men 
who devise schemes against God and the righteous.”151 As such, it has the notion of 
discreet execution of judgement. When referring to humans, the term tends to have 
an air of secret scheming often with a view to immoral or harmful ends. This is 
particularly evident in the Psalms (eg. Ps 10:2, 37:7), but the negative sense is also 
seen in Proverbs (eg. 30:32, where the NRSV translates the term to being “devilishly 
evil”, though perhaps “prideful scheming” would be closer to its meaning given the 
context). 
However, mĕzimmâ need not be negative and is certainly not intrinsically evil, 
especially as it is used in Proverbs. As mentioned above, God’s own plans are 
considered mĕzimmôt. This is true particularly according to Proverbs where in the 
singular form (mĕzimmâ) it expresses a consistently positive and morally sound 
meaning. It is found only five times in the Hebrew Canon in this form and all five 
occurrences are in Proverbs (1:4; 2:11; 3:21; 5:2; 8:12). In all cases the NRSV 
translates the term to prudence and, on a more detailed level, is associated with 
discretion of being able to recognise the good and truly valuable and thus walk 
confidently through the course of life (3:21-26ff). 
The morphological closeness of the negative and positive sense of the term provides 
a point of interest. As a verb, one can scheme (zammôtā) to evil ends (Prov 30:32) or, 
on the other hand, consider (zommâ) and execute toward the good (31:16). However, 
the one who truly has the noun mĕzimmâ in the singular sense used in Proverbs 
knows and takes the path of righteousness. For the purposes of this project, it is 
useful to highlight this distinction. There is shrewd scheming and devising, but this is 
not necessarily a good. One can work towards good ends only if one has the wisdom 
of mĕzimmâ that Proverbs entreats. As with other notions of wisdom discussed 
above, it certainly has a moral outlook. Further, it has particular relevance to the 
Thomistic notion of prudence because it is associated with internal recognition of the 
                                                 
151 Harris, Archer, and Waltke, eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, 244. 
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truly good as opposed to the apparently good and, further, uses such recognition 
towards deliberating well in the activity of life.152 
2.1.6 Tûšiyyâ 
Tûšiyyâ is a relatively technical term for wisdom that is found almost exclusively in 
Proverbs and the Book of Job. Like tĕbûnâ, it has a pragmatic outworking and 
encapsulates the ability to deal with difficulties and navigate courses of action 
therein. TWOT describes it as a “sound efficient wisdom, i.e. sound judgment, 
wisdom that leads to practical success.”153 More simply, the NRSV translates the 
term in Proverbs to ‘sound wisdom’. Its general use in context, again like tĕbûnâ, is 
associated with an ability to recognize and live life well in the broadly moral sense.  
Of note, given the focus of this study, is that one of its only two uses outside of the 
wisdom literature is in Is 28:29 where it expresses the type of wisdom that denotes 
God’s providential control of history. This finds its way into Proverbs as well, 
though with a distinct nuance. The Lord’s providence is acknowledged in Proverbs; 
however, it is mediated to humans through wisdom. As such, tûšiyyâ is a particular 
form of wisdom available to humans that allows them to successfully negotiate 
creation as ordered by God. For example, in concert with other forms of wisdom, it is 
tûšiyyâ that affords protection from harm (3:13-35). It does so not by removing 
points of difficulty or confusion outright but, rather, by allowing those who acquire it 
to navigate times of confusion or vulnerability successfully (3:21-26). The link to 
God’s providential dimension is expressed in this pericope in the verses that follow 
(3:27-28). As Van Leeuwen states it, these verses point to God acting as the ultimate 
“guarantor” behind such notions of practical wisdom. 154  As noted above, the 
Thomistic notion of prudence is linked to providence155 and, though it would be a 
stretch to consider it a directly equivocal term,  the conceptual expression of tûšiyyâ 
clearly expresses moral weight tied to living within God’s providential creative order 
which, when grasped, leads to just and life-affirming outcomes. 
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As used in Proverbs,ʿormâ is another term that more easily translates directly to the 
English prudence and is translated as such by the NRSV on two of the three 
occasions it appears in Proverbs (8:5, 12). On the other occasion it is translated to 
“shrewdness” (1:4), though here, as suggested by Brown who ties it with the term 
mĕzimmâ, prudence would be the more appropriate.156 Outside of Proverbs, ʿormâ 
signifies a talent to attain one’s goals by cunning and wily means. The goal in that 
sense might be arbitrary. However, in Proverbs it is exclusively seen as an ability to 
use such skills towards ends that are morally sound. 
Nevertheless, this notion of ʿormâ as ‘cunning’ or ‘cleverness’157 points to an ability 
that can potentially be used towards illicit ends and bears interesting reflection when 
compared to a sin of ‘cunning’ (astutia) as held by Aquinas.  For Aquinas, cunning 
as a vice (like many vices)158 has much in common with its equivalent virtue in 
prudence but is distinct in two ways. Firstly, those who exercise cunning as opposed 
to prudence use sound reasoning (a necessary aspect of prudence), but towards an 
end that is not good or good only in appearance. Secondly, cunning is also evidenced 
when pursuing an end that may be good, but is done so by means that is “not 
genuine, but feigned and specious.”159 The latter in particular is what Aquinas calls 
“the sin of cunning.” Such notion of cunning, which is often tied to guile (dolus) 
which can be understood as the activity of trickery and deceit,160 may use certain 
skills found in prudence but is, in fact, false prudence. Though not articulated in 
Proverbs as such, it certainly seems that such a notion sits behind ormâ, however, it 
is used carefully by the sages to refer to a morally licit understanding of this human 
capacity. 
Further, in Proverbs ormâ is particularly associated with moral sophistication. In 
Prov 8, ʿormâ is one of the qualities that Lady Wisdom has to offer and it is the 
simple and naive (petî) that lack it (8:5). Further, it is the simple that do not pay due 
consideration to their ways (Prov 14:15) and are unable to recognise a disastrous way 
of life when walking it (Prov 22:3). In this sense, ʿormâ is a prudential wisdom 
                                                 
156 Brown, Character in Crisis, 26-27. 
157 Terms favoured by Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 35, 61-62 and Murphy, Proverbs, 3 respectively.  
158 ST, II-II, 21.3. 
159 ST, II-II, 55.3. 
160 ST, II-II, 55.4. 
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associated with maturity; that is, an ability to move one from naivety to right or 
truthful vision found in the morally mature.161 
2.1.8 Mûsār 
Along with daʿat, which will be discussed below, mûsār represents a term for 
wisdom that has least resemblance to prudence, but is worthy of focus nonetheless. 
Seen in context with its root meaning, mûsār is commonly associated with discipline 
or punishment and is at times translated as such. However, particular when taking in 
its equivalency in the LXX (paideuo), it is understood to entail the notion of 
education or instruction in a broader sense. In Proverbs at least, this would be its 
more common understanding. However, it should be pointed out that it is used in 
both senses throughout and commonly, even when used in the sense of instruction, it 
is nonetheless linked to reprimand through terms such as ‘rebuke’ and ‘reproof’ (e.g. 
10:17, 13:18). In any case, as Fox notes, the goal of mûsār is always towards 
providing moral insight or a quality of moral character. Further, “it is always given 
by a superior to an inferior, who is morally obliged, but not forcibly compelled to 
listen and learn.”162 
It is not surprising then that the term is so frequently used in Proverbs which has, at 
its heart, the task of instructing the young and immature, in a formal and informal 
sense, in the ways of wisdom and righteousness. This notion of instruction will be 
returned to more fully in section 3.3 below, but it is of use to pick up key points here 
in how Proverbs uses mûsār.  
Firstly, the moral instruction (mûsār) of Proverbs is often tied to an accentuation of 
the stance of humble reception that the listener must have (e.g. Prov 15:33). It is a 
notion akin to the docilitas so important to the Thomistic understanding of the virtue 
of prudence. Secondly, when Proverbs warns of the consequences of rejection of 
mûsār, in virtually all cases the source of negative consequence that would follow is 
arbitrary (e.g. Prov 5:23, 10:17); it is not, for example, sourced from the instructor or 
even from God. This is not to say that Proverbs suggests that rightful reproach cannot 
come from a superior, a teacher or from God. Indeed the wise person is able to both 
heed and utilise such reproach when it is necessary (e.g. 13:1). However, when 
                                                 
161 See 2.2.1, 3.2 and 3.3 below. 
162 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 34. 
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righteous admonition is present, and particularly when one takes the path of rejecting 
such wisdom and good teaching, then no additional reproof is necessary; the 
rejection itself creates the situation in which negative (including evil) consequences 
will follow. The implication here is that there is a natural course of consequence to 
one who rejects the ‘teaching’ (mûsār) on offer. One actualises the good in their 
seeking and heeding of wisdom found in mûsār, or actualises the bad on its rejection. 
As such, Proverbs does not present a simple punitive moral framework even where 
reproach associated with mûsār is evoked.  
2.1.9 Daʿat  
Simply translated as the noun ‘knowledge’, daʿat expresses “a multitude of shades of 
knowledge gained by the senses.”163 As such, it is the broadest of the wisdom words 
used extensively throughout the OT and strictly speaking is not, literally at least, a 
word for wisdom at all. Because of its scope, daʿat can refer to cognition too 
elementary to be called wisdom in the mode associated with the terms discussed 
above. However, particularly in Proverbs (and throughout the Wisdom literature), it 
is associated with wisdom properly understood and so bears some relevance here. In 
this sense, Proverbs seems to present daʿat in what Fox terms “the high end of the 
spectrum” where it begins to “overlap ḥokmāh, both as erudition and as sagacity in 
living.”164 
Its use in Proverbs then has a particular sense. It certainly suggests that the one of 
mature and wise character will value knowledge but, more specifically, Proverbs 
clearly expresses that true knowledge is prudential in nature. One who seeks daʿat is 
of virtuous character, able to avoid folly (e.g. Prov 15:12), to temper blind desire 
(Prov 19:2) and understand “the rights of the poor” (Prov 29:7). As such, knowledge 
(daʿat) in Proverbs of any kind is always valuable but it is not an end in and of itself. 
Rather, it is a means to finding and maintaining a wise character, to act prudently and 
journey on the path to righteousness. 
 
                                                 
163 Harris, Archer, and Waltke, eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, 366. 
164 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 31. 
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Taken as a whole, the terms examined above provide weight to the prudential nature 
of wisdom as expressed in Proverbs. Fox provides a useful summary of the lexical 
leaning of the words that are commonly translated or associated with ‘wisdom’: 
Wisdom is always prudential, conducive to the individual’s well-being, 
but it weighs the effect of an action on others as well. It is an ethical 
quality, never merely instrumental. It is also a quality of character, for it 
entails not only the knowledge of the right ends but also the will to 
pursue them.165  
 
2.2 Overall Composition of Proverbs 
The above lexical analysis focuses on some key words associated with wisdom in 
Proverbs and highlights the prudential nature of many concepts raised therein. The 
aim of this section is to broaden the scope and to begin to take in Proverbs as a whole 
whilst also allowing the individual parts and sayings to speak for themselves. As 
such, general themes and concepts found in the book of Proverbs will be examined. 
However, the backdrop of the wider discussion of virtue-based morality in the 
Thomistic tradition and the virtue of prudence in particular is still held. With that in 
mind, exegetical analysis is included in this section and a broad appreciation of 
Proverbs is held; however, the aim is not to provide a detailed analysis of Proverbs in 
its own right but, rather, to focus on that which helps inform the wider discussion 
most directly.  
2.2.1 Overarching Moral Framework of Proverbs 
Michael Fox makes the point in his opening to Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of 
Proverbs that the unity of Proverbs “allows us to discuss various topics in the book 
as a whole.”166 It is this unity which allows Fox and others to find key moral themes 
in Proverbs. By briefly examining how this unity is established and what it says 
about the nature of Proverbs, we can witness how some aspects of these themes 
relate to the virtuous life and the virtue of prudence in particular. 
The distinct parts that form Proverbs, particularly its short self-contained pithy 
sayings which constitutes the bulk of the work and their diverse form and places of 
                                                 
165 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 29. 
166 Fox, "Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs," 75. 
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contextual origin has, at times, led many scholars to suggest that there is no overall 
organisational intent within the work.167 As Van Leeuwen suggests, there is a long 
held position “which takes the actual arrangements of proverbs in the collections as 
being quite haphazard and thus virtually irrelevant for their interpretation.” 168 
However, there are problems to this approach. Though one may well find utility in an 
atomised reading, it risks missing an overall narrative that can be gleaned and, 
moreover, individual sayings and expressions may lose their intended impact when 
pulled out of context in this manner; a typical atomised reading alone may diminish 
the moral weight and direction that can be found within Proverbs.  
It is in response to such issues that the aforementioned Fox recognises a more unified 
reading.169 Underpinning Fox’s approach is the notion that wisdom “is not only a 
genre of literature, it is a process, a dialectic in which thinkers of different times 
mediated on ideas they had learned from their predecessors and shaped them in new 
ways.” 170  In Proverbs, this dynamism is reflected in three stages which are 
identifiable in their literary form and topical concern. In a very general sense, Fox 
articulates a development of wisdom and the type of morality that this wisdom 
presents from one more overtly pragmatic in the first stage, to one more interested in 
moral character in the second, to the more abstract and universal in the third. Fox 
stresses that one stage does not displace the previous but, rather, that each stage 
builds on the previous, extending and enriching them. This highly developmental 
approach is one that is not overly popular among some scholars.171 Nevertheless, it 
                                                 
167 Though the focus of such discussions is often on chs. 10-29, the notion of a unifying structure in 
Prov 1-9 is also debated, though it is generally filled with less conjecture. A survey discussion in this 
regard can be found in Bálint Károly Zabán, The Pillar Function of the Speeches of Wisdom: Proverbs 
1:20-33, 8:1-36 and 9:1-6 in the Structural Framework of Proverbs 1-9 (Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 
8-18. 
168 Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, Context and Meaning in Proverbs 25-27 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1988), 7. Van Leeuwen here is referring primarily to an often cited proponent of this view in William 
McKane. Van Leeuwen also cites other authors and provides a detailed discussion of the topic in Van 
Leeuwen, Context and Meaning in Proverbs 25-27, 6-17. McKane’s primary work on this topic is 
found in Proverbs: A New Approach (London: SCM Press, 1970), esp. 10-11, 413-414. See also 
Whybray’s survey of this topic in The Book of Proverbs, 54-61; Proverbs: Based on the Revised 
Standard Version, New Century Bible Commentary (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994), 62-92. 
169 Primarily found in his essay Michael V. Fox, "The Growth of Wisdom," in Proverbs 10-31, ed. 
Michael V. Fox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
170 Fox, "The Growth of Wisdom," 923.  
171 As Dell points out briefly in her review, "A Heap of Proverbial Jewels," review of Proverbs 10-31: 
A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary by Michael V. Fox, The Expository Times 121, 
no. 12 (2010): 627. 
54 
 
provides a valuable examination of the overall unity that can be found in Proverbs 
and something of the overarching teaching that the book seeks to impart.  
Another example of an approach that traces a unifying arc over the work of Proverbs, 
and one that will be looked at more closely, is found in William Brown’s piece The 
Pedagogy of Proverbs. 172 Brown also regrets the lack of attention given to Proverbs’ 
overarching literary organisation. He notes that even where attention to literary form 
is made, there is often little attention given to the overall arrangement and direction 
exhibited by the work as a whole and the interpretive value found therein. Brown 
responds by examining the discernible movement in both textual form and theme 
from beginning to end which expresses certain messages. 173  Obviously Brown’s 
study focuses on 10:1-31:9 of Proverbs, the sections most commonly noted as being 
disparate and disorganised. However, Brown does place the central bulk of the book 
in relation to Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31. 
As is commonly held, chs.1-9 introduces the book and provides a “guide to how it is 
to be read and used.” Brown further notes that:  
Indeed, Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31 have been deliberately placed to 
exemplify the formation of moral character. The development of 
Wisdom’s character, for example, form irritated teacher in 1:20-33 to 
child of God and hostess in chapters 8 and 9, and ultimately her 
association with the ʾēšet-ḥayil (“woman of strength”) in the concluding 
acrostic poem of 31:10-31, suggests an overarching movement from 
beginning to end. … In short, the bookends of Proverbs trace the 
formation of moral character that culminates in the union between 
Wisdom and her student, a movement that spans the process of 
maturation from receptive child to responsible adult, from dependent to 
patriarch.174 
Further, within Prov 1-9, the very opening section of 1:1-7 acts as an introduction to 
the work overall. Whybray, for example, states that, “1:1-7 reads like a preface, not 
merely to chapters 1-9, but to the whole book.”175 Contained therein are a number of 
terms addressed in the previous section that have significant intellectual and moral 
                                                 
172 William P. Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," in Character & Scripture: Moral 
Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
William B. Eerdmans, 2002). 
173 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 151-152. 
174 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 153. 
175 Whybray, Proverbs, 16-17. In his earlier work, Brown refers to the opening verses as a “purpose 
statement” and an “ancient ‘course objective’.” Brown, Character in Crisis, 24. 
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weight; the inference being that what follows will confer on the attentive 
reader/listener a tremendous array of virtuous qualities. Among them, the notion of 
prudential wisdom is brought to the fore suggesting that a key concern of the work to 
follow is: 
To teach shrewdness (ʿormâ) to the simple, 
knowledge (daʿat) and prudence (mĕzimmâ) to the young. (1:4) 
 
This verse sits in a prologue highlighting the value of wisdom (ḥākmâ) (v. 2) and 
does so with a leaning towards ethical virtues of righteousness, justice and equity (v. 
3). As such, present in this very foundational introduction is a linking of wisdom 
properly understood and ethical living. Further, this linking is not built on 
speculative thinking but on the concrete reality of prudential living highlighted with 
terms such as mĕzimmâ above and others such as discerning (nābôn)176 and skill 
(taḥbulôt) (v. 5).177  
As such, this opening stanza anticipates the movement that is to be encouraged in 
Proverbs proper, from the gullible and immature (captured in the notion of ‘simple 
one’ (petî) in v. 4) to the well-formed character imbued with the virtues as described. 
This overarching movement, Brown suggests, is not only intentional and evident in 
the ‘instructional’ bookends of Proverbs, it is also evident in the bulk of the work 
found in the intervening sections (10:1-31:9) that would “sustain this overall 
movement.”178 
Brown’s essay traces through a number of identifiable topics that are developed 
throughout the work based on literary structures and thematic focus. Of particular 
interest is the development he notes through the two Solomonic collections (10:1-
22:16. Part 1 being 10:1-15:32, part 2 being 15:33-22:16). Within the collection of 
sayings, Brown notes a movement on a number of levels. He outlines this movement 
as one from terse antithetical sayings to more poetic verse forms suggesting that this 
“may indicate greater complexity of learning, particularly a move from a strictly 
                                                 
176 Literally “the discerning man” from the root bîn. 
177 Von Rad suggests that, though the terms are distinct, the various concepts overlap too, indicating 
that the ensemble of many terms “seems to aim at something larger, something more comprehensive 
which could not be expressed satisfactorily by means of any one of the terms used.” Von Rad, 
Wisdom in Israel, 13. As such, the various virtuous notions are not compartmentalised points of 
character; their efficaciousness is tied to their integration. A relevant point given the integrative 
function of prudence as it is understood in Thomistic thought. 
178 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 153. 
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binary mode of moral understanding to more synthetic modes.”179 To explain, the 
sentences tend to be dominated by proverbial sayings that paint the world in a moral 
dichotomy of the right and wrong; one is either wise or foolish, righteous or wicked 
with little room for ambiguity or mitigation beyond that paradigm. However, the 
movement that Brown highlights points out that the teaching of Proverbs does not 
remain there. Proverbs, particularly in the later part of the Solomonic collection and 
even more so in the later sections overall (22:17-31:9), nuances this position in both 
form and theme. Naturally, righteousness and wisdom are still held in high regard 
and wickedness and foolishness as evils to be avoided, but there is a greater 
complexity introduced, so much so that even when a way may seem right it may, in 
fact, lead to ultimate destruction (16:25).180 Without going into great detail at this 
point, what is being taught here is that being wise and living rightly is more complex 
than what is immediately apparent and certainly not as basic as blindly following a 
prescribed rule or principle in the simple sense. Further, when we consider the nature 
of the instructional material found in 1-9 (as noted above), we see that the very 
structural flow of Proverbs implies that prudence is not only a virtuous character trait 
being encouraged in its own right but, also, necessary if one is going to find full 
meaning and right application of the collection of sayings themselves. 
Brown also highlights other thematic progressions. For example, there appears a 
movement in the settings of the instructions which progress from the familial home 
to the more abstract communal and political sphere – particularly the setting of the 
royal court which underpins the Hezekian collection (25:1-29:27) and the Words of 
Agur (30:1-33). As Brown notes, in the first part of the Solomonic collection there 
are only two references to the royal context (14:28, 35), whereas there are twelve in 
the second half. Further, within the identity of the ruler himself (where he is present) 
there is a movement of sorts. In the Solomonic collection, the position of kingship is 
                                                 
179 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 164. It should be pointed out that Brown shows 
caution with such interpretation indicating that the movement is not categorical or absolute. For 
example, he notes that antithetical sayings that form the bulk of 10:1-15:32 are also found in 15:33-
22:16, but the number of them diminishes markedly in the latter section compared to the first, (Brown, 
"The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 156-157). Thus, the movement in Proverbs is, at times, subtle 
and gradual. 
180 Van Leeuwen notes a movement in a similar vein to Brown stating that, “the contrast between 
righteous and wicked in chapters 10-15 is typical of the first Solomonic subcollection. It creates an 
orderly view of reality and justice in which good and bad actions are met with corresponding 
consequences. In contrast, the second Solomonic subcollection (16:1-22:16) presents a more complex 
view of acts and consequences.” Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs," 23. 
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made akin to that of God himself and a king can hold such office when embodying 
virtues such as loyalty and faithfulness (20:28) and deep righteousness (16:12). In 
this section, there is an implication that a king can be of poor character, wicked and 
unjust, but it is not explicitly noted. However, this shifts in the Hezekian and Agur 
sections where the vulnerability of the position of kingship is more overtly exposed. 
To illustrate, in 25:2 Proverbs notes that the role of the king is to pursue wisdom 
which is hidden by the very glory of God no less. Later, in 28:16, an abject warning 
is given where the leader who lacks prudence will inherently be a cruel (i.e. morally 
corrupt) oppressor.181 The ultimate conclusion to this is that, as Brown identifies it, 
there is a pedagogical direction within Proverbs to move one from the naïve son to 
the wise (prudent) king, something that requires one to constantly hold a character 
trait of being teachable and humble. As Brown summates, “the main body of 
Proverbs illustrates a certain advancement of sapiential instruction. As the king 
becomes an object of critique, so the reader must cultivate self-criticism.”182 
Moreover, speaking more generally on Brown’s approach, he notes that: 
The pedagogy of wisdom, in sum, begins with the basic staple and 
proceeds to more advanced, variegated fare. Although many of the 
proverbial sayings and instructions seem simplistic in isolation, together 
they build up a substantive and sophisticated level of moral instruction.183 
In other words, the pedagogical outlook of Proverbs is to move the implied reader 
and would-be student towards maturity. This process involves holding certain 
disposition and virtues in the first place (captured in Prov 1-9), then being able to 
negotiate and interpret the familial and sometimes simple proverbial notions, 
building on them to develop the sophistication implied in the later sections of 
Proverbs. As will be discussed in section 3.3 below, this concept of movement from 
immaturity to maturity is a key dimension of prudence in general. As such, this 
unifying theme of growth in maturity in Proverbs also points to a theme of how one 
acquires prudence.  
The approach that Brown makes is useful in many respects. However, a point should 
be made here on the position this study makes in relation to the overall arrangement 
                                                 
181 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 171-172. 
182 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 181. This also touches on the notion of ‘political 
prudence’ which is taken up in the following section. 
183 Brown, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 181-182. 
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and themes of Proverbs; are they a collection of disparate sayings (in regard to 
chapters 10-22) and slightly larger but still independent lectures (1-8, 31) or a 
homogenous work of tightly organised material? The simple response is something 
of a middle ground. Frydrych, though ultimately underlining the disparity of the 
work, notes that: 
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. At the same time, this new 
perception of the book should not obscure the fact that the nature of the 
petty sayings is such that they have to be understandable in relative 
autonomy, i.e. the primary source of meaning in the collections is the 
individual saying.184 
In other words, taking in the overall whole has useful implications for using Proverbs 
in a study such as this one, but the individual units and even particular short sentence 
sayings inherently must have discernible worth in and of themselves. As has been 
discussed above, it is this approach which allows one to identify the moral 
framework of Proverbs resting on the formation of character overall even when 
individual isolated sayings may seem particularly casuistic or situational in their 
expression.185 The interpretive analysis which follows holds this in mind. Even when 
individual sayings are examined, it is acknowledged that a larger framework of moral 
formation of the reader is implied. This moral formation is found in a number of 
dimensions, some of which will be unpacked in the following. 
2.2.2 Social-Political Influence in Proverbs and the Political Dimension of 
Prudential Wisdom 
A common approach when dealing with a particular work of Scripture is to focus on 
something of its exegetical framework by examining such things as its social context, 
authorship and historical influences. A fuller appreciation of Proverbs, particularly as 
it pertains to the virtues and prudence, can be had in this process. It is one already 
started in the previous sections, but an interpretive analysis using such exegetical 
tools is taken up more overtly here. 
As a starting point, we can consider the notion of authorship. Though authorship of 
Proverbs has traditionally been attributed to Solomon, usually based on the opening 
                                                 
184 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 8. 
185 As Murphy states, “the goal of the teaching [in Proverbs] is formation of character, and this 
transcends the casuistry that forms a necessary part of ethical thought.” Murphy, Proverbs, 276. 
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line in 1:1,186 it is generally held by most scholars that the final form of Proverbs is 
unlikely to have been composed by the historical figure. Though some would argue 
that certain parts that have found their way into the final form of Proverbs trace their 
origin to the historical figure, the connection between the historical Solomon, or even 
his court, to the literal authorship of Proverbs as we have them today is an 
improbable one.187 There are a number of reasons why this is so. Firstly, there are 
numerous discernible sections within Proverbs that are quite distinct in style and 
content that suggest disparate authorship. Further, certain collections within Proverbs 
bear distinct relationship to non-Israelite ANE wisdom literature in general. This 
relationship came to the fore and has been explored to various degrees since the 
publication of the Teachings of Amenemope by W.E. Budge in 1923. These ancient 
Egyptian sources evidently bear particular resemblance to Proverbs 22:17-24:22. 188 
However, later scholarship has also shown links in the ten lectures or instructions 
that form the bulk of the first nine chapters of Proverbs.189 Though there is no fixed 
understanding as to how much non-Israelite influence there is in Proverbs, or even 
the direction of that influence,190 there is little argument that certain parts at least 
were not unique to the Israelite tradition much less a unique product of the 
Solomonic context. Adding to the complexity of this issue has been the additional 
and more recent analysis of non-Egyptian ANE wisdom literature, particularly that of 
Semitic regions of Mesopotamia. 191  Taken as a whole, what this broadening 
contextual perspective undoubtedly indicates is the international character of the 
                                                 
186 As well as other appellations in 10:1 and 25:1. 
187 Fox provides a brief but lucid discussion on “Solomon and the Title of Proverbs” in Fox, Proverbs 
1-9, 56-58. See also James L. Crenshaw, "Proverbs," in Urgent Advice and Probing Questions: 
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(London: British Museum, 1923), Plates I-XIV. Cited in Whybray, The Book of Proverbs, 6. The 
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191 Richard J. Clifford, ed. Wisdom Literature in Mesopotamia and Israel, SBL (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2007). 
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wisdom tradition, one that seemed to influence Israel’s surrounding cultures as much 
as it influenced Israel’s.192 
Moreover, this ‘foreign interaction’ is only part of the story in the formation of 
Proverbs. It is but one part of many influences that seem to have shaped the final 
form. A very important one nonetheless, particularly for our concern, because it 
indicates that the redactor sages certainly saw an appreciation in wisdom that went 
beyond the exclusive domain of the Israelite community. It indicates that the wisdom 
teachings of Proverbs, including its prudential aspects, were witnessed and stretched 
out into the wider reality in which the Hebrew people found themselves and points to 
a universal conception of wisdom. As noted above, the Pontifical Biblical 
Commissions recent document on the bible and morality does not refer to the 
wisdom literature at length, but it does make reference to this universal notion: 
The sages contemplate the world God created in all its beauty, order and 
harmony. These reveal something about their Creator. Through wisdom 
Israel meets her Lord in a living relationship open also to other peoples. 
The openness of Israelite wisdom to the nations and the clearly 
international character of the sages’ movement provides a biblical basis 
for dialogue with other religions and the search for a global ethic. The 
Saviour God of Jews and Christians is also the Creator who reveals 
himself in his creation.193 
Foreign influence aside, the material in Proverbs also bears evidence of multi-faceted 
influence in terms of social setting. For example, there are significant parts of the 
collection that have a familial ‘folksy’ nature to them in both syntax (references to 
‘father/mother and son’) and, on occasions, their topical focus.194 This is particularly 
so with the sayings of 10:1-22:16 which appear to have the ‘pre-history’ at least of 
being common oral sayings – short self-contained adages that bear the hallmarks of 
popular proverbial aphorisms common across most cultures and times.195 On the 
other hand, there is clear inference that other parts of Proverbs were compiled within 
an aristocratic or courtly environment and certainly the non-Israelite sourced material 
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193 Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality, §40. 
194 See R. N. Whybray, Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs, JSOTS (Sheffield: Sheffield 
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noted above seems set for the instruction of the courtly elite.196 Christopher Ansberry 
taking in the work overall suggests that, though Proverbs was compiled from a 
variety of social settings and periods, ultimately the work is set for the audience of 
those in or aspiring to leadership in the courtly environment.197 Most scholars would 
agree with this position to at least some degree, and certainly that the final redactors 
were scribal sages of a courtly status is quite likely. However, the role of the ‘family 
environment’ and the place of the ‘father and son instruction’ should not be 
underestimated. As Dell succinctly states it, particularly in reference to Prov 1-9, 
“why, if they were intended for the education of officials or even as school 
instruction, was the primary address from father (and sometimes mother – Prov 1:8; 
6:20) to son?”198 This point will be returned to shortly, but if the various contextual 
influences that can be discerned within Proverbs are acknowledged, they highlight 
the diasporic origin of the collections and hints to the broadness of intent of the final 
work as we have it. As Crenshaw states it, “The book therefore takes the shape of an 
anthology, its various components coming from various periods of Israel’s 
history.”199 The upshot is that the intended audience, as far as what can be gleaned 
from the text itself, could be of any place and time and, more the point, the moral 
teachings it contains could be rightly imbued into people’s lives of varying 
backgrounds and of varying standings – from the common peasantry, to the courtly 
elite of potentially many cultural contexts. Whybray notes as much in one of his 
many introductory discussions on Proverbs, stating that, “the reader, who is 
addressed almost exclusively as an individual, might, it seems, be of any 
nationality.”200 
Given the eclectic and nebulous contextual setting evident in Proverbs, dating and 
discussing authorship of the work with any certainty becomes problematic. As Fox 
states it, “the notion of “dating” a text, a traditional concern in Bible studies, is not 
quite germane to the book of Proverbs.”201 The best that can be achieved is broad 
                                                 
196 Particularly regarding the second Solomonic collection (25:1-29:27). Fox, for example, describes 
Chapters 25-28 as forming a “sort of manual for a monarch.”  Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 10. 
197 Christopher B. Ansberry, Be Wise, My Son, and Make My Heart Glad: An Exploration of the 
Courtly Nature of the Book of Proverbs (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 126-161. 
198 Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 24. 
199 Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 355. See also Roland E. Murphy’s discussion on the ‘pre-history’ sources 
of Proverbs in "Form Criticism and Wisdom Literature," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 31, no. 4 (1969): 
especially pp.481-483. 
200 Whybray, Proverbs, 5.    
201 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 6. 
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allusion to the boundaries of when certain sections may have been composed, which 
itself would be full of conjecture where any specifics were to be applied. Having said 
that, though certain parts may be difficult to pin down, there is a general consensus 
that the final redaction took place in the post-exilic environment, and this point does 
have some bearing on interpretation as will be noted presently.202 
With the above in mind, the focus of many biblical scholars has shifted to the final 
form of the work and what can be gleaned from any discernible processes the 
redactors may have employed. Fox makes the point as such: 
While the sayings in Proverbs are drawn from different social groups, 
including the “folk” and the literati, it was a series of editors who 
ultimately determined what was included and what was excluded … in 
the end it is their work and their idea of wisdom that we are reading, and 
it is, not surprisingly, ideologically quite coherent.203 
Returning to the notion of Solomon’s authorship touched on at the start of this 
section, and if we are to take on board Fox’s suggestion that the final redactors 
compiled their work with clear intent and purpose, then clearly Solomon’s attribution 
was not an arbitrary inclusion. Its inclusion draws into focus an aspect of wisdom 
and the virtue of prudence that makes for noteworthy correlative comparison to the 
Thomistic teaching that informs this project. 
As discussed above, the multi-faceted (including multi-authored) influences of 
Proverbs gives it a certain flavour of universality and, at the same time, the 
significance of Solomon’s authorship as a matter of historical fact becomes less 
important to interpreting the work. Having said that, the attribution of Proverbs to 
Solomon can bear importance in understanding the work overall and the nature of 
wisdom taught therein. Alan Moss is one recent scholar who has attempted to 
                                                 
202 As Dermot Cox notes in his discussion on dating Proverbs, one needs to be aware of the distinction 
between the actual date of the material itself (for example when some of the oldest oral sayings were 
first documented) and the editorial project which led to the final product. To that end, Cox states that 
“while much of the material, and indeed some of the collections, are old, the actual Book of Proverbs 
as we have it was put together, and in part modified, at a quite late period, and reflects a post-exilic 
editorial intention to some degree.” Dermot Cox, Proverbs: With an Introduction to Sapiential Books, 
ed. Carroll Stuhlmueller and Martin McNamara, OTM (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1982), 89-92. 
See also Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 17-22, 56-64. Though there is 
still conjecture particularly where specifics are concerned (see for example Clifford, Proverbs, 3-6. 
who would favour an earlier dating), more recent scholarship has tended to correlate with Cox’s 
position.  
203 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 11. 
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examine the place of Solomon in this sense.204  He notes that the attributing of 
Solomon as author of at least significant sections of Proverbs has traditionally (i.e. in 
the scholarly environment pre-dating the historical-critical approach) given it a 
certain sense of authority 205  and most contemporary scholars agree that the 
superscription of Proverbs 1:1 at least is placed in memory of some sense of special 
authority assumed of Solomon.206 In the historical-critical environment, the place of 
this authority has been questioned, not only historically as already stated, but also in 
terms of the lack of congruency between the Solomon as depicted in Kings 
(particularly 1 Kings 1-11) and the Solomon given attribution of the various books 
and parts of books of the wisdom canon. Most strikingly is the ultimate 
unfaithfulness of Solomon and the subsequent decline of the monarchy (1 Kings 11) 
in contrast to the unity and safety that his reign promised and, to a certain extent at 
least, delivered (1 Kings 4:24-25) – a successful reign attributed at least in part to 
Solomon being particular gifted in understanding (bînāh) and wisdom (ḥokmāh) (1 
Kings 3:9), key character traits also esteemed in Proverbs. 207  The incongruence 
between Solomon’s ultimate demise and the wisdom writing that is attributed to him 
in later works is captured particularly so in the contrast between the teaching of 
Proverbs, which warns the young son to avoid the ‘strange woman’ (e.g. Prov 2:16-
22),208 and the recording of 1 Kings 11:1, which states categorically that Solomon in 
fact “loved many foreign women.” 
It is beyond the scope of this work to expound such issues at length, but it is worth 
positing, as Moss does, that the contrast points to a particular need of the post-exilic 
                                                 
204  Alan Moss, "Proverbs with Solomon: A Critical Revision of the Pre-Critical Commentary 
Tradition in the Light of a Biblical Intertextual Study," Heythrop Journal 43, no. 2 (2002). Though 
Moss’ work is drawn upon here, there have been a number of scholars who have focused on the 
connection between Solomonic imagery and wisdom as it pertains to political theory. Two others 
include Walter Brueggemann, "The Social Significance of Solomon as a Patron of Wisdom," in The 
Sage in Ancient Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (Winona 
Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1990); Vladimir Wozniuk, "The Wisdom of Solomon as Political Theology," 
Journal of Church and State 39, no. 4 (1997). 
205 Moss, "Proverbs with Solomon," 202-204. 
206 Both to his productivity of “three thousand proverbs” stated in 1 Kings 4:32 and his particularly 
gifted embodiment of wisdom (1 Kings 3:11-12). For a succinct but useful survey of Solomon’s 
connection to the Wisdom tradition see Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 42-50. 
207 See section 2.1 for discussion on the significance of such terms. 
208 2:16-22 is a poignant example as it draws on the prophetic imagery of being ‘cut off from the land’ 
(v. 22). See also Prov 5:1-20, 6:20-35, 7:1-27, 23:27. The character of the ‘strange woman’ has drawn 
much attention and is beyond the scope of this discussion to unpack. The term is used by convention, 
but represents a complex notion. A surveyed discussion on this concept is well made by Fox in 
Proverbs 1-9, 134-141; 252-262. 
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Israelite community in which the final work of Proverbs was compiled and, at the 
same time, to a particular kind of moral outlook. In short, there is a shift in focus on 
wisdom and, to the degree it can be discerned, a corresponding shift in the 
characterisation of Solomon. 1 Kings clearly presents wisdom in the context of a 
political and administrative setting, where its outworking is prudential, but 
governmental in nature. In Proverbs, the social setting and the image of ‘Solomon’s 
teaching’ tends to focus on sustaining the community in the familial context 
compared to the more particularly political-governmental one that typifies 1 Kings. 
This shift is necessary because the latter proved to be ultimately inadequate in 
maintaining social and communal good. Moss explains it as such: 
In Proverbs 1–9 Solomon enacts no political and administrative reforms. 
Indeed the society implied in Proverbs 1–9 is a family-centred world. 
Wisdom consists more in avoiding too much contact with the wider 
world than in engaging explicitly in that society. True, kings reign by 
Solomon’s wisdom (8:15–16) and temple offerings are due (3:9). 
However, the rituals lead to the household’s prosperity (3:10). As I have 
argued elsewhere, the Wisdom who instructs kings personifies 
Solomon’s domestic instruction.209 In 1 Kings Solomon’s political and 
administrative programme caused division of his kingdom (1 Kgs 12:1–
20). On the other hand, Solomon’s family-based and nonpolitical wisdom 
programme in Proverbs consolidated Jewish society after the exile.210  
Brown similarly notes, in reference to the opening nine chapters in particular, that:  
Proverbs addresses a situation of social distress, a dissolute age in the 
eyes of some. To be sure, much of the attention is focused upon the 
family with the silent son listening at the feet of his parents. Why the 
family? Because it is seen as the invincible bastion of ideological 
innocence by virtue of the fact that everyone has or has had a family … 
Hence, of all social domains, the family provides the strongest appeal and 
basis for shaping and reorientating the praxis of the community.211  
                                                 
209 Moss refers in particular to "Wisdom as Parental Teaching in Proverbs 1-9," Heythrop Journal 38, 
no. 2 (1997). 
210 Moss, "Proverbs with Solomon," 206. It should be pointed out, as already discussed above, that the 
familial focus of the call to wisdom in Proverbs is clearly not the only one, particularly when taking in 
examples such as Prov 25:1-7 were the epitaph of Solomon is explicitly tied to the kingly houses of 
Hezekiah and Judah and the focal point is the monarch himself (see fn. 196 and 197). In that regard, I 
would disagree with Moss’ suggestion that it is entirely ‘non-political’. However, on the other hand, 
overall the focus of wisdom is certainly widened in Proverbs and the prudential wisdom being taught 
is not limited to a political mechanism. That is essentially the point being made here. 
211 Brown, Character in Crisis, 45. Even beyond Proverbs and the particular emphasis being noted 
here, the family represents arguably the most important social unit in the Israelite tradition. See Leo 
G. Perdue et al., eds., Families in Ancient Israel (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997).  
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The point being made here is twofold. Firstly, it reiterates the already noted 
understanding that any moral outworking that Proverbs might make leans to a 
universal appeal. Though those in positions of power are called to exercise it 
particularly, including in matters of state and for the sake of justice (Prov 8:15) and 
prudential wisdom is inherently important for good leadership because by it rulers 
“govern rightly” (8:16), it is also the same prudential wisdom that is meant for those 
on every street, the town squares, the busy corners and the city gates (1:20-21). 
Further, and by extension, as discussed previously, the call to prudential wisdom 
serves to realise a created order and that order has a social-ethical dimension, 
however, it is erroneous to assume that it is purely the place of the political elites to 
seek and maintain such a dimension. The assumption that the created order setting 
the backdrop to wisdom equates to a socio-political order that requires mandating by 
political leadership (prudential or otherwise) does not seem to necessarily hold in 
Proverbs. It is clear, and often documented, that parts of Proverbs are directed to 
forming the young aspirant to leadership by the ways of wisdom such that the 
societies they rule find life-giving cohesion and stability in keeping with the order 
woven into creation itself.212  However, if we are to draw on Moss’ reflections noted 
above, the idea that prudential wisdom exercised at the governing level is enough to 
ensure a staving off of chaos and destruction (which is the antithesis of order) seems 
to be evidently not true. A social order is required, but it is to be sought and found at 
a more fundamental level – in the individual in relationship to their familial 
community and thus to their community at large. Von Rad’s seminal work on 
Israelite wisdom speaks to this. He notes that: 
Both good and evil create social conditions; in a completely ‘outward’ 
sense they can build up or destroy the community, property, happiness, 
reputation, welfare of children and much more besides. Here, then it is a 
question not only of movements and tendencies inside a man’s heart, but 
of life-forming forces whose power was obvious to all.213  
                                                 
212 This notion comes through particularly strongly in the Egyptian influence, especially in the concept 
of ma’at (world order) and is a central theme of wisdom deliberated upon in the courtly context (see 
Perdue, Wisdom Literature, 41-42; 54-55). It is a notion that bears some correlation with the 
understanding of the natural law as discussed previously; expressing the order that can be found in 
creation and in the human world in all its many dimensions (civic, familial, professional, relational, 
etc.). Thus, it was particularly important that those in political authority exercise their office in 
keeping with ma’at. See also fn. 99 above. 
213 Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 77. 
66 
 
Von Rad later asks whether this concept of attaining wisdom for good ends and for 
the avoidance of evil socially expressed pertain only to a ruling class. He answers: 
Seen as a whole, this question is certainly to be answered in the negative. 
It is impossible to establish a particular interest in the sphere of life of the 
upper civil servants, nor any, of course, in the sphere of life of the 
enslaved or even those who were socially or culturally of the lower 
classes. In the foreground there appear the relationships of a relatively 
well-placed middle class. The decisive factor is, however, that here 
orders are described which not only have their validity in a specific social 
group but which are, in principle, valid for all men.214 
Thus, it can be said that, in part at least, Proverbs does seem to hold in mind an 
audience that is courtly and thus concerned with prudential leadership that is typical 
of the wisdom enterprise understood in other ANE contexts, and the Solomonic 
attribution attests to this in some sense. However, Proverbs also presents a notion of 
wisdom that is clearly wider in its scope. Succinctly put, the virtues that Proverbs 
encourage can and should be taken up by anybody seeking the good life. How this 
can be witnessed in Proverbs will be unpacked in the following. However, it also 
points to a certain political-communal dimension of prudential wisdom that has 
strong correlation to the notion of political prudence found in the Thomistic moral 
tradition. This latter point will be examined in the final section of this thesis,215 but 
suffice to point out here that Proverbs does not leave the exercising of prudential 
wisdom for the sake of the communal good in the place of a distinct ruling class. 
Rather, it sees all members’ adoption of such wisdom as being necessary for the 
good of the society overall. 
2.2.3 The Particular and Universal Scope of Proverbs 
It has been noted that Proverbs seems to address a reader who could be of any 
nationality and from any strata of society. The same could be said of the 
chronological placement of the intended audience. Though the final redaction of 
proverbs occurs in the context of Israel’s post-exilic experience and this naturally 
influences its composition, Proverb’s sourced material and articulation is such that 
the teachings it enshrines are meant for an audience of any time and place. Crenshaw 
indicates as much when discussing the dating of Proverbs. He notes that the “sages 
                                                 
214 Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 82. 
215 In particular 4.1 below. 
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endeavoured to communicate insights that transcend space and time. Their teachings 
aimed at universal assent by any intelligent individual, Israelite or non-Israelite.”216 
Rather than dwelling on the “specifics of national history” which is obviously 
important to the majority of the Old Testament as it is in the course of historical 
events that God’s salvation and ongoing relationship with His people is established, 
the authors of Proverbs “remained silent about the specifics of national history, 
choosing rather to dwell on things accessible to every human being.”217 
Waldemar Janzen makes a similar point in his Old Testament Ethics.218 Citing the 
work of Hans Schmid, Janzen nuances the notion that Proverbs is intentionally ‘non-
historical’, suggesting that it does bear a relationship to history, but one that is an 
interplay between the concrete experience within history properly speaking and the 
timeless and universal principles that we see associated with wisdom within 
Proverbs. The interplay is expressed as a three step process articulated by Janzen as 
such: 
(1) Very concrete (historical) experiences are observed and sifted. (2) 
These are handed down from father to son, teacher to student, in poetic 
generalized formulations (proverbs) that in themselves seem timeless and 
universal. (3) They are, however, meant to be received in a particular 
historical situation and applied judiciously to it, to see whether they can 
become new historical reality at this new time an in this new place.219 
Expounding this a little, there appears embedded in Proverbs an appreciation of the 
importance of lived experience in the process of discerning what actually constitutes 
good teaching on wisdom.220 The lived experiences of both the parent/teacher, who is 
often the narrator, but also the generations that precede him/her are the fundamental 
building blocks of Proverbs. Whether that be the sagacity gleaned in a more formal 
context of a courtly school or ‘informally’ in the intergenerational interaction in the 
                                                 
216 Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 358. 
217 Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 358. See also Ansberry who makes a similar observation while discussing 
the original historical context of Proverbs surmising that “in essence, proverbs are situationally 
oriented, open-ended sayings that cut across social barriers and remain relevant to a wide variety of 
people.” Ansberry, Be Wise, My Son, and Make My Heart Glad, 2. 
218 Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1994). 
219  Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 123, citing Hans Heinrich Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der 
Weisheit: eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur, BZAW 
(Berlin: Töpelmann, 1966), 79-84. 
220 This point is made even more poignantly when looking at some of the proverbs which speak to life 
experience in particular. See section 3.3 below. 
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village circle, the ‘words of the wise’ (Prov 22:17a) were collected and laid out not 
only for a particular generation, class or vocation, but with an eye for an arbitrary 
future. This process is impossible but for an understanding that wisdom has a 
necessarily universal appeal. This is evidently true not only by taking in Proverbs as 
a work itself but, also, how it sits in the broad wisdom tradition. Fox, for example, 
notes that: 
Proverbs is a slice of tradition that precedes ancient Israel and continued 
beyond it. This tradition comprised the creation, reshaping, and 
transmission of wise sayings and teachings about how to live a righteous, 
productive, and happy life. The Israelite tradition had predecessors in the 
ancient Near East and successors in Jewish Wisdom texts.221 
Ronald Clements in his Wisdom in Theology is another author who addresses the 
relationship between the particular and the universal as presented in Proverbs.222 In a 
mode typical of modern biblical scholarship, Clement draws his theological 
reflections through the lens of the historical context in which the wisdom tradition 
came to prominence in the Israelite history. In particular, in the post-exilic 
environment, the concept of ‘world order’ comes to supplement the Israelite faith 
that was previously built on the centrality of the nation state and the temple cult.223 
Some significance of this has already been discussed above, but Clement’s focus 
points out that such a notion of ‘world order’ that underpins Israelite world-view 
necessarily is imbued with a universal ethic. Clement, in a similar vein as Fox, notes 
that a key development in this ‘universal principle’ is found in the process that the 
early sages undertook in collecting and redacting the writings of Proverbs. In short, 
as the proverbial tradition moved from more folk and essentially oral to a written 
one, a more universal appreciation of them emerges. He states, “Once sayings were 
written down they could be compared and contrasted with each other and more 
universal truths deduced from them” and, as such, isolated truths and perceptions 
became “coordinated into a more universal body of truth.”224 However, the ultimate 
purpose of such a collation does not remain there. Ultimately they are recorded with 
                                                 
221 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 11. See also, pp. 17-27. 
222 Ronald E. Clements, Wisdom in Theology, The Didsbury Lectures (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. 
Eerdmans, 1992). 
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the intent that the future reader would be able to apply universal notions of wisdom 
captured therein to the particulars of his or her individual life.  
It is this latter point that is particularly pertinent to our discussion. Returning to 
Janzen who again cites Schmid, he makes the observation that the temptation to 
“freeze” wisdom at the second level (seeing Proverbial wisdom as timeless and 
universal) as a problematic interpretive inclination – suggesting that allowing 
“individual formulation [from Proverbs] to become contextless absolutes” misses 
their intended use.225 
What is being implied here is that Proverbs does not present timeless and universal 
deeds which must be ‘re-enacted’. Nor is the heart of what Proverbs might impart 
found in simply finding ways to ‘reinterpret’ certain aphorisms to a corresponding 
present day situation in a narrow sense. It is, rather, deeper than that and is found in 
the character formation that lies at the heart of the moral framework of Proverbs. 
Clifford makes this point stating in his commentary, “Proverbs is concerned with 
wisdom as a fundamental option in life rather than specific wise actions.”226 It is 
important to note here that this does not mean that the sages were not interested in 
actions at all. Rather, he is stressing that Proverbs does not present a formulaic list of 
maxims that must be followed if one is to be wise. As such, the teachings of Proverbs 
proposes a disposition that must be captured and directed such that one is able to 
recognise what wise living looks like in the activity of a particular life.  
We see this elaborated elsewhere by Clifford when discussing the relationship of the 
lectures of Prov 1-9 with the sentences of 10-22. He notes: 
The narrative in Prov 1-9 locates the pursuit and practice of wisdom with 
the formation of the human person in all of his or her responsibilities … 
Karl Rahner has helpfully coined the term “fundamental option.” It is the 
outgrowth of God’s encounter with people: the attractiveness of divine 
love draws humans into orienting themselves and their choices [and thus 
their actions] toward God. In Proverbs, the instructions of Woman 
Wisdom and the parents are not very specific. They inculcate receptivity 
to trustworthy authorities and fidelity to basic relationships. Counter-
                                                 
225 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 123, citing Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, 79-84.  
226 Clifford, Proverbs, 32. 
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voices mimic the genuine call and must be rejected for the primary 
invitation to be properly received.”227 
This notion of “receptivity”, which will be discussed at greater length below,228 is not 
only necessary to gaining wisdom in general, but also to navigating the bulk of the 
work of Proverbs, being the sayings themselves (Prov 10-29) and the concluding 
appendices (Prov 30-31). The Solomonic section in particular (10:1–22:16) is drawn 
from and seeks to espouse concrete actions, but actions, nonetheless, that are the 
outworking of a virtuous character, and especially a prudential one. As Clifford goes 
on to note, “since the book conceives life largely as action, it comes close to equating 
knowing the good with doing the good. The ignorance of the fool is not a simple lack 
of knowledge but an active aversion to it.”229 An illustrative example among many is 
Prov 12:11;  
Those who till their land will have plenty of food, 
but those who follow worthless pursuits have no sense. 
 
This verse forms part of a triplet of proverbs rooted in agricultural activity (12:9-11), 
but as Fox discusses in his commentary, it is not praise of physical labouring of the 
land which is the heart of the message (though it would be dismissive to ignore it 
either). Rather, “the couplet juxtaposes images of fullness and emptiness: The worker 
is rewarded with satiety, while they who pursue trifles – lit., “empty things” – are 
mindless.”230 The word rêqîm which is translated as “worthless pursuit” in the NRSV 
is the key here. NIV uses perhaps a more accurate word of “fantasies” which rightly 
evokes the image of ‘mindlessness’ that Fox alludes to. Taken as a whole, what is 
captured here is that he who has good sense will work their land – importantly it is 
their land i.e. what they are able to work in the particular, not an arbitrary notion of 
working the land as an abstract concept.231 Conversely, he who lacks good sense is 
lost in ‘fantasy’ and ‘frivolous thought’ and will go without because of it. The 
concept is not literal, but it is not purely allegorical either. Rather, it is attitudinal and 
virtue-based. It points to the quite typical imagery in Proverbs where the tangible 
                                                 
227 Richard J. Clifford, "Reading Proverbs 10-22," Interpretation 63, no. 3 (2009): 245. 
228 See section 3.3. 
229 Clifford, "Reading Proverbs 10-22," 248. 
230 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 552. 
231 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 552. It should be pointed out, in contrast to Fox’s observations, that manual 
labour in the abstract does seem to be esteemed elsewhere depending on how one translates/interprets 
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71 
 
activity that is observable in the real world of the ‘ordinary person’ points to the sort 
of character one is to hold such that they will find sustenance in the total sense. This 
is captured here and many times throughout Proverbs in the Hebrew lēb (or in this 
case the lacking of it; ḥăsar-lēb – lit. lack heart) which in the NRSV quoted above is 
translated as ‘sense’. It is imbued with holding the concept of the totality of one’s 
inner life – including their intellect, dispositions and emotions i.e. what we 
understand as pertaining to character. Van Leeuwen in the NIB captures this well in 
his commentary on Prov 12:11: 
Not to work with what is ours is to flee the real to chase the unreal. To 
lack judgment is literally to lack heart, without which one cannot acquire 
wisdom (17:16; see Pss 51:6; 90:12). The heart, in OT psychology, is the 
burning centre of our humanity from which flow our thoughts, words, 
and deeds.232   
There are a number of points which can be gleaned from this which are important for 
our purposes here. Firstly, as with wisdom in Proverbs, the virtue of prudence is 
concerned with the relationship between the universal principles of goodness and the 
lived reality of how it looks in the activity of our lives at any given point in time. In 
other words it is properly ethical in its concern. However, it is so in a particular 
manner; Proverbs builds the moral framework around the character of person rather 
than the specifics of particular acts themselves. Further, this interplay between the 
‘concrete experience’ and the timeless universal principles that can be gleaned 
therein implies a certain trust of creation that underpins the sapiential tradition in 
general, but particularly so in Proverbs. 
This is an important theme that has already been discussed above, and is a reminder 
of the basic premise that Proverbs inherently sees created reality as essentially 
capable of revealing the right way to be and act. As discussed in section 1.2, though 
technically this does not directly equate to a form of ‘natural law’ that underpins 
Thomistic virtue ethics, there is a correlation on the fundamental level which sees 
human participation in creation (as well as creation itself more broadly speaking) as 
inherently good. It is therefore capable of illuminating the proper ends of human 
nature and, thus, of human conduct – particularly so when right observation and 
reflection on such participation is made.  
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Moreover, this focus on the nature of human affairs and creation leads to 
understanding the universal appeal of this ‘right living’. As was noted previously, 
there is modern day conjecture on how an appeal to nature can truly be understood as 
‘universal’ given the myriad of understandings of ‘nature’ that have been borne out 
of the scholastic tradition into the modern era.233 Certainly there are philosophical 
issues to this approach in the modern context. Nevertheless, there is something useful 
to be had in drawing on the basic premise held in both Proverbs and in a traditional 
understanding of natural law. 234  The wisdom teaching of Proverbs builds from 
particulars to universal and then asks the reader to apply the universal back to the 
particular. Though steeped in the human capacity for right reasoning and a trust in 
the goodness of creation, the process also recognises limits; that being, that we are 
not creators of our own world of moral meaning. Prudential wisdom taught in 
Proverbs asks the student of wisdom to discover moral truths and ends and then find 
means to attaining those ends, not to determine what those ends are. Such a notion is 
also found in the traditional scholastic understanding of natural law that Porter 
identifies as a useful import even in our contemporary context. She states that such 
an understanding reminds us of a “pride of assuming that we can create our own 
world of meaning, within which we can take refuge from the ambiguities of human 
society and the stark inhumanity of the physical universe.”  Rather, the scholastics, 
and I would add the sage author of Proverbs, remind us that: 
We live in a world that we did not make, under the sovereignty of a 
Creator whose goodness we can trust but whose designs will always be to 
some extent opaque to us … what the scholastic concept of natural law 
provides is not an absolutely reliable guide to determining what is 
natural, but a framework within which to reflect on the moral 
significance of the pre-conventional roots of human practices, in 
accordance with our best efforts at any given point to discern what these 
are.235  
To summarise, the interpretive approach to Proverbs discussed above suggests that 
the ultimate call of Proverbs is not simply to establish a sense of ‘universal order’ in 
itself but, rather, to draw the reader to navigate their experience of creation such that 
they can discern how right living looks in the particulars of their lived experience in 
                                                 
233 Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 29-33. 
234 ‘Traditional understanding of natural law’ and its benefits refers to that identified by Porter in 
Natural and Divine Law, 305-318. 
235 Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 308. 
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keeping with that sense of the universal which is implicit in a notion of created order. 
In this sense, the call of Proverbs is prudential in that the virtue of prudence, 
similarly, draws the person to find the means in the particulars of their circumstance 
towards realising a universal notion of the good. The noteworthy feature of Proverbs 
is its movement from the particular (of a given admonition, for example) to the 
universal and then the implication for the reader to find application to their particular 
lives from there. This is only possible, however, if one takes on the call of wisdom 
itself; and this is the key to what Proverbs attests to. Simply careful examination of 
created reality is not enough, one can easily be deceived. To successfully recognise 
what right living looks like, one needs to do so by cultivating and maintaining a 
certain character. As Proverbs points out, it is the one who has a discerning and 
perceptive character (mēbîn) that finds wisdom in their very midst, but the fool can 
search all of creation and not find it (17:24). 
In the teaching of Proverbs, however, being of wise character is more than a form of 
human moral deliberation in the natural order of things. There is a limitation, as has 
been alluded to above, in the human capacity to employ prudential wisdom; 
however, Proverbs does not leave the formation of prudential wisdom at that. There 
is a theological dimension that engages with this limitation that is explicitly 
addressed which is vital to understanding prudential wisdom in its fullest form. This 
is taken up in the following section. 
2.2.4 Fullness of Life and Theological Imagery in Proverbs 
In both Proverbs and the virtue ethics tradition, there is the potential to understand 
prudence and the virtuous life in general as an intrinsically secular activity. That is to 
say that one can simply apply human intellectual faculties (of prudence or otherwise) 
to carefully observe the goings on of the world and employ such observations in 
deducing how to live the morally good life. One level of addressing this has already 
been made in highlighting the importance of the theological dimension of creation 
that underpins both the natural law tradition and the concept of wisdom in Proverbs. 
It has been well noted that God, as the author of creation and one that has proclaimed 
it ‘good’ (Gen 1), has inherently created a world that is able to witness to the good in 
itself. However, there is a further theological thought to be held which is captured in 
Proverbs in particular ways. In both the book of Proverbs and in the Thomistic 
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tradition there is an understanding that, though there is a human capacity to navigate 
to the teleological good, we struggle to actually recognise what that entirely is and 
so, for humans to achieve the truly good, something outside of itself is needed. It is 
Proverbs that will be the particular focus here, but it will be a notion returned to in 
the final stage of this thesis. 
A starting point to this topic can be found in returning to Prov 12:11 mentioned in 
the previous section. It points to the idea that the reward for ‘good sense’ and right 
living is sustenance. However, a closer look at this and the rewards of wise living in 
general, as is done by Murphy, reveals that the good to be had is not limited to 
physical sustenance in the simple sense but a fullness of life in all its facets – and it is 
this which represents the telos of wisdom. Murphy states it most emphatically, “the 
kerygma of wisdom can be summed up in one word: life.”236 He comes to this point 
within an examination of the introductory opening of Prov 1:1-6237 and of Proverbs 
8; in particular vv. 32-36 where Wisdom speaking in the first person cries out: 
“And now, my children, listen to me: 
 happy are those who keep my ways.  
Hear instruction and be wise,  
 and do not neglect it.  
Happy is the one who listens to me,  
 watching daily at my gates,  
 waiting beside my doors.  
For whoever finds me finds life  
 and obtains favor from the LORD;  
 but those who miss me injure themselves;  
 all who hate me love death.” 
 
As is found in numerous places in Proverbs and throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, a 
pathway is set out for life and death.238 Read at face value the options are very simple 
and stark, seek and find wisdom and you find the end of searching that is life, hate 
wisdom (and all it entails) and you will necessarily gravitate to death. It is this stark 
expression of gaining life and avoiding death which is the ultimate aim of wisdom, 
but life here needs to be understood with a certain depth. It does refer to ‘the good 
                                                 
236 Roland E. Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," Interpretation 20, no. 1 (1966): 9. For a 
useful discussion see Cox’s chapter on the “Goodness of Life” in Cox, Proverbs, 58-66. 
237 Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," 3-5. See also brief reflection in 2.2.1. 
238  The list of relevant references in Proverbs can be found in Murphy’s discussion (Murphy, 
"Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," 10). It is  reiterated again in his later work Murphy, The Tree of 




things of life’ as would typically be understood and this is iterated in Proverbs in 
various ways; longevity (3:16; 28:16), reputation (10:7; 22:1), nourishment (28:19) 
and material wealth (8:18; 24:4) are all identified as good things of life in Proverbs. 
However, as Murphy warns, “life is a very elastic concept”239 and these materially-
based goods have a greater depth of meaning than we might immediately give them. 
As he points out, “life is more than material goods; these are seen as sacramental, 
signs of the Lord’s blessings (Prov 10:22).”240 
This is particularly notable when the antithesis of life is looked at, that being 
death. 241  Death in the context of Proverbs is undermining to the person and 
community and it entails not so much a ceasing of earthly existence that we might 
typically associate with the term (though it might include that), but an existence 
where we animate as if alive but are less than living at the same time. It is captured in 
the image of Sheol which is synonymous with the place of death (Prov 7:27; Ps 
49:14)242 and certainly the pathway towards which one will head if they are not able 
be wise (Prov 15:24). It is a state where one exists, but is never complete or whole; a 
state of forever seeking, a place of constant want (Prov 30:16). Guillet (who Murphy 
also cites)243 captures the notion when reflecting on various Proverbs (Prov 10:16; 
27; 11:19 among others) and notes that there is something more than the “naïve 
belief” that simple enumeration of length of life is at stake. Rather,  
there is a profoundly moral conviction: that sin is, in man, a principle of 
corruption, an evil which undermines his being. The sinner may appear 
prosperous, but this is an illusion. At [the] bottom, he is a sick man 
whose equilibrium has been affected.244 
Thus, in contrast, we can say that life, as the telos of wisdom, is encompassing of the 
full being of the person. Brueggemann describes it as all the assets associated with 
being human; “emotional, physical, psychical, social, spiritual – which permit joy 
                                                 
239 Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," 10. 
240 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 29. 
241 Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," 11. 
242 Not to be confused with the distinctly Christian image of Hell that is often read into such texts. 
Nevertheless, the notions do naturally share a relationship of sorts and certainly the later Old 
Testament literature and the development of relevant early Christian theology drew from imagery of 
Sheol as presented in such texts. Theodore J. Lewis, "Abode of the Dead," in The Anchor Yale Bible 
Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 104-105. 
243 Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs," 11. 
244  Jacques Guillet, Themes of the Bible, trans., Albert J. LaMothe (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides 
Publishers, 1960), 172-173. 
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and security and wholeness. It includes ‘all these things’ which let a person reach his 
full capacity.”245 
With such a lofty image of the sort of life that is offered in the enterprise of wisdom, 
it is not surprising that attaining it becomes a difficult prospect. On the one hand, the 
way to ‘life’ is ever present, woven into the very stuff of existence; of human activity 
and natural occurrence alike. It is witnessed in as common an endeavour as how one 
goes about building an abode (Prov 24:27) and in the natural activity of ants, 
badgers, locusts and lizards (30:25-28). Yet the ways of wisdom are inherently 
difficult and the personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 8 captures this. The image of 
wisdom being tied to the act of creation has already been touched on, and her call to 
the listener to find life through her is repeated throughout the work, but what is also 
highlighted in this section is the chasm between the human experience and wisdom 
in her totality. Frydrych is one who focuses on this. Starting with an attentive reading 
of 8:22-31, he notes that “this passage shows that the divine sphere has an existence 
which is entirely independent of the human world, for God [and Wisdom] is active 
before the human world is brought into being by this creative work.” 246  The 
countering forces of the chaotic enter the cosmology of Proverbs without any clear 
indication of its origin, but its presence reflects what Frydrych describes as a 
‘dualistic battle’ between the forces of creative wisdom and destructive chaos, one 
played out within creation but which has its origins and end beyond it as well.247 
However, this is not to deny the monotheistic imagery of God, and the primacy of 
God over any image of wisdom (personified or otherwise), plus both God and 
wisdom’s superiority over chaos and folly maintains that monotheistic stance of God 
as creator absolute.248 It is thus that the locale of wisdom is very much in creation 
                                                 
245 Brueggemann, In Man We Trust, 15. 
246 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 87. Frydrych discusses the figure of Wisdom and notes how she 
maintains her God-likeness yet independence from God while still not being ascribed a god in the 
polytheistic mode. She is also not considered of God in the hypostatic mode as would be later drawn; 
where Wisdom’s identity is found in Christ (e.g. 1Cor 1:24). This is not addressed in this project as 
such, except to note that there has been an evolving understanding of personified wisdom throughout 
the history of the Hebraic then Christian faiths. Further, as Murphy suggests, by certain 
understanding, it is possible to be fair to the historical meaning of the text as it sits within the OT as 
well as allowing for its continual development in the NT and beyond. Murphy, "Kerygma of the Book 
of Proverbs," 5-6; The Tree of Life, 146-147.  
247 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 88-93. 
248 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 92-94. 
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and in the ongoing activity of creation, but it is beyond it as well and, further, its 
fullest expressions and rewards are found in God alone.249  
This conception is important as it lays the groundwork for a thoroughly theological 
aspect of wisdom. Central to this thesis is the notion that wisdom in Proverbs is 
inherently prudential, however, this does not make it entirely a human activity apart 
from any theological conception. It necessarily (according to Proverbs) cannot be – if 
one is to grasp the truth of things, then one is going to have to apply a certain 
attentiveness to created reality, the world we live in, that is intrinsically theistic. In a 
sense this is a re-iteration of what has been stated earlier (particularly section 1.2).  
However, the stress here is the more overt attention to the theistic dimension that can 
be gleaned in the scope of prudential wisdom. Proverbs explicitly states on a number 
of occasions and at key points, predominantly through the ‘fear of the Lord’ idiom,250 
that the search for wisdom originates and ends in God. Most notably the all-
important introductory stanzas of 1:1-7 have at their crown such a statement:  
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge; 
fools despise wisdom and instruction.251 
 
Given the discussion had to this point, and the cosmology put forward by Proverbs, 
such a notion is entirely logical. The introductory stanza mentions a number of 
prudential aspects of wisdom such as discretion, vision and knowledge (Prov 1:2), 
and Proverbs encourages that ‘learning and skill’ in such things can be gained (1:3), 
but the complete depth of such learnings can only be found if such tasks are found in 
God. As Van Leeuwen states it, Prov 1:3 “is the book’s motto and states its 
theological theme.” 252  Brown points out this verse is a “leitmotif of proverbial 
wisdom” and “is presented as a comprehensive intellectual virtue. It marks the 
                                                 
249  As Frydrych reminds us, wisdom mediates true understanding, but does not generate its 
consequences. Yahweh alone is responsible for the nature of the blessings that comes from accepting 
wisdom. Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 91. It is this sentiment which is also found in the cry of Job 
28:12. 
250 The phrase occurs fourteen times throughout Proverbs. In addition, there are a lengthy number of 
statements of what the Lord loves and abhors which also points to the importance of Yahweh in the 
compression of proverbial wisdom. A comprehensive list can be found in Michael V. Fox, "The 
Epistemology of the Book of Proverbs," Journal of Biblical Literature 126, no. 4 (2007): 679. 
251 It can also be pointed out that the conclusion of Proverbs also has the ‘good Woman’ being praised 
for ‘fearing the Lord’ (Prov 31:30). As Perdue states it, such a bracketing forms a “major inclusio for 
the entire book of Proverbs.” Perdue, Wisdom Literature, 49. 
252 Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs," 33. See also Whybray who points to v. 7 being a “‘motto’ 
summing up the teaching of the whole book.” Proverbs, 17. 
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starting point as well as the end point of the journey of wisdom.”253 As is Brown’s 
outlook overall, he highlights that such an assertion points to the disposition one 
must hold if they are going to appropriate the “repertoire of virtues”254 that are made 
on offer. This disposition, Brown highlights, sits in a relational dimension and speaks 
to the totality of the person. He states: 
“The fear of the Lord” introduces a relational dimension to the list of 
virtues that grounds this catalogue squarely within the parameters of 
normative character. Whereas the list of virtues delineates the external 
contours of ethical character, the “fear” of God deals fundamentally with 
the heart and center of character, namely the position of the person in 
relation to God. A position of humble, receptive reverence, an 
acknowledgement that all wisdom is divinely generated.255 
Another key expression of the same sentiment is found in the very next chapter, 
particularly 2:1-6. The chapter starts with the familiar call from the parent/teacher for 
the attentive youth to take heed of his words which provide both the pathway to 
wisdom and includes wisdom itself (2:1-2). Verses 3-4 point to a disposition of 
character that one is to attain and the language and tense is conditional; 
 if you indeed cry out for insight,  
and raise your voice for understanding [good sense];  
if you seek it like silver,  
and search for it as for hidden treasures256 
 
These verses clearly express the attitude the pupil should have, one that not only 
seeks out the things of wisdom, but does so with a depth of awareness of the sort of 
value it entails. Further, being like ‘hidden treasure’, it will require activity built on 
that disposition to find. What is the outcome of such conditional statements? In the 
words of Prov 2:5, it is a grasp of “fear of the Lord” and “knowledge of God.” Fox in 
his examination of this chapter makes the point that, “whereas we would expect the 
quest for wisdom to culminate in the finding of wisdom, this verse makes an even 
greater claim. The promised outcome is religious enlightenment: the understanding 
                                                 
253 Brown, Character in Crisis, 28.  
254 Brown, Character in Crisis, 28. 
255 Brown, Character in Crisis, 28-29 (emphasis in the original). 
256 My emphasis. Squared bracket translation my own based on word study in section 2.1. 
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of the fear of the Lord and the knowledge of God.”257 Fox’s comments on the verse 
that follows is particularly illuminating. Proverbs states in 2:6: 
For the Lord gives wisdom;  
from his mouth come knowledge and understanding [good sense]. 
 
As Fox notes “Wisdom engenders mature piety because God is the source of 
wisdom, and in seeking it you are in effect seeking him.”258 He goes on to state that, 
as is typical of Proverbs and the wisdom literature in general, this does not equate to 
a form of verbal revelation as one would witness, for example, among the 
Prophets.259 Nevertheless, there is a meeting between human and divine and it is one 
that advances to a mature form of “reasoned, cognitive conscience.” 260  Fox 
continues, “hence fear of God … is the object of understanding (2:5a) and is defined 
by the parallel as a form of knowledge (2:5b). With wisdom, fear of God becomes 
conscience, and inner sense of right and wrong and a desire to do what is right.”261 
Fox goes on to cite the Franciscan Dermot Cox who provides a point of view that is 
particularly pertinent to our discussion. He states that ‘fear of God’ is:  
A form of conscience that calls for an intellectual adhesion to a principle, 
the divine order, the concept of goodness of life, and this is a guarantee 
of 'success’. … It is a state of mind, not an action; it is almost 
synonymous with knowledge (especially in Prov 1-9).262 
That said, it should be pointed out that this notion of ‘fear of the Lord’ is not simply 
an inner state of mind or character trait with no outward expression. Clifford is one 
who seems to stress a more ritualistic image of the ‘fear of the Lord’ motif. 
According to Clifford, and based on the conception found in the ANE broadly,263 he 
states that “‘fear of a god’ does not refer primarily to an emotion or a general 
                                                 
257 Michael V. Fox, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2," Journal of Biblical Literature 113, no. 2 (1994): 
237-238. 
258 Fox, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2," 238. 
259 Here one needs to be aware of what is meant by ‘revelation’. I hold that the lack of explicit verbal 
revelation does not deny revelation, that being a form of divine disclosure, entirely. As is being 
articulated both here and above, though it is not always an easy concept to capture in Proverbs, the 
divine is revealed in the very fabric of created reality and in the virtuous formation of character. For 
similar discussion see Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 218-225. Fox is more circumspect in his 
understanding of revelation in this mode, but seems to fundamentally hold the same premise. For 
fuller reflection on revelation in particular see Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 946-962. 
260 Fox, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2," 238. 
261 Fox, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2," 238. 
262 Dermot Cox, "Fear of Conscience?: Yir'at YHWH in Provers 1-9," in Studia Hierosolymitana III, 
ed. Giovanni C. Bottini (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1982), 89. 
263 Based on Clifford’s premises as articulated in his introduction, Proverbs, 8-19. 
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reverent attitude. Rather it means revering a particular deity by performing the god’s 
rituals and obeying the god’s commands.” He then warns that the “modern readers 
need to recall that ancient religion was regarded as something one did rather than 
something one felt. Doing one’s duties were part of fearing God.”264 This perspective 
is duly noted, and it is fair to say that Proverbs, though it does not say much 
regarding cultic activity, does nonetheless acknowledge it. However, and contra to 
Clifford’s observation, it does so only in a certain way. Prov 21:3 is a particularly 
pertinent example which simply states that “to do what is righteous and just” is 
preferable to Yahweh than cultic sacrifice.265 Not that religious activity in and of 
itself is unimportant to Proverbs,266 but the moral disposition of the person is vital. In 
this case we are also reminded that ‘righteousness’ itself, which tends to be used in 
such references, is not simply a state of simple external piety either. Lyu’s study on 
the concept of righteousness within the context of Proverbs specifically provides an 
excellent definition: 
Righteousness is the all-encompassing quality of human or divine 
character in toto above and beyond specific behaviours, which is 
actualized as rectitude in moral choices and fairness and benevolence in 
social transactions. A righteousness person embodies righteousness as an 
internalized and pervasive character trait, cultivates the desire to be 
righteous, and finds pleasure when that desire is met.267 
To bring the above together and into the wider discussion, it can be seen that the end 
that is life in its total goodness will be found by those who acquire prudential 
wisdom. Further, such wisdom belongs to the human but is beyond it as well. 
Moreover, the person’s ability to follow such a path is not entirely within the human 
capacity and, more the issue, it is not a given that what might seem like the ‘right 
path’ to humans is in fact so. As Prov 14:12 warns; “There is a way that seems right 
to a person, but its end is the way to death.” Drawing on this, Frydrych well warns, 
“the sage who acquires wisdom using his God-given senses should not think that 
                                                 
264 Clifford, Proverbs, 35-36. 
265 Also 15:8-9; 15:29; 21:27. This also echoes a sentiment found elsewhere in the Hebrew Scriptures 
(e.g. Isa 1:11–15; Amos 5:22; Mal 1:12) 
266 As Frydrych states in his discussion on such verses, “at least on one occasion (Prov 3:9) the sages 
encourage involvement with the cult, and this, in combination with the earlier observed systematic use 
of Yahweh, renders the simple conclusion that the sages rejected the cult untenable.” Living Under the 
Sun, 95. 
267 Lyu, Righteousness in the Book of Proverbs, 13-14. See also fn. 125 above. 
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such wisdom can make God dispensable.”268 Frydrych, citing Prov 16:2; 16:9; 20:24 
as well as the aforementioned 14:12, suggests that such expressions point to “general 
limits” to human capacities, “consequently the wise person is never entirely self-
reliant … it is from this basic anthropological perspective that the fear of Yahweh 
emerges as a cornerstone of proverbial wisdom.” 269  It is a cornerstone that is 
necessary because, though there is tremendous capacity for the good in the human 
being, it will not automatically reach that potential without formation in wise living 
that, according to Proverbs at least, can only be conceived as truly wise when the 
theological conception is imbued in it. 
This allows the makeup of the moral outlook of Proverbs to be further identified. 
Firstly, it is teleological in that the ultimate aim of acquiring wisdom, both its 
prudential facets as well as the other virtues that work in concert with it, is life in its 
fullest. Secondly, this notion of fullness of life can include that which pertains to 
‘natural’ goods, but an appreciation of the theological imagery of Proverbs 
recognises that the fullness of this telos is necessarily theistic as well. How this can 
be more fruitfully interpreted will be discussed in section 4.2 below where the notion 
of infused virtues is taken up. In anticipation of that discussion, what can be noted 
here is that Proverbs presents an elevation of what would appear as prudential pursuit 
of ‘natural goods’ (such as good familial and political relationships, adequate 
sustenance, just dealings in business) to a good which serves and is served by the 
human relationship to God.  
  
                                                 
268 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 129. 
269 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 129.  
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3. Truthful Vision and the Parts of Prudence that Aid It 
3.1 Truthful Vision: Seeing Reality Rightly 
One common thread running through the discussion to this point rests on the 
importance of seeing reality right. It was noted at the beginning of this project that 
the heart of the moral life rests on a truthful grasp of reality, which can be termed 
‘truthful vision’. We recall again what was quoted there from Pieper:  
The intrinsic goodness of man – and that is the same as saying his true 
humanness – consists in this, that “reason perfected in the cognition of 
truth” shall inwardly shape and imprint his volition and action. In this 
fundamental principle of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole 
doctrine of prudence.270 
The contemporary theologian Paul Wadell, from whom the term ‘truthful vision’ has 
been borrowed, likewise states that “there is an intrinsic connection between truthful 
vision and virtuous action because we cannot act rightly unless we first see 
rightly.”271 Doing so, however, is not as easy as it may seem. Wadell continues by 
pointing out that seeing truthfully is not as straightforward as “opening one’s eyes, 
because we can open our eyes and still fail to see;”272 what is needed is a depth of 
attentiveness that takes in the whole human fabric and thus pertains to the formation 
of character in the fullest sense. Similarly, Proverbs invites the reader to form right 
vision of the world, but also points to the notion that to fully apprehend reality is not 
necessarily straightforward and we can be easily deceived. It is thus that Clifford 
observes that, “Proverbs assumes the existence of a world created by God with a 
certain order or inherent dynamism. People perforce live in God’s world, but they do 
not by that fact know how to live in that world. There is much they do not know, 
much that is hidden.”273 That fuller knowledge necessary for the fullness of life is not 
simply a technical or empirical apprehension of things, but an appropriation of the 
                                                 
270 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 8. 
271 Wadell, Becoming Friends, 122.  
272 Wadell, Becoming Friends, 122. Wadell draws on Iris Murdoch to inform such conclusions; “The 
Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts” in The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1970), 77-104. Also referred to is Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, 30-47.  
273 Richard J. Clifford, The Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 50. 
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truth of how the world, as created by God, is. Thus, as Clifford adds, “knowledge in 
Proverbs is not information but a way of seeing reality.”274 
Aquinas himself likewise notes that right apprehension of reality is an important 
aspect of prudence. This is captured particularly in his description of the various 
parts of prudence and allied virtues that are bound to it (what can also be called ‘sub-
virtues’). 275  He also, in a similar vein to Proverbs, points out that our natural 
existence gives us a certain propensity towards seeing reality rightly and thus 
developing prudence, but doing so does not occur by effortless course. In describing 
one of these parts of prudence, that being memory (memoria), Aquinas, citing 
Cicero, states: “The aptitude for prudence is from nature, yet its perfection is from 
practice or from grace. And so Cicero observes that memory is not developed by 
nature alone, but owes much to art and diligence.”276 This observation pertaining to 
the sub-virtue of memoria is the first of three parts of prudence that will be 
examined. Here I will follow Pieper in taking three of the more significant parts of 
prudence as outlined by Aquinas, that being memory (memoria), teachablity 
(docilitas) and nimble decisiveness (solertia).277 In each of the three areas I will 
address an understanding of the ‘sub-virtue’ as understood in the Thomistic mode, 
highlight some key features of it and address its relationship to the virtue of prudence 
in general. Secondly, I will look at how this concept is expressed in Proverbs. In 
doing so, the benefit of the aspect of prudence in question will be unpacked while 
also allowing the teachings of Proverbs to enrich such an understanding. 
 
                                                 
274 Clifford, The Wisdom Literature, 50. See also Fox’s discussion on the construal of knowledge in 
Proverbs which expounds on this in Fox, "The Epistemology of the Book of Proverbs." A newer 
version of the same article appears in Proverbs 10-31, 963-976. 
275 Aquinas develops a rather technical understanding of ‘part’ in ST, II-II, 48. Later, while still 
referring to prudence as a virtue, he describes a list of 3 ‘allies’ (adiunctus) of prudence being  well-
advisedness (euboulia), sound judgment (synesis) and a sharpness of mind  to deal with exceptional 
circumstances (gnome); ST, II-II, 51. These three concepts in particular capture the notion of a right 
apprehension of reality, but also find expression within eight ‘parts’ of prudence found in II-II, 49. For 
the sake of staying consistent with Aquinas, both terms are noted here. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, ‘sub-virtue’, ‘part’ and similar will be used interchangeably to refer to such principles. 
276 ST, II-II, 49.1 ad 2 (Blackfriars translation). 
277 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 10-20. Direct literal translation of the Latin terms can be 
problematic as the concept being held within them might be lost in its modern usage. For this reason 
the Latin will be generally referred to. The translations used here are based on Blackfriars translation 
of the Summa and Pieper himself. The term solertia is the more difficult of the three. Pieper states it as 
being the virtue of “objectivity in unexpected situations.” Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 16. The 




3.2.1 ‘True-to-Being’ and ‘True-to-Self’ Understanding 
On the face of it, the importance of memory as a part of the virtue of prudence is not 
especially complicated. Recollection of past experience helps one formulate an 
impression of the present and thus allows one to navigate a path to a future goal. 
Further, it seems that memory is an entirely natural and involuntary activity, thus it 
might seem of little use to discuss it as a part of the formation of a virtue as there is, 
correspondingly, little we as moral agents can do about it. Indeed, one of the 
objections in the relevant article on memoria in the Summa Theologiae points out 
that, unlike prudence more broadly, it would seem that memory should not be 
considered a special part of prudence because it happens as a matter of course and is 
not something that can be “perfected by practice” as applies to the virtues in 
general.278  
Aquinas’s response helps us understand the importance of what we can term ‘right 
memory’. It has already been indicated above that memory, as a cognitive function, 
is not perfect by nature – the sheer fact that one can improve recollection of things by 
certain ‘aids’ points to this (and Aquinas, citing Cicero and Aristotle, lists four 
methods to achieving just that).279  The implication is that our memories can be 
distorted or obscured. There are two aspects which can be held in this regard. Firstly, 
we can think of memory as simply the ability to recall the experience of our past, 
including how we may have dealt with moral dilemma and the like. How did we 
navigate such events? When confronted with a situation where we were required to 
favour one particular moral norm at the expense of another, how did we employ them 
in the right order towards the right ends? Such elements of memoria, which are 
important to developing a prudent character, seem to be the focus of Aquinas in the 
reply of II-II, 49.1. It is, in this vein, that memoria is an important aspect of coming 
to moral maturity. This topic is more closely examined in the next section but, put 
simply here, failing to utilise and foster right memory is akin to failing to ‘learn from 
our experiences’ and, as such, there is a sense of culpability associated with such a 
neglect. 
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Secondly, and not totally distinct, there is a more complete sense of memory that 
applies to the self that is more than simple cognitive recollection. It is related to what 
Pieper terms ‘true-to-being memory’. Pieper describes this principle as such: 
True-to-being character of memory means simply that it “contains” in 
itself real things and events as they really are and were. The falsification 
of recollection by the assent of negation of the will is memory’s worst 
foe; for it most directly frustrates its primary function: to be a “container” 
of the truth of real things.280 
Pieper is pointing out that the human person not only can struggle to ‘remember’ in a 
technical sense, but that the human condition is such that, whether by wilful 
movement or a negation of it, we falsify or distort our recollection of things. For 
example, I might have been asked to give money to a viable and sound cause but 
chose not to for selfish reasons and by negating my will that would otherwise be 
moved to do so. I might ‘recall’ later that my reasoning was based on lack of means 
or a perception that the charity involved was questionable in its practices and the 
like. I might falsely regard myself as being just and generous in character though my 
actions in a certain point in time did not demonstrate those virtues at all. Such an 
example is simplistic but, as Pieper notes, the problem is that such falsification of our 
memories of is often unnoticeable. As such, right memory, or ‘true-to-being 
memory’, requires diligent and active work at developing a character committed to 
the good and to the truth of things. As he states: 
There is no more insidious way for error to establish itself than by this 
falsification of the memory through slight retouches, displacements, 
discolorations, omissions, shifts of accent. Nor can such falsification be 
quickly detected by the probing conscience, even when it applies itself to 
this task. The honesty of the memory can be ensured only by a rectitude 
of the whole human being which purifies the most hidden roots of 
volition.281 
As such, we can understand this concept of memory as holding to a clear-sightedness 
of the self, a ‘true-to-self memory’ as much as true recollection of events and entities 
outside one’s self. As McCabe states it, “good sense282 is a kind of clear-sightedness 
about our problems which enables us to put them in proper perspective, to see what 
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is more important and what is less so. It also, and most importantly, involves a 
certain clear-sightedness about myself.”283 
Given that, it is quite understandable that such a practice does not come easily. 
Pieper goes on to state that the ‘knowing’ required by prudence is metaphysical in its 
scope rather than purely psychological and, as such, is not acquired easily. Thus, it is 
rightly described as a bonum arduum, a steep good.284 
There is another layer to note in regard to right memory. Though the above is deeply 
personal, there is a notion of shared or collective memory that can be (and evidently 
clearly is at times) falsified or suppressed from a people’s viewpoint. For example, 
Australia’s inadequate attention to Aboriginal occupancy and heritage for much of its 
colonised history allowed for political imprudence and injustice to develop in the 
nation’s formal dealings. Turkish failure to recognise the genocide of Armenians 
during World War I has done similar.285 In the play Paradise Lost by Clifford Odets, 
the character Leo Gordon is listening to a radio announcer’s upbeat nationalistic 
commentary celebrating the 15th anniversary of Armistice Day. Leo, holding to the 
memory of a loss endured from the war, recalls in a lamented tone “We cancel our 
experience. That is an American habit.”286  These words speak to how a failure to 
attend to ‘right memory’ frustrates the role experience can have in serving the 
virtues, both in a collective and individual sense. In either case (collective or 
individual), morally sound activity guided through the virtue of prudence is 
impossible when our memory is supressed or obscured.287 
3.2.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Memoria 
This deeper notion of memoria is also esteemed in Proverbs though the terminology 
is not used. It does not describe memory as a particular psychological conception in 
the technical sense, but the importance of ‘true-to-being’ and ‘true-to-self’ memory 
is nonetheless present. This is captured in a number of ways. One has already been 
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mentioned regarding the Hebraic concept of heart (lēb).288 The concept of lēb is an 
encompassing one that captures the entire inner motivations, sensibilities, and 
dispositions of the person. Though generally representative of emotions in modern 
Western settings, in the Hebrew Scriptures the heart is associated more so with the 
intellectual capacities of reason. Having said that, it should not be confused with 
mere psychological functionality either; the Hebrew image of heart holds an 
integrated conception of the faculties of the human mind.289 Included in it would be 
the concept of memory as discussed above. Though the sages of Israel may not 
necessarily see memory as being distinct from other capacities associated with the 
‘inner workings’ of the human being, nevertheless, the way the concept of heart is 
used in Proverbs provides for a useful point of reflection in relation to the 
understanding of the sub-virtue of memoria being considered here. 
For example, Prov 27:19 states: 
As face mirrors face in water, 
so the heart reflects the person. 
 
This somewhat cryptic verse in the Hebrew is translated in various ways and the 
NABRE translation is used here as it is closest to the literal.290 The notion is that 
one’s face is essentially invisible to the self unless one sees it reflected back to them. 
Likewise, the person is known by seeing into the inner reflections of the heart, the 
inner mind.291 As Murphy states it, “the heart serves as a mirror, and when you look 
honestly and directly into it, you attain greater knowledge.”292 Murphy also indicates 
that there is ambiguity into whose heart is being looked into. It could be one’s own or 
the other. Neither is definitive nor should they be mutually exclusive.293 As such, the 
former is possible and, thus, inference can be found in two senses. Firstly, outward 
appearance is not the measure of a person, both as we see ourselves and as others 
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perceive us. Secondly, and subsequently, if one is to have a true appreciation of the 
self, a ‘true-to-being’ apprehension, the heart is where the examination must lie.  
The importance of the notion of ‘heart’ can also be found in observing how Proverbs 
describes those who lack it. Among characteristics that are found in the fool, we see 
that deception and misapprehension is high amongst them. For example, Prov 14:8 
states: 
         The wisdom of the shrewd enlightens their way,  
         but the folly of fools is deceit.294 
 
This verse illustrates a typical pattern found in Proverbs where wisdom and folly are 
juxtaposed. In this case, it indicates that prudential wisdom295 illuminates the way of 
one’s life, while the vice of the fool is found in their dishonesty. As Fox points out, 
the deceit in question in such a verse is primarily of the self. He states, “Since the A-
line alludes to wisdom’s benefit to its possessor, the B-line presumably speaks of 
folly’s harm to its possessor. Hence the deceit in question is self-delusion.”296  
Elsewhere Proverbs points out that the one who has understanding (tĕbûnâ) has clear 
path to follow, but those that lack ‘heart’ fail to recognise folly for what it is. Prov 
15:21 for example states: 
Folly is a joy to one who has no sense [ḥăsar-lēb, lit. lacks heart],  
but a person of understanding walks straight ahead. 
 
Davis’ analysis of such concepts points out, “the exercise of prudence is so basic that 
to be without it is to lack the identifying element of humanity, namely, a ‘heart’ or 
‘mind’.”297  Davis continues, while referring to Prov 14:8 as cited previously, that the 
prudent life explicated in Proverbs asks one to be self-critical, “The realism that 
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underlies good judgment begins with a rigorous attitude towards the self.”298 As 
such, the teachings of Proverbs are very clear that a failure to seek ‘true-to-self’ 
apprehension of reality will necessarily inhibit prudential living. 
It is not surprising, then, that Proverbs instructs the young student to, above all other 
things, guard one’s heart, for fullness of life is found therein (Prov 4:23). Van 
Leeuwen’s reflections on this are worth noting:  
Even though the heart can stand in metonymy for the whole person in its 
“mental,” inner aspect (what my heart thinks is what I think), there is in 
the admonition to guard one’s heart an awareness of the mysterious 
reflexivity that humans possess: I can look at myself and make even my 
inmost self the object of care, reflection, improvement, and betterment.299 
As can be seen, Proverbs does not describe ‘truthful vision’ as including memory in 
the same terms as those found in Aquinas, but the deeper sense of memoria discussed 
previous, namely that indicated by ‘true-to-being’ and, even more so, ‘true-to-self’ 
memory is certainly present.  Acquiring prudential wisdom is wrapped up in a sense 
of the self that is deeply truthful. Conversely, deception, and in particular self-
deception, is found inherently in imprudent and foolish lives. 
As noted previous, memoria as a part of prudence also has a collective dimension. A 
collective underpinning is certainly found in Proverbs that correlates with this. For 
example, much of the teaching of Proverbs rests on a notion that what is being 
passed on is a collective wisdom, a collective memory of prudential living as it were, 
gathered such that those who follow can ‘recall rightly’ the truth of things and thus 
form virtuous character.300 Correspondingly, the teaching being imparted in Proverbs 
is not only for the betterment of the individual, but it benefits the community at large. 
The communal dimension of prudence has been discussed previously (2.2.2 above) 
where it was noted that the prudence of individuals and the collective/communal 
good are intrinsically entwined. Indeed, according to texts such as Prov 14:34, it is 
the moral and spiritual character of a people in the collective sense that is the 
measure of a nation’s greatness rather than its power, wealth and influence which 
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would be the more obvious criteria. As such, though Proverbs is largely addressed to 
the individual and a sense of ‘truthful vision’ is encouraged on that level, a 
communal dimension is always implied and surrounds such notions.301  
On both the individual and communal level, prudential living requires a ‘true-to-self 
memory’, one that sees the reality of the self as it has and continues to engage with 
existence in its fullest sense. Proverbs in its own mode of expression supports the 
importance of self-awareness and a ‘true-to-self memory’ and, with some frequency, 
also reminds the reader of the self-deception that shadows the fool. According to 
Proverbs, as Von Rad states, “the fool miscalculates his potentiality; he lives in 
deception (14:9). For this reason, folly is always something which endangers life 
(10:21; 18:7).” Thus, the acquiring of prudential wisdom requires a rigorous attitude 
toward the self and, further, spills over into the virtue of being humble and teachable, 
notions captured in the part of prudence termed docilitas which is taken up presently.   
 
3.3 Docilitas 
After memoria, the next necessary part of prudence to be examined is understood as 
docilitas. It rests on the idea that one way to aid the acquisition of the virtues is by 
being taught them via the wisdom and example of others. It is not the only way and 
certainly not the complete way for it is well noted that exercising the virtues in the 
activity of one’s life is necessary to habituate them into the character of one’s being. 
Nevertheless, for Aquinas, because prudence is concerned with the particulars of 
activity in the vast contexts of our lives, the ways of prudence above any other virtue 
seeks to gain the most in learning from others for it exposes us to a far greater sphere 
of experience than we could acquire with self-reflection alone.302 Likewise, the Book 
of Proverbs esteems the reader to be a student of wisdom, attentive to instruction in 
prudential living. Of all the aspects of the virtue of prudence this thesis examines, 
this is perhaps the one that is most prevalent in the Book of Proverbs. As Aquinas 
quoting Proverbs 3:5 indicates, one needs to be cautious when “leaning on their own 
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prudence.”303 A good part of Proverbs’ instructions are on where one can ‘lean’ 
rightly and thus learn the ways of wise living. 
3.3.1 Docilitas: Acquiring the Virtues by Being Open and Teachable 
When discussing notions of acquiring virtues, invariably most scholars in the field 
will address the issue of habitus. Included within the concept of habitus is the idea 
that one acquires the virtues and, more specifically, has their character shaped in 
accordance with the virtues in the ongoing and repeated activity that concurs with the 
virtue in question in the particulars of life. In this sense, the virtues are expressions of 
enacted choices an individual makes over a period of time. There is a certain 
relationship between speculative reason and practical reason here. A person may 
indeed have a grasp of the good in a speculative sense, but, through the exercising of 
prudence, the truly virtuous is able to enact speculative knowledge of the good in the 
particulars of one’s life such that the virtue habituates itself into the character of the 
agent. It is this which provides a depth to the notion of habitus as it relates to the 
virtuous life.  
Though habitus is often translated as ‘habit’, it is not simply through disengaged or 
mindless repetitive activity that one acquires the virtues nor is it a form of what 
Pinckaers terms an empty “psychological automatism.”304 Pinckaers cautions seeing 
the virtuous life as being something acquired through repetitive action alone or the 
‘automatic’ activity built on simple notions of habit because such a rendering 
diminishes the moral weight that formed virtue should have.305 Rather, virtues are 
acquired by deliberate, formed inner conviction which moves one to morally sound 
activity born out of sound character – i.e. it is prudential activity which itself forms 
the virtuous person. Keenan commenting on the same article by Pinckaers states; “by 
prudence, an agent becomes what she or he intentionally does. … Humans are not 
simply products of their actions, rather, virtues are acquired by intended, desired, 
prudential activity.”306 
Such reflections by Keenan and Pinckaers are built on the thoughts of Aquinas who, 
in simple terms, taught that the agent’s prudential engagement of particular activities 
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occasions the further development of dispositions present within the agent. As 
Keenan notes, “Thomas’s appropriation of Avicenna’s formula for the acquisition of 
virtue through ‘reflection and exercise’ (stadium et exercitium) is evident here: to be 
virtuous requires right exercise of immanent activity.”307 As such, prudence, like any 
other virtue, is obtained and perfected through practice in deliberation and action. 
When we consider a more nuanced approach to this notion of practice, deliberation 
and action, as suggested by Keenan and Pinckaers, we can begin to conceive that 
formed virtue is not simply acting automatically, but developing what can be termed 
moral maturity.  
The cardinal virtue of prudence in particular is dependent on one’s experience in 
moral deliberation; experience which is found over a lifetime, which is why, 
according to Aquinas, it is seldom found in the young.308 As such the quality of 
prudence is necessarily tied to maturity of age and the necessity of long years of 
experience.309 Though the young may have a degree of prudence, Thomistic thought 
would suggest there is a correlation between age in years and the capacity for having 
a character more fully imbued with prudence.  
However, simply living long enough to be considered ‘mature in age’ is not enough. 
To again draw on Pinckaers, even simply repeating certain acts for a length of time 
does not necessarily lead to the fully formed character. It is thus that Pinckaers notes 
that one does not acquire the virtues by simple habit, but by a fuller notion of ‘moral 
education’.310 To be ‘educated’ into the moral life one has to be teachable and it is 
this which represents the crux of docilitas. Aquinas teaches that the sub-virtue of 
docilitas allows one to be humble enough to learn the lessons that life has to offer; to 
be open and teachable to the ways that prudential living looks such that one can 
indeed mature into being prudent. As such, it also affords an avenue for acquiring 
prudence (and indeed an understanding of the virtues overall) for the young such that 
they can truly find moral maturity as they grow into physical maturity.  
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Of course the notion of docilitas has a multi-layered aspect. It is most directly 
translated as ‘docility’ which potentially has the undesirable connotation of what 
Pieper terms “simple minded zealousness of the ‘good pupil’.”311  Rather, as Pieper 
continues,  
what is meant [by docilitas] is the kind of open-mindedness which 
recognizes the true variety of things and situations to be experienced and 
does not cage itself in any presumption of deceptive knowledge. What is 
meant is the ability to take advice, sprung not from any vague “modesty,” 
but simply from the desire for real understanding (which, however, 
necessarily includes genuine humility).312 
The aim of moral maturity is ultimately to be able to recognise and exercise the 
virtues in one’s own particular life. Speaking from an educators perspective, 
Pinckaers suggests that the aim of moral education is to “acquire enough maturity to 
take formation into his own hands and to trace out his path to moral perfection by 
himself,”313 i.e. to able to recognise vice and virtue in the reality of their own lives 
and the context they occupy. However, such a place of maturity requires a prior 
formation that strikes a balance between the need of ‘personalism’ on the one hand 
and moral rigour that will not “abandon the other person … to his own 
inexperience”314 on the other.  
Returning to docilitas in particular, what is imaged here is the realisation that a good 
moral pupil will be able to ‘think for themselves’, that is, to be malleable enough to 
realise the variety of life situations and have the character to adapt moral 
understanding to it. It also, however, requires at a more fundamental level that one be 
open enough to being taught in the first place. In the Thomistic tradition, this is 
intrinsically part of acquiring prudence. If one finds oneself holding the position of 
being a ‘know-it-all’, then it is quite likely that the virtue of prudence is in fact at 
some distance away from being acquired. The truly prudent is able to hold the 
somewhat counterintuitive notion of needing to be aware of their lack of wisdom and 
knowledge such that they are able to seek it from outside of themselves. Thus, it 
necessarily requires seeking and recognising what Aquinas would term good counsel. 
Indeed, it is part of what would be the first step in the ‘activity of reason’ as 
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indicated in ST II-II, 47.8. Prudence includes the ability to seek good counsel and 
deliberate well with it, to form judgements about such counsel and inquiry, and to 
then command to action in accordance with that judgement.315 
To put this into the language of ‘truthful vision’ noted above, seeing reality rightly 
will only be possible if one is open enough to being taught how to do so in the first 
place. One’s own vision will only go so far. To acquire prudence, one needs to be 
open to being educated in moral formation. This is not found simply in abstract 
notions of the good nor is such an education found in imparting a codified set of 
rules to perform at certain points. Moral formation is an education into moral 
maturity, one that allows one to become good such that they recognise it and can 
respond rightly in the particulars of daily activity in its infinite possibilities; and such 
moral maturity is one that necessarily requires docilitas.  
3.3.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Docilitas 
This understanding of educating one into moral maturity similarly underscores 
Proverbs. It has already been noted that imparting a codified set of moral rules is not 
the mode in which Proverbs is shaped. However, the moral life is nonetheless its 
underscore and education in this vein certainly seems its intent. As discussed in 
2.2.2, the social setting of Proverbs is a disputed understanding. However, what is 
generally agreed is that the intention of Proverbs is for instruction, particularly for 
the young. Education in ancient Israel and throughout the Ancient Near East was 
devoted primarily to the task of “moral formation” or the “building of character”316 
and Proverbs, shares this aim. In agreement with Aquinas as discussed above, 
Proverbs suggests that prudence is seldom found in the young and they have to be 
formed into moral maturity in that sense. It was noted previously (in 2.2.1) that the 
overall progression found in Proverbs is to move ‘the student’ from a place of naïve 
childhood to one of moral maturity able to deal prudently with the caprices of life. 
The aim here is to bring this into sharper focus through the sub-virtue of docilitas. 
More specifically, we can examine how Proverbs seeks to imbue the reader with a 
sense of docilitas as part of its pedagogical framework and thus help us shape an 
understanding of this important part of prudence. 
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As with the Thomistic notion of docilitas mentioned above, the start of wisdom is 
found in the ability for the pupil to have a quality of humility, to realise that they can 
only grasp the height of wisdom by being aware that they are, in fact, not near it in 
the first place. Crenshaw concludes his opening section in The Acquisition of 
Knowledge in Israelite Wisdom Literature by highlighting such a notion: 
[The teachers of wisdom] never forgot that wisdom was a stage beyond 
knowledge and that it meant far more than the accumulation of 
information. Wisdom, the capacity to use information for human good, 
includes virtue.  By virtue these scholars meant generosity and humility. 
Perhaps a biblical proverb best sums up what these ancient scholars seem 
to have meant. 
Three things are too wonderful for me;  
four I do not understand:  
the way of an eagle in the sky, 
the way of a snake on a rock,  
the way of a ship on the high seas, 
and the way of a man with a girl. (Prov 30:18–19)317 
 
Life’s abundant mysteries evoke gratitude and reverence before the 
author of wisdom and truth.318 
Elsewhere in Proverbs we are reminded that deception is the vice of the fool and the 
wisdom of the prudent (ʿārûm) is to understand one’s way (Prov 14:8). However, this 
cannot be a self-created activity. Understanding one’s way is not the same as self-
forming one’s way despite the contemporary tendency to equate the two. On the 
contrary, according to Proverbs, one in essence despises the self if they do not seek 
to be formed by those around them: 
Those who ignore instruction despise themselves,  
but those who heed admonition gain understanding. (Prov 15:32) 
 
Quite simply the fool thinks they know it all, while the wise seek and, more 
importantly, listen to advice (12:15) even when it is not that easy to receive. 
As discussed above, to be without prudence is to lack heart/understanding. If one is 
to overcome this lack, one needs to be willing to do so through the discipline of 
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submitting to the critical judgment of others, particularly those who not only hold 
authority but have intimate knowledge of you: 
A fool despises a parent’s instruction,  
but the one who heeds admonition is prudent. (Prov 15:5) 
  
It is worth dwelling on this verse for a moment. In section 2.2.2, the role of the 
‘parent’s instruction’ was touched on. Drawing on that again, we see that parental 
image implies not only a mark of authority in an abstract sense but, moreover, one 
who seeks to form their child in the context of a particular familial community; to 
maintain and enhance an existent relationship. The one who is acquiring prudential 
wisdom recognises that right instruction and ‘admonition’ will come from such a 
relationship.319  
Further, as Fox notes, the structure of this verse is typical of the A-B line structure. 
In this case we are to deduce from the B line the consequence unstated in the A line, 
namely that a fool will remain imprudent if they despise a ‘parent’s instruction’. 
Thus, “The fool … very likely fancies himself ʿarum ‘shrewd,’ ‘cunning,’ so the 
proverb targets the very quality he prides himself on.”320 Fox goes on to note that the 
focus is not on the “chiding” a parent might instinctively express in response to poor 
behaviour. Rather, the reprimand implied is more considered; “instruction 
(discipline) and admonition (reproof) are ethical correction.”321 Taken as a whole, the 
imprudent fails to recognise the value in authoritative familial moral instruction not 
because they do not value ‘prudence’ itself (or aspects akin to it), but because they 
think they already have it. In contrast, one who is actually enhancing prudence 
knows how to accept admonition from appropriate sources. 
The one truly seeking prudential wisdom not only heeds it as found in familiar 
environments, but will actively seek it out in the world they live. Fox’s translation of 
Prov 15:12 provides an example of this: 
                                                 
319 To draw back to Pinckaers’ reflections on moral education; to educate rightly requires that “the 
exercise of authority and profound respect to go hand in hand.” Thus it necessarily requires a 
relational dimension for “only an intelligent love for the person whom one is educating can find the 
correct formula.” Pinckaers, "Virtue is not a Habit," 81. 
320 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 590. 
321 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 590. 
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The impudent man does not like being rebuked. 
He will not go to the wise.322 
 
The verse rests on the principle that the one truly seeking prudential wisdom will 
find company that helps in this cause, a notion that is echoed throughout Proverbs 
(e.g. 12:1; 13:20; 14:7). The impudent one (Heb: lēṣ lit. prideful and scorning) does 
not recognise the value of wise correction and thus is dissuaded from finding 
company that would offer such advice. They will keep away from the wise who will 
have an eye to rightly point out imprudence and foolishness where they see it. In 
contrast, one who seeks to live wisely will understand that rebuke and correction will 
be part of the process, they will not only hear it as such, they will, further, ‘bed 
down’ and find a home in it. As 15:31 states: 
The ear that heeds wholesome admonition 
will lodge among the wise. 
 
All this points to the good quality of being humble and teachable that Proverbs 
esteems and many other examples could be drawn.323 However it is the attitude that 
one must hold that is to be highlighted. 
Prov 12:1, for example, bluntly states: 
Whoever loves discipline loves knowledge, 
but those who hate to be rebuked are stupid.  
 
Here one who loves discipline (mûsār) is, effectively, showing right corresponding 
love for knowledge (daʿat). This knowledge is no doubt prudential and valuable to 
the one who would seek it and would allow them to live the good life. However, this 
knowledge is not the real focus of this proverb as such. The focus, rather, is on the 
seeker of daʿat. Someone who has to seek this ‘knowledge’ is not, by implication, 
fully wise or knowledgeable and, as such, some of his or her actions may call for 
correction. However, lacking wisdom or knowledge is not necessarily in and of itself 
a foolish or an immoral position. The virtue really being highlighted here is not 
knowledge (prudential or otherwise) but, rather, the attitude of being open and 
                                                 
322 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 593. 
323 Indeed as Brown points out, all of the Solomonic collection (Prov 10:1-22:16) have a common 




indeed appreciating reproof.324 On the other hand, he who hates reproof is ‘stupid’ 
regardless of what they may demonstratively know or not know. Their culpability 
lies in their attitude to learning (mûsār), an attitude which leads to irredeemable 
ignorance.325  
Thus, the attitude that is in keeping with docilitas has an air of paradox about it. As 
Davis states in her reflections on Proverbs 3:5-8: 
The sages address us [the readers] as newborns, challenging us to give up 
our adult pretensions to know just what to do. Shockingly, prudence 
begins with acceptance of our own ignorance; yet ignorance itself is no 
virtue. The sages have no praise for the intellectually lazy; only fools 
hate knowledge (1:22). Nonetheless, genuine prudence means 
recognizing how much in fact we do not know, and can never know.326  
This last statement is poignant. Davis here is drawing from Prov 3:5; “Trust in the 
Lord with all your heart, and do not rely on your own insight.” As mentioned above, 
it is the same verse that Aquinas himself uses to highlight the importance of docilitas 
to prudence. But Davis is also drawing in the greater theological notion of ‘fear of 
Yahweh’ which is persistent throughout Proverbs and is ‘the beginning of all 
wisdom’ (1:7; 9:10).327 Full and complete wisdom is only found in God, thus there 
will always be a knowing that is beyond us. Proverbs illustrates that a notion of 
docilitas extends to this inestimable level and informs the attitude that the student of 
wise living should have. As Davis puts it, “the discipline of elders is a necessary help 
towards prudence, but a properly rigorous attitude toward myself always proceeds 
from a realistic attitude toward God.”328  
With the above in mind, it is not surprising that Proverbs is keen to teach the student 
to recognise good authority from that which is malevolent. Clifford makes the point 
that in Proverbs, particularly Prov 1-9, key authority figures in the parent and ‘Lady 
                                                 
324 Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 546. 
325 This is particularly seen in the later section of the ‘Hezekian collection’ where the one who is a 
fool in character is well described, but an even more dire character is highlighted who ‘knows it all’ 
and thus has no need for humble learning (Prov 26:12, 29:20). As Brown states it, “The Hezekian 
collection paints the fool on the lower end of the sapiential scale, one who deserves rebuke and harsh 
discipline by the wise … In contrast, however, there is the presumptuous individual for whom there is 
no hope … Compared to the sin of presumption, folly is only a relative flaw.” Brown, "The Pedagogy 
of Proverbs 10:1-31:9," 173.  
326 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 191. 
327 See more detailed discussion of this in section 2.2.4 above. 
328 Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 190. 
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Wisdom’ are found. Further, the instructions the authority figures provide are not 
very specific. Rather, “they inculcate receptivity to trustworthy authorities and 
fidelity to basic relationships. Counter-voices mimic the genuine call and must be 
rejected for the primary invitation to be properly received.”329 In other words, an 
overarching theme in Proverbs is to recognise and heed the advice from appropriate 
authority, but to recognise that there are many characters (both literal and figurative) 
who will make claim to our sensibilities and searching who in fact have no capacity 
to impart true wisdom. For example, the calls of both Lady Wisdom and the 
juxtaposed Woman Folly will be found in the streets, squares and many other 
vantage points (Prov 1:9 and 9:14-15 respectively). The task for the attentive student 
is to recognise them for what they are. To find counsel in the right place as it were. 
When found, such sources of advice and counsel need to be approached with 
humility and a state of being teachable, an approach that is forever useful for even 
the wise can be come wiser still (Prov 9:9; 1:5). 
 
3.4 Solertia 
As has been pointed out previously, in both the Thomistic tradition and the wisdom 
literature there is an understanding that creation is imbued with a certain order. 
However, our experience of creation is not always predictable and the dynamism of 
our existence means that it is impossible to account for every circumstance we may 
face. The most complete moral system, codified or otherwise, or the most 
knowledgeable in moral matters cannot anticipate every situation one will face in 
every context. Further, such vagaries of life can rise in such a manner that timely 
response is required. Solertia is the ability to respond to such matters; to assess a 
situation quickly yet accurately and move one towards the goal of the good.  
One advantage of the character-based morality taught in Proverbs is that it too 
recognises that all contingencies cannot be catered for and, though there is a 
discernible order in creation, the fullness of this understanding is beyond us. We can, 
however, navigate this uncertainty by forming a certain character of preparedness 
that allows us to respond to such contingencies in a composed yet decisive manner. 
                                                 
329 Clifford, "Reading Proverbs 10-22," 245. 
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3.4.1 Solertia: Timely Decisiveness  
Solertia is not a word that translates simply into English. As Aquinas uses it, it can 
be understood as adroit, astuteness and quickness of mind. Deferrari states that it 
means “skill in discovering something, especially the principle of a thing.”330 Pieper 
uses the term “nimbleness” and describes it as “objectiveness in unexpected 
situations”331 and Thomas Gilby translates the term in the Summa Theologiae to 
acumen.332 All these terms capture the notion of Solertia which is an ability to assess 
a situation and decide on a right course of action and to do so in good time. Its focus 
is an ability to come to a right decision when presented with the unexpected and 
when “something has to be done without warning.”333 
This particular habitus which serves prudence sits in contrast to other aspects that we 
might consider useful for the virtue. For example, the two other parts of prudence 
examined above (memoria and docilitas) are lingering and more deliberate in their 
nature. They are based on the idea that one can grasp reality and come to right 
decisions with sound reflection, both introspectively and by good external advice and 
counsel, over a lengthy period of time. However, life and the moral encounters that it 
requires will present us with the necessity to make decisions in quick time, ones for 
which we may not be able to fully prepare. In such circumstances, the ability to 
accurately size up the situation and act well to achieve the good is a required aspect 
for the perfection of prudence.  
However, the focus on rapidity can be overstated. Good decisions, even when needed 
quickly, should still employ the aptitudes of prudence. Aquinas holds that certain 
steps are needed to cause an action to be prudent. Included among them are true-to-
being memory, insight into the present and heeding good advice, all of which inform 
an action. For Aquinas unnecessarily rushing any of these steps can lead to 
imprudence rather than prudence.334  Further, thoughtless action even when haste is 
required is still thoughtlessness and will necessarily lead to a poor judgment of 
                                                 
330  Roy J. Deferrari, M. Inviolata. Barry, and Ignatius. McGuiness, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas based on the Summa Theologica and Selected Passages of his Other Works (Baltimore: 
Catholic University Press, 1948), 1037. 
331 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 16-17. 
332 Thomas Gilby in Thomas Aquinas, Prudence: (2a2æ. 47-56), trans., T. Gilby, Summa Theologiae, 
vol. 36  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 2006), 69. 
333 ST, 49.4 ad 2. 
334 ST, II-II, 53.3. 
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reality and thus is culpable to sin.335 On the other hand, being thoughtful and well-
reasoned, but lacking decisiveness to execute a conviction in good time will likewise 
inhibit prudence.336 Thoughtless haste is a vice not to be confused with solertia. On 
the other hand, indecisive irresolution is not to be considered a viable approach to 
moral quandary either. Solertia, in a sense, is an ability to make the right decision at 
the right time.  
This aspect of the virtue of prudence is applicable to any age, but perhaps is 
particularly pertinent today where the types of activity we engage in and the 
technological advances of modern life accelerate the frequency in which we are 
faced with new experiences in decision making. Celia Deane-Drummond provides an 
interesting insight into the value of prudence in this regard and includes the value of 
the three ‘sub-virtues’ that are examined here.337 Regarding solertia she states that, 
“Solertia includes the ability to take decisions when faced with the unexpected, even 
when there is little time for deliberation, as it draws on the experience gained in the 
past.”338 
As Deane-Drummond is indicating, solertia (as with the other aspects of prudence 
and the virtues overall for that matter) does not operate in isolation from other 
abilities and virtues. The successful implementation of solertia assumes that other 
parts are functioning well. In this case memoria is alluded to, but another that is 
indicated by Aquinas himself is solicitude (sollicitudo).339 Aquinas warns against 
excessive solicitousness as unnecessary fear and anxiety towards the future which 
not only clouds judgement but disturbs the spirit.340 However, urgent concern of 
future contingencies regarding things that matter is an aid to the prudential life. It 
encourages one to be moved to rightly prepare in both a practical and psychical sense 
but recognises, at the same time, that one can never operate out of a state of complete 
certitude. As Aquinas states, “because the subject matter of prudence is composed of 
                                                 
335 ST, II-II, 53.4. 
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337 Celia Deane-Drummond, "Bodies in Glass: A Virtue Approach to Ethical Quandaries in a Cyborg 
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contingent individual incidents, which form the setting for human acts, the certitude 
of prudence is not such as to remove entirely all uneasiness of mind.”341 
To expand on this, Aquinas notes that there is an appropriate solicitude to any 
moment; “different times call for their own sort of solicitude.”342 Taking this on 
board, we can say that reading the times that one is situated in allows one to prepare 
rightly for the circumstances of one’s life. However, we must also recognise that we 
cannot account for all contingencies. Solertia, then, is the ability to face such 
contingencies when they arise in keeping with the wider notion of prudence. To 
change the terminology slightly while still holding to the principle; concern which 
leads to preparedness does not eliminate the need for nimble astuteness, rather, it 
serves it. To illustrate this notion Aquinas uses the example of the ‘diligent ant’ 
found in Prov 6:6. A reflection on this provides a useful entry way into this subject as 
found in Proverbs. 
3.4.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Solertia 
It is not uncommon in the Hebrew Scriptures for animal behaviour to be held up as a 
model in the ways of wisdom and right living. 343  In the case focused on here, 
Proverbs uses the ant to target the problematic behaviour of laziness but it also 
speaks to the notion of sollicitudo as just indicated. It reads: 
 Go to the ant, you lazybones;  
consider its ways, and be wise.  
 Without having any chief  
or officer or ruler,  
 it prepares its food in summer,  
and gathers its sustenance in harvest. (6:6-8) 
 
The word translated by the NRSV to ‘lazybones’ is the character being targeted and 
is less colloquially translated to ‘sluggard’ by many other versions and 
commentaries. The sluggard is one who not only embodies laziness, in itself a vice 
                                                 
341 ST, II-II, 47.9 ad 2. See also Pieper’s lucid discussion on this The Four Cardinal Virtues, 17-19. It 
should be pointed out that in Aquinas’s thoughts overall, solicitude is most strongly associated with 
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Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty (Leuven: Peeters, 1994), 89-91. Also SCG, 
3.132; 3.135. 
342 ST, II-II, 55.7. 
343 Other prominent examples outside of Proverbs include Job 12:7–9; Isa 1:3; Jer 8:6–9. 
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like quality but, as highlighted in these verses in particular, does not have an 
appreciation for the season at hand. Hence Aquinas points out the ant, in contrast to 
the ‘sluggard’, shows solicitude at the seasonable time.344  
Davis provides a useful analysis of this verse in relation to the Thomistic expression 
of solicitude and notes that the parable of the ant can be engaged on three particular 
layers. 345  First is the more obvious reading where what is being encouraged is 
practical and industrious preparation. Another is the encouragement to pay particular 
attention to the non-human world, a kind of ‘nature wisdom’, to use Davis’ term; to 
read accurately the goings on of our created reality and seek wisdom therein. 
However, the notion that is most pertinent to our concern is based on a long 
traditional reading of this passage which sees it as an admonition against the sin of 
sloth. This interpretation of Prov 6:6 is more overtly spiritual and moral in that sense. 
As Davis puts it:  
Sloth is more than laziness, an aversion to work. One may have 
considerable achievements and still be slothful. The spiritually deadly sin 
is the refusal to be alert to the new opportunities that continually come to 
us from God, opportunities that require us to keep our hearts open, minds 
fresh and restless in God’s service.346 
What the ant teaches then, in this traditional reading, is an urgent concern for the 
future that motivates one to action – but not action for the sake of activity. The ant is 
not motivated to do anything and certainly not everything, but to prepare food based 
on what the season holds. There is, as the often quoted stanza from another wisdom 
book states, a time for all things (Ecc. 3:1-8).  
As such, we can well note that ‘solicitous preparedness’ is part of the moral life 
esteemed in Proverbs347 but, ironically it might seem, one way that solicitousness is 
exercised rightly and aids prudence is recognising that we cannot attend to all 
circumstances.348 We cannot account for all cases in advance, only what is presented 
to us in a given time and place, but a prepared attitude and openness to ‘new 
                                                 
344 ST, II-II, 57.7 ad 1. 
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347 See also 24:27 for example. 
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happenings’ allows us to deal in a prudent manner with such events. Here we a 
returning to solertia in particular. The ability to discern rightly and with good timing 
what is presented to us in a given moment, particularly in regard to the unexpected. 
In terms of particular texts in Proverbs, there is not anything obvious which discusses 
the ‘unexpected’ or novel as a dilemma in its own right. However, it does point out 
that calamity catches the fool by surprise as they are so blind to the reality of the 
world and fail to heed the teaching of wisdom (e.g. Prov 1:26-27; 6:15). Moreover, 
Proverbs does call the one of sound character to be ready to enact and apply the 
teaching of prudential wisdom at any moment. As Prov 22:17-18 states: 
Incline your ear and hear my words, 
and apply your mind to my teaching;  
for it will be pleasant if you keep them within you,  
if all of them are ready on your lips. 
 
The latter stanza in this verse suggests no specific reward except for goodness itself 
(nāʿîm translated as ‘pleasant’ here); there is no concrete issue at hand toward which 
the wisdom being taught will address. However there is the imperative that such 
teaching will nonetheless be useful at any moment. The notion of ‘on your lips’ 
captures this; what is internalised in our minds (Heb: lēb) will find expression in our 
lips, a symbol of both action and speech.349 
Indeed, as has been discussed in the examination of Proverbs overall, the 
pedagogical structure of Proverbs is such that the aim is not to prescribe set action in 
and of itself but, rather, form one into a certain quality of character such that they are 
able to cater for the particularities of any given situation and to navigate the 
sometimes conflicting requirements of living the moral life. This is evidenced in the 
myriad of life settings and aphorisms, sometimes contradictory, which form the 
collection of chs.10-29. An often quoted example is 26:4-5: 
4 Do not answer fools according to their folly,  
or you will be a fool yourself.  
5 Answer fools according to their folly, 
or they will be wise in their own eyes. 
 
                                                 
349 Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs," 204. Murphy on the same verse also points out that the lips 
represent the most important organ for wise practice, Proverbs, 170. 
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Not only do we see a contradiction, but they are deliberately, it would seem, placed 
up against each other. There have been many interpretations attempting to reconcile 
the contradiction 350  but most scholars concede that the presence of contrasting 
maxims is a point in itself. As Crenshaw states: 
The wise man is one who knows the right time and place, the person who 
exercises propriety. Thus one finds outright contradictions in proverbial 
sayings, once even juxtaposed (Prov 26:4-5) … Both statements are true, 
and one must choose which of the two is called for by the situation itself. 
The willingness to face up to contradictions arises out of the fact that 
wisdom is an open system, … the sage knew that there were limitations 
to the comprehension of reality, both in terms of intellectual capacity and 
divine inscrutability … The ever present incalculable ingredient to every 
experience promoted an openness to various possibilities and a 
recognition of one’s limits.351 
Thus those with prudential wisdom know how to read the times and anticipate the 
choices one will have to make (what we understand as solicitousness), but has the 
acumen of solertia to deal with the ‘incalculable’ and unexpected that even the 
wisest sage cannot fully anticipate.  
Solertia as an aid to prudence requires a certain disposition in other modes as well. 
For example Proverbs often attests that a prudentially wise person is calm (17:27), 
good-tempered (15:18), patient (19:11), unperturbed and measured (14:29-30) in 
character. Thoughtless haste is particularly problematic and will have one missing 
the way of wisdom all together (19:2). Composure is the key to dealing wisely with 
the situations of life, particularly when emotional rashness is the easier option 
(15:11). All these points allow one to hold solertia which thus allows one to be 
prudent in any circumstance. 
 
At the start of this section it was noted that a key aspect of prudence is truthful 
vision. There are many ways this can be unpacked, three noted here help elucidate an 
understanding of truthful vision and, further, how the Thomistic notion and the 
teaching of Proverbs correlates and aids such an understanding. Memoria is an 
important starting point of truthful vision as it draws the agent to recall rightly the 
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Proverbs 10-31, 793-794. 
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lessons of the past. Proverbs in particular attests that a sense of memoria is more than 
cognisant recollection but is, rather, an honest dealing with the self in a total sense – 
a ‘true-to-being’ memory. Such an approach will necessarily recognise that no one 
person can possibly have all that is required to live the moral life, as such, the one 
who is truly prudent will also employ the ability of docilitas. In this regard, the 
assumed and expressed underpinning of Proverbs rests on a notion that the full moral 
life is not automatically attained but, rather, requires an attentive openness to 
teaching; a humility and attitude of seeking such that one can be educated and 
formed. As such, docilitas is not simply a passive docility that an English translation 
might suggest, but an engaged obedience to right authority and right teaching built 
on respect. However, even the most well-formed and ‘true-to-self’ individual will 
encounter circumstances that cannot be entirely anticipated. In such a case, solertia is 
an ability to still remain prudent even in those circumstances; to stay ‘true to 
character’, as it were, when circumstances are most likely to force one to do 
otherwise. As such, truthful vision is neither purely retrospective nor entirely 
anticipatory (though it includes those elements), but seeks to hold to a truthful grasp 




4. Thomas Aquinas in Dialogue with Proverbs: Socio-Political 
and Theological Dimensions of Prudence 
The overall work to this point has examined a number of different aspects of 
prudence and sought to analyse Proverbs in relation to it. The aim of this final 
section is to bring some of that discussion into a closer dialogue with Thomistic 
thought. Two dimensions of prudence are examined here. The first is the social-
political dimension of prudence, more commonly understood as political prudence. It 
recalls particularly section 2.2.2, though draws on the overall discussion had to this 
point. The second dimension attempts to address the theological dimension of 
prudence in a particular mode. The theological dimension has been addressed 
throughout this work, but by way of conclusion it provides a crowning perspective of 
what prudence in its fullest sense is in the Thomistic tradition and how it can 
correlatively inform and be informed by the teaching of Proverbs. 
4.1 Thomistic Political Prudence 
The virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition has a significant political 
dimension.352 This dimension also brings to the fore the difficulty that can present 
itself when drawing two somewhat disparate traditions into dialogue when 
expounding one concept. In this regard especially, Aquinas is far more technical and 
delineating in his understanding of morality compared to the more organic and 
eclectic approach that we see in writings such as Proverbs. For Aquinas, the moral 
science was divided into three distinct spheres that allowed for conceptions of 
corresponding types of virtues. The first domain concerned personal conduct, that 
which pertains to all people, the second was the management of the household and 
the third was concerned with right governance of a city or realm. Correspondingly, 
there were three types of prudence: personal prudence (prudentia simpliciter dicta), 
domestic prudence (prudentia oeconmica) and governmental prudence (prudentia 
regnativa).353 Not surprisingly given Aquinas draws on Aristotle in this field, the 
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question of the distinctly political nature of prudence is given some attention 
throughout his work including the Summa Theologiae. For example, he states: 
It belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command 
concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence 
regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common 
good of the multitude.354 
Aquinas later goes on to articulate the special place of prudence in the life of the 
individual ruler in attaining the ‘common good’:  
Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in 
one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community 
of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according 
as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. 
Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king 
who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom.355 
Domestic prudence follows this in a sense, though is still seen as distinct and sits as a 
‘midway point’ between political and personal prudence. Thomas notes that just as 
individuals are part of a family, so a family is part of a political community. As such, 
domestic prudence is distinct in that the head of a household exercises an authority 
“like a king … but without the full power of a king.”356  Beyond this, Thomistic 
thought does not display a particularly strong emphasis on prudence in the familial 
context as it pertains to maintaining the ‘common good’ compared to the imagery of 
prudential wisdom in Proverbs. However, as in Proverbs, Thomistic thought does 
draw attention to the importance of maintaining ‘good family order’ as an important 
aspect of maintaining the good of the community more broadly speaking even when 
the notion of ‘domestic prudence’ is not directly evoked. In Thomistic thought, it is 
evident that the understanding that the various ‘institutions’ of society (e.g. family, 
state, legislative authorities, church) are linked to the wellbeing of both society and 
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individual.357 Regarding the formation of the virtuous person, it is certainly well 
noted that the place of familial relationships becomes vital. As Wadell sates: 
Morality is not something [apart from] friendship, but is what happens to 
us through the best and most enduring relationships of our lives, with 
God to be sure, but also with family, spouses, communities, or lifelong 
companions. It is in these friendships that our character takes shape and 
we are transformed in the good.358  
Thus, the familial context matters to the formation of good societies and good 
individuals.  
Returning to the more technical aspects of virtue of prudence in the social-political 
sphere, Aquinas’s scheme offers important points of reflection. Certainly on the face 
of it, Aquinas seems to follow many other classical thinkers in understanding an 
ordered society as being the outworking and the responsibility of the prudent ruler 
who, in that capacity, allows society to experience a ‘common good’. In this vein 
Aquinas seems to hold a hierarchical sense of political ordering drawn from a 
cosmological (and theological) understanding of the created order. Aquinas utilises 
Dionysius in particular whose neo-platonic, theologically informed, hierarchical 
imagery was very influential throughout the middle ages and seemingly on Aquinas 
himself.359 Moreover, Aquinas holds that the crown of any hierarchal sense of reality 
is a God who governs, by way of the eternal law, “the whole community of the 
universe by Divine Reason” and by “dictates of practical reason.”360 The rulers in a 
society are called to participate in the same eternal law by fulfilling the natural law in 
                                                 
357 Aquinas’s discussion on the objects of love (charitas) is an example, ST, II-II, 25-26. Paul J. 
Wadell provides a contemporary discussion in line with this thinking in "Growing Together in the 
Divine Love: The Role of Charity in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas," in Aquinas and 
Empowerment: Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives, ed. G. Simon Harak, vol. Moral Traditions & 
Moral Arguments (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996).  
358 Wadell, "Growing Together in the Divine Love," 140. 
359  Paul E. Sigmund, ed. St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics: A New Translation, 
Backgrounds, Interpretations (New York: Norton, 1988), 108. This hierarchical framing reflects not 
only Aquinas’s time, but also his sources including those found in Roman legal thought and Stoic 
natural law (Sigmund, ed. St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics: A New Translation, 
Backgrounds, Interpretations, 181). It should be pointed out that, though Aquinas draws from 
Dionysius among others who emphasises the good found in hierarchical ontological expressions, for 
Aquinas and many that follow him hierarchical order does not inherently equate to the good. Aquinas 
clearly intimates that when he describes how even demons have a sense of hierarchical order. Such a 
sense of hierarchical order is present because they have a created nature and exist under the universal 
providential order of God who creates (ST, I, 109.1 ad 2). As such, we see that a sense of hierarchy is 
attributed to being part of God’s creative providence, but in fallen nature (demons representing this in 
the particular) a collective organised as a hierarchy is only a statement of being, it is not sufficiently a 
‘common good’ in itself. 
360 ST, I-II, 91.1. See also Ethics, vol. 1, lect. 2. 
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their capacity as ruler by way of prudence (governmental prudence to be more 
specific) so the community itself can be ‘perfected’.  
This is not unlike, at least in broad principle, the expression that seems to sit behind 
wisdom in Proverbs (where it pertains to governance) and articulated in 1 Kings as 
noted above in section 2.2.2. Recall, however, that the role prudential wisdom might 
have in maintaining a morally ordered society does not rest in the ruling class alone. 
Similarly Aquinas, and many influenced by him, does not leave the ‘perfection of 
society’, and the role of political prudence therein, within the moral character and 
actions of the ruler(s). Clearly, there are expressions in the Aristotelian tradition that 
find their way into Aquinas’s thought that suggest the role of subjects, being the 
individual members of society, is to simply enact ordinances prudently within their 
limited sphere of influence.361 However, the place of the individual and the virtue of 
prudence, even in a societal context, is more sophisticated than that line of thought 
would suggest.  
A closer examination of Thomistic thought identifies that there is a greater role for 
those being ruled (the subjects) in building a society that is ordered to the common 
good. This can be gleaned when we recognise how Aquinas draws from Aristotle in 
the formation of his political conceptions. Aquinas uses Aristotle heavily, but he 
does so in certain ways and, ultimately, in ways of some difference to that of classic 
Aristotelian thought. Gilby is one who examines this and he demonstrates how 
Aquinas moves Aristotelian notions in a direction that suggests political 
responsibility (and hence a notion of political prudence), in some sense at least, rests 
on all people not simply those charged with enacting societal ordinances. Gilby 
articulates that in Aquinas’s earlier writings, particularly in the Commentary on the 
Sentences, Aquinas followed Aristotle in stressing the role of ‘governmental 
prudence’ (prudentia regnativa) and there was only “a vague reference to another 
kind of prudence which should be expected of his subjects, namely the statesmanship 
                                                 
361 ST, II-II, 50.2 as way of example notes that slaves, who are more readily subject to the command 
of others, are still “self-acting through free will. Accordingly this much is required of them, that they 
possess in themselves a certain rightfulness of governance whereby they direct themselves in obeying 
their rulers.” Cf. ST, II-II, 104.1 & 5, where the limits of obedience are discussed. Most notably, 
Aquinas always tempers any call to obedience in a human context with the higher calling to virtue and 
to the highest authority of all, being God.   
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of the citizens themselves.”362 In the Summa Theologiae, however, Gilby points out 
that Aquinas modified Aristotle’s approach. Gilby states “Statesmanlike prudence, 
prudentia politica, was not reserved to the ruler, … it was the virtue of practical 
intelligence whereby citizens freely made their own ordinances of political 
authority.”363 
Here Gilby is focusing on the difference between prudentia politica, what might be 
termed political or civic prudence; a prudence of the populace,364  and prudentia 
regnativa which is the term Aquinas generally uses when discussing the virtue in 
relation to the person or persons in positions of legislative leadership. Prudentia 
regnativa would rightly be attributed to the position of regent and political law 
maker, while the former (political or civic prudence) is something that can be 
acquired and exercised by everybody within a given polis. It is this broader notion of 
civic prudence where Aquinas (unlike Aristotle) seems to place significant focus. 
Gilby explains this shift from a traditional reading of Aristotle as such; he notes that 
Aquinas’s examination of Politics indicated that political prudence was restricted to 
the governor.365 However, 
St. Thomas was uneasy about the limitation of political responsibility. In 
the Summa Theologiae, however, he felt freer to expound his own 
sentiments even if that meant stretching what Aristotle had said. The 
legis positiva and the government was in some sense everybody’s 
responsibility.”366  
The point of interest for the concern of this project is that the role of prudence as a 
virtue is one that not only finds expression in the life of the individual but, while 
remaining operative in the individual, has a role in shaping the good of the 
community at large and does so regardless of where a person sits within the various 
strata of a given community. In this vein, Aquinas sees a connexion between the 
                                                 
362 Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 292. Citing Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on 
the Sentences of Peter Lombard, III, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1. 
363 Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 292-293. Citing ST, II-II, 50.1 ad 1. 
364 Deferrari uses the terms ‘civic prudence’ or ‘the prudence of the subjects’. A Lexicon of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, 912. 
365 Gilby here cites ST, II-II, 47.12 Obj. 1; Politics, III, 4. 1277 b26.  
366 Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 293. It is this sort of understanding which 
encouraged later scholars to utilise Aquinas towards moral teachings that called for greater emphasis 
on the general populace (both their concerns and their participation) in certain spheres of political 
matters. This often drew on notions of natural law to underpin universal goods all people should 
enjoy. Paul E. Sigmund provides some useful samples of such in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and 
Ethics: A New Translation, Backgrounds, Interpretations, 145-188. 
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good to be found in the individual and a communal sense of the good. Moreover, 
prudence that is exercised in whatever capacity will rightly regard the “common 
good of all people, not merely the private good of one individual.”367 Along these 
lines, the primacy of the common good is well evidenced in Thomistic writing.368 
This is premised, however, by an understanding held by Aquinas that the human 
person is necessarily social and so, even in a perfect state, what Aquinas would 
describe as a ‘state of innocence’, she would maintain that social context,369 thus the 
goodness of the individual will also serve the good of the whole. It is this social-
communal dimension in Thomistic thought that adds depth to the virtue of prudence 
that could otherwise be construed in rather individualistic terms. Naturally, the 
responsibility of maintaining a ‘common good’ is going to rest more overtly in the 
ruler. However, as noted above and indicated by Aquinas himself, the individual 
subject (not just the ruler) should also employ ‘political prudence’ for the sake of the 
common good.370 
Broadly speaking then, prudence as taught in the Thomistic tradition, though it will 
have particular ends proper to the position one holds, is fundamentally a virtue that 
should play a role in both the individual subject and in the communal-political 
sphere. In this sense there is a correlation of sorts between prudence in Thomistic 
virtue theory and Proverbial wisdom. The wisdom teaching of Proverbs is couched in 
more familial context, but it nonetheless stresses a communal dimension and 
responsibility to the ‘common good’ that crosses all strata of society. It is worth 
unpacking this further. Starting with the communal dimension generally, it is often 
observed that, though many of the teachings of Proverbs seem to be addressed to a 
single person and relate to his individual success and prosperity, the person is 
nonetheless necessarily seen in a communal context. For example, Frydrych states: 
While the book addresses itself to an individual and the depiction of 
success is largely in individual terms, in general, prosperity is understood 
in the book as happening in the context of the progress and affluence of a 
                                                 
367 ST, II-II, 47.10. 
368 E.g. ST, I, 108.6; II-II, 31.3 ad 2; SCG, I, 41. 
369 ST, I, 96.4. 
370 ST, II-II, 50.2. Note especially ad 3: “Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in 
relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation 
to the common good.” In a more overtly political sense, Gilby offers the following interpretation: 
“Citizens were those who took an active part in politics. Thus political prudence, corresponding to 
general justice which served the Common Good, should be well dispersed and not concentrated in the 
official rulers of the State.” The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 293.  
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community to which the individual belongs. Wisdom is not simply a tool 
of bringing order and success to an individual’s life, but also a means for 
creating order on the social level. The righteous and wise uphold such an 
order, principally to do with justice, while the fools reject and pervert 
it.371 
The interrelationship between the individual good and the surrounding community is 
not only implied, but often stated as such, particularly in the sentence material (10:1-
29:27). For example, Prov 10:21 states that the righteousness of the individual is not 
only self-nourishing, but it “feeds many, while fools die for lack of sense.” The 
implication seems to be that those who surround the righteous one will be nourished 
as a natural consequence; a spilling over, as it were, of goodness. In contrast, the fool 
as a victim of his own lack of ‘right reasoning’372 not only fails to see the value of 
goodness in itself, but he fails to recognise the nourishment provided by the wise 
around him and becomes lost within his individual folly. 
Naturally the wellbeing of the community is tied to the ruler in many ways and, as 
already noted above, it seems self-evident that people would rejoice when the 
righteous rise in influence and groan with despair when “the wicked rule” (Prov 
29:2). Nevertheless, for large parts of Proverbs, the familial/communal setting is the 
most important dimension in which prudential wisdom as a concept is expressed and 
in which it is to also be found. Familial points of reference are located throughout 
and, in particular, the parent appealing to the child to follow the former’s teaching is 
most common. This is perhaps more evidenced in the lecture material where we see 
the importance of family cohesion expressed. As an example, on a number of 
occasions the notion of marital faithfulness is evoked (e.g. 5:15-20) and considered 
of the utmost importance given the discord that can follow from the jealousy that 
unfaithfulness unleashes (6:34). 
Expanding on this example of marital faithfulness, the point to focus on is that, 
within Proverbs at least, it is not adultery or lack of faithfulness in itself which is of 
concern – an intrinsic evil of the act in itself is not the issue. Rather, it is the 
disharmony that it creates within the family as well as in wider society that is of 
                                                 
371 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 134. Frydrych refers to Prov 24:23-34 as a particular expression 
of this. See also Brown, Character in Crisis, 33-36. 
372 Hăsar-lēb lit. lack of heart or mind, usually translates to ‘lack of sense’ (eg. NRSV and NAB) in 
this usage, but is akin to ‘lack of reason’ or ‘lack of right reason’ (see for example HALOT בֵל –7). 
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concern. As Rodd states, “what the writers of proverbs and the givers of instruction 
are worried about are those who threaten the stability and easy functioning of the 
community. This can be seen from various angles.”373 Those angles include what we 
could term the general public sphere; the marketplace, streets, the gate and town 
squares374 where thieves and murderers undermine the community (Prov. 1:11-19). 
Prov 11:9 indicates that one’s imprudent words could destroy one’s friends and 
neighbours but prudent knowledge (daʿat) can build the society up, a notion that 
extends to the wellbeing of the city at large (11:10-11).375 It is within this larger 
framework that the most significant angle of the familial dimension sits – the “home 
and the wider society cannot be separated. Stability within the community is of 
central importance to the sages, and they are swift to condemn those who disturb 
it.”376 
There is a role for the political leadership in this, and on at least one occasion (Prov 
29:4) the character of the king is explicitly tied to the stability society might enjoy, 
and thousands of years after such words were recorded, the virtue of prudence as 
understood in our contemporary times would likewise still hold; as Dobel states, 
“prudent leaders hold special responsibilities to maintain and strengthen community 
foundations. Excellent political achievements do not stand in isolation but sustain the 
legitimacy of institutions and build community.”377 It is this communal dimension 
that Proverbs helps to draw into focus, but it does so with a view that it is not only 
the prudent political leader who creates life giving communities, but all people 
valuing, seeking and acquiring prudential wisdom that will necessarily be needed if 
we want stable and successful societies. 
By way of conclusion we can draw two points of focus. Firstly, both the wisdom of 
Proverbs and the virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition point to a 
political/communal dimension. In Aquinas there is more emphasis on the political 
role that prudence employs particularly as it relates to those in governmental 
authority and is inherently more technical. Proverbs places far less emphasis on the 
                                                 
373 Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 278. 
374 Frydrych provides a brief but valuable discussion on the image of the village gate in this context; 
Living Under the Sun, 143-145. 
375 Of note is that the LXX reading of these verses stresses the political sphere even more so with the 
term politēs (lit. citizens) used instead of ‘friend’ or ‘neighbour’ as found in the original Hebrew. 
376 Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 279-280. 
377 Dobel, "Political Prudence and the Ethics of Leadership," 79. 
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importance of the political leadership in this regard (in the form of the court/king in 
its own context), but it is nonetheless present. In both cases, however, there is 
recognition that prudence will necessarily have a communal dimension whether 
exercised by the ruler in their capacity as leader, in the familial context or at the 
individual level in one’s ‘common’ life. It is this communal dimension which offers 
a particular twist on our contemporary understanding of the virtue of prudence (or 
the virtues in general for that matter). There is a tendency to see them in an 
individual sense; that it is the betterment of my individual character that is ultimately 
and perhaps even entirely at stake. The virtue tradition and, even more so, the 
prudential wisdom teaching of Proverbs, reminds us that our character formation and 
the actions that ensue will necessarily shape our community and, likewise, our 
character will be shaped by the community in return. Indeed, as the discussion on 
docilitas in particular attests, the need of the other in the formation of the self is in 
fact necessary.378 Brown discussing the relational dimension of prudential wisdom in 
Proverbs agrees. Taking 3:27-31 as an example, he states that the listed five negative 
directives are designed to illustrate the outworking of “the sensibly prudent 
lifestyle.” He continues: 
How they hang together is readily clear. All deal with the maintenance of 
harmonious relationship within the community. The importance of this 
list cannot be underestimated, since it clearly indicates that the 
instrumental virtues of discretion and good sense (3:21) are intimately 
bound up with the welfare of the community. The prudent lifestyle is 
profiled relationally, beyond the perspective of the efficient and 
successful attainment of individual goals.379 
Secondly, the familial/communal dimension, certainly as far as Proverbs is 
concerned, is another layer of universality that seems to underpin its teachings. As 
discussed previously, the eclectic socio-political setting and multi-authored influence 
                                                 
378 See 3.3 above. Though not unpacked here at length, the allusion being made here is that the 
community is vital in the shaping of the prudent character, not simply that the prudent individual will 
serve the community. As Brown states it, when we examine the communal dimension of Proverbs we 
recognise that “wisdom is the community, created to behold and follow the ways of God.” (Brown, 
Character in Crisis, 39). 
379 Brown, Character in Crisis, 35. Brown later comments on the concluding chapter of Proverbs 
where the fully formed character returns to the place of family; finding “the ideal spouse, raising the 
ideal family and securing the esteem of fellow patriarchs.” In establishing this ideal, the “silent son 
has become a responsible citizen of the community.” The ‘woman of excellence’ (Prov 31:10-31) is 
also key to this fulfilled image and together “the establishment of a family … represents and 
indispensable form of engagement with the community.” Brown, Character in Crisis, 154-155.  See 
also Murphy, The Tree of Life, 199-200. 
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of Proverbs points to a universality in its teaching. Though it may not seem so 
obvious on the face of it, the importance of prudential wisdom in maintaining 
fundamental familial relationships also lends itself to a universal appeal. It might 
seem counter intuitive to state that the family speaks to a universal principle because 
how we understand the notion of family seems to be heavily influenced by the social 
setting in which it sits. A family of modern day Europe, for example, could well be 
considered very different to a family in ancient Israel. Even within the biblical world, 
the character of a ‘typical family’ in Israel in the monarchical era would differ in 
quite significant ways from pre-monarchical Israel – and both find expression 
throughout the vast scope that the Hebrew bible covers and, as noted above, within 
Proverbs itself. It is for this reason that Perdue in his examination of the family in the 
Hebrew tradition warns against drawing “absolutist, propositional, moralistic truths” 
on the “dos and don’ts” for the modern family in the contemporary Western 
context.380 Nevertheless, as Carol Meyers in the same publication suggests, “virtually 
all considerations of human behaviour operate under the assumption that there is 
such a thing as a family in every society. Indeed, the family is empirically 
ubiquitous”381 and it is this sense of ubiquity which seems to pervade Proverbial 
teaching. Regardless of the socio-historical setting, those who embody prudential 
wisdom will do so within our fundamental social units and it will necessarily lead to 
a communal good. 
Moreover, the formation of prudence should not be considered a moral trait for the 
‘professional’ statesman or those in socio-political power.382 As Aquinas indicates, 
theirs is a special place that requires the perfection of prudence for the sake of the 
common good, but there are limits to leadership regardless of age or system. 
Proverbs expresses a similar sentiment in the limitation of kingship (of the human 
kind at least) in the imagery of Solomon as the patron of Wisdom. We recall from 
section 2.2.2 above that Solomon represents a highpoint of Israelite culture and, 
                                                 
380 Leo G. Perdue, "The Household, Old Testament Theology, and Contemporary Hermeneutics," in 
Families in Ancient Israel, ed. Leo G. Perdue et al. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 
244. Perdue does not suggest that the Hebrew Bible cannot aid the moral formation of our modern 
families at all but, rather, that an appropriate hermeneutical approach is required. Perdue, "The 
Household, Old Testament Theology, and Contemporary Hermeneutics," 245-249. 
381 Carol Meyers, "The Family in Early Israel," in Families in Ancient Israel, ed. L.G. Perdue et al. 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 1. 
382 It should be said that, particularly in today’s societies where those of noted celebrity can arguably 
have as much influence on the social fabric and even legislative matters as the political elite, we do 
well to expand our conception of ‘socio-political power’ to those beyond formal seats of government. 
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moreover, he represents a point in history where unity and order are apparent and 
thus can speak with authority in dictating how ‘the good life’ for Israel can be found 
and what it constitutes – most notably that it is found in wisdom itself. But the 
prudently wise king is not enough, and so Proverbs emphasises, even more so than 
Thomistic thinking (even though there is a correlation of sorts) that prudential 
wisdom is to be sought by those at any level of society and in any sphere of life. It is 
in this broad application to the formation of character that will ultimately lead to both 
the good of the individual and of life-giving societies. 
 
4.2 Theological Imagery and the Infused Virtues 
We recall the concluding examination of Proverbs conducted above (section 2.2.4) 
highlighted the teleological image of life that informs the direction to which 
prudential wisdom aspires. This teleological imagery provides a useful comparative 
basis on how Proverbs and Thomistic conception of the virtue of prudence can be 
examined. It is well established that Aquinas employed the eudaimonic principles 
from Aristotle and related philosophies to help formulate his broader moral outlook 
and, as touched on in earlier sections, this approach is integral in understanding the 
virtues. To briefly elaborate, virtue theory in this classically informed mode has at its 
heart the idea that everything has a particular and appropriate telos or a ‘final end’ 
which, when realised, expresses the fullness of that thing. Further, when that proper 
end is realised, the thing is fulfilled or ‘happy’ (Greek: eudaimonia). Eudaimonia, in 
Aristotelian thought and that which follows it, is the highest human good and, in 
itself, has significant resonance (though is not to be confused as being the same 
thing) as the notion of ‘goodness of life’ as found in the Proverbs discussed above. 
As with Proverbs, classically defined eudaimonia has a certain depth. It is identified 
with having a good life in a whole and consistent basis – it consists in both living 
well (eu zēn) and doing well (eu prattein).383  
                                                 
383  NE, 1095a19-20. Regarding the virtue of prudence, for example, Aristotle states that it is 
concerned with the deliberation about “things that are good and beneficial for himself, not about some 
restricted area – about what sorts of things promote health or strength, for instance – but about what 
sorts of things promote living well in general.” NE, 1140a27-29.  
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Aquinas takes such a position and, though he ultimately moves away from Aristotle, 
fundamentally agrees with it. In Summa Theologiae I-II 1-5 Aquinas discusses such 
notions more closely. There he points out that all humans desire complete fulfilment 
and this complete fulfilment is what is meant by the ‘ultimate end’ (ultimi finis) of 
human existence.384 The good, then, is that which rightfully realises this ‘desire for 
fulfilment’. However, as he goes on to articulate, how one realises such an end is not 
held unanimously, “since some desire riches, as their consummate good; some, 
pleasure; others, something else.”385 For Aquinas, this uncertainty about what the 
good actually is opens up the idea of limits of human nature and, further, sin (both 
actual and original) which has as one of its effects the confusing of the desire for the 
ultimate end with the seeking of it in ‘lesser goods’.386 Though Proverbs does not 
articulate this with the same technical and philosophical language, and it obviously 
does not have a developed concept of sin as it would appear in the later Christian 
tradition, there is, as discussed above, the echo here of such ideas – where the human 
person can seem to be on the path to the good, but whose end is anything but good 
(e.g. Prov 14:12).  
Returning to Aquinas, he goes on to examine a catalogue of spheres where true 
fulfilment might be found.387 Raised are many human goods, but as to holding the 
ultimate good, none of those suffice. Rather, it is found in God alone. Even the good 
quality of one’s soul is not the ultimate good. As Aquinas states:  
The thing itself desired as the final end is that which gives substance to 
happiness and makes a man happy, though happiness itself is defined by 
the holding of it. The conclusion to be drawn is that happiness is a real 
condition of soul, yet is founded on a thing outside the soul.388 
Then in the following article he states it clearly, as translated by McInerny: 
For happiness is the perfect good which totally quiets appetite; otherwise, 
if there still remained something to be sought, it would not be the 
ultimate end. The object of will, the human appetite, is the universal 
good, just as the object of intellect is universal truth. From this it follows 
                                                 
384 ST, I-II, 1.7. For a recent analysis of Aquinas’s approach to the role of teleological desire see Jean 
Porter, "The Desire for Happiness and the Virtues of the Will," Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 1 
(2014).  
385 ST, I-II, 1.7. 
386 ST, I-II, 1.7 ad 1. 
387 ST, I-II, 2. 
388 ST, I-II, 2.7 (Blackfriars translation used). 
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that nothing can quiet the will of man except the universal good, which is 
found in no creature but in God alone, since every creature has a 
participated goodness. Hence God alone can fulfil the will of man.389 
As McInerny discusses, this leads to an understanding that a perfectly fulfilled life is 
impossible in this one and can only be found in loving union with God in the beatific 
vision; a state of being that can be tasted in this life but not fully experienced.390 A 
point should be made that, given we are bringing the wisdom of Proverbs into 
dialogue with Thomistic thought, this notion of the afterlife that is heavily informed 
by New Testament and early Christian imagery, is not one found in Proverbs. The 
concerns, articulations and teachings of Proverbs are weighted to how the current life 
is shaped and, as such, are not concerned with ‘ultimate rewards’ in the same 
manner.391 However, as has been argued previously, there is in Proverbs a vision of 
God who is beyond human experience but, nonetheless, is imbued within created 
reality and that such a vision matters in properly conceiving life in its goodness as 
well as the means to achieving such goodness. Moreover, when we begin to reflect 
on how such ‘high’ imagery of God both within and beyond created reality impacts 
the virtuous life including the virtue of prudence, we can find points of similarity 
between Thomistic thought and Proverbs and, consequently, a place where one can 
begin to more directly inform the other. 
With that in mind, and returning to Thomistic thought more centrally, what this 
theocentric image of the ultimate good does is open a layer of understanding of the 
virtuous character that might otherwise remain silent. For Aquinas this is considered 
in a number of ways including in his integration of the theological virtues as well as 
the importance of the infused virtues. It is difficult to briefly discuss these ideas 
because they are, firstly, complex in their own right and, secondly, Aquinas’s own 
writings shift in such a way that those who follow and interpret him in the field of 
moral thought do not always have fixed agreement on some of the issues 
                                                 
389 ST, I-II, 2.8. As cited in McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 30. 
390 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 30-31. 
391 Note that Aquinas himself does use imagery found in the wisdom literature including Proverbs 
(Prov 9:3; Sir 24:4) to articulate the teleological image of human longing, SCG, 3.50. According to 
Aquinas, such high imagery of wisdom and its calling to humanity is an illustration of our natural 
desire to see God which informs the telos of human existence. A task here is to articulate similar 
notions, though in concert with more modern biblical scholarship. 
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presented.392 As such, the infused and theological virtues are discussed here only in 
general terms, but they nonetheless provide a valuable framework on how certain 
aspects of prudence, as understood both in the virtue tradition broadly as well as in 
Proverbs, can be more fully informed. 
To unpack this we need to briefly revisit the concept of virtues more broadly. 
Acknowledging that the ultimate good, that is the ultimate end of human goodness, is 
found in God alone places a limit on the acquired cardinal virtues of prudence, 
fortitude, justice and temperance. Given the fundamental idea that something from 
outside the natural human experience is required to find that ultimate end (being 
union with God himself), Aquinas recognises that the traditional cardinal virtues in 
themselves are not sufficient. Though they perfect the human person, they do so only 
in the ‘natural order’. This is articulated in a number of places in Thomistic thought, 
but is perhaps made most clear in his discussion on the virtues in general in I-II, 55-
67 of the Summa Theologiae. Aquinas here draws the distinction between the 
acquired moral virtues and infused virtues. The former, as the appellation suggests, 
are virtues that can be acquired through the exercise of the human faculties, 
including the intellect, and in the development of habits through human effort. The 
latter are bestowed by God directly and are necessary if we are to attain our ultimate 
end as articulated above. As Aquinas states: 
Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to 
happiness. Now man’s happiness is twofold … One is proportionate to 
human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his 
natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and 
which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of 
participation of the Godhead, about which it is written [2 Pet 1:4] that by 
Christ we are made partakers of the Divine Nature. And because such 
happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural 
principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not 
suffice to direct man to this same happiness.  
                                                 
392 For example Sherwin’s treatment of how charity (the key theological virtue in Thomistic thought) 
interacts with the moral life articulates that an understanding of such relationships shifts in Aquinas. 
Michael S. Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Of America Press, 2005), 192-202 and 
passim. Kent similarly notes how a shift even in the Summa alone is identifiable. It is why she 
suggests that “the Summa can be better understood as a conversation continuing over the course of 
many evenings than as the straightforward textbook discussion modern readers might expect.” Bonnie 
Kent, "Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49-70)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 112. 
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Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional 
principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even 
as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, 
albeit not without the Divine assistance. Suchlike principles are called 
theological virtues: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they 
direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God 
alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by 
Divine revelation, contained in Holy Scripture.393 
What this introduces is the notion of theological virtues, which are identified as faith, 
hope and charity.394 As the above quote indicates, these virtues allow for the ultimate 
telos, that being participation in God, to be realised and are termed theological 
because they originate from God alone and are not able to be acquired any other way. 
The term ‘bestowed’ was used earlier and this is apt as they are ‘gift’ in the fullest 
sense; hence they are, in regard to the virtuous life, the essence of grace. Further, this 
graced moral life is found in the gifts of the Holy Spirit which operate within human 
experience to elevate the person to communion in the Godhead. 
Two points need to be made regarding this. As alluded to in the above, the goals of 
‘natural happiness’ served by acquired virtues are certainly goods. They are not to be 
confused as being inherently immoral simply because they have as their object 
human flourishing in the place of natural existence. To expand, the virtue of justice, 
even as exercised with only the power of human reason for the sake of human good 
in the natural order of things, will still properly be a good for the human individual 
and the community in which they live. However, it may not be able to aid in the 
ultimate good which is found in union with God. Nevertheless, assuming it is well 
directed by prudence and is in concert with the other cardinal virtues, it will cause 
both the agent and her actions to be genuinely good according to her nature. Having 
said that, according to Aquinas at least, the effects of sin make the virtuous life apart 
from grace difficult, but nonetheless it is, in principle at least, possible.395 For the 
                                                 
393 ST, I-II, 62.1. A sentiment repeated in various modes, for example: I-II, 3.6; I-II, 4.5-6; I-II, 51.4; 
I-II, 63.3. 
394 The theological virtues receive much attention in contemporary Thomist theology. For a succinct 
summary of their conception as being discussed here, see Jean Porter, Recovery of Virtue: The 
Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 168-171. 
395 ST, I-II,109.2; cf. I-II, 65.2. 
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sake of space, I simply note, as Aquinas does, that the ‘lower order’ of goods are still 
sufficient in serving the ends in that order.396 
Secondly and most importantly, the above mentioned theological virtues do not sit in 
isolation. Also introduced above is the notion of ‘infused virtue’, that is, virtues 
otherwise considered natural that are ‘infused’ with grace. This is a key notion for 
this discussion. Not only is there a well-regarded understanding that for all the 
virtues to be virtues, they need to work in concert in the person, Aquinas has taught 
us that, similarly, the theological virtues and the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirt need 
to operate in concert with all the other virtues if one is to live the ultimate fullness of 
life.397 This does not involve a suppression of the naturally acquired cardinal virtues 
with a replacement set of theologically shaped virtues. As such, the term ‘infusion’ is 
apt in its imagery as it represents an infusion of grace within the human person; a 
mixing with a capacity readily present. In this vein, the notion of the infused virtues 
is not something that suppresses created reality, but elevates our moral activity 
within it such that the ultimate telos can be realised. As Cessario describes it:  
The infused moral virtues assume that God has acted in human history in 
such a way as to make beatific fellowship with himself possible for every 
member of the race. This elevation of human nature’s destiny requires a 
proportionate elevation of human nature’s capacities.398 
Nonetheless, it always remains a capacity within the created being operative within 
creation.  
Naturally in developed Christian theology, this notion of ‘God’s action in history’ is 
captured in the image of Christ in which, through the Holy Spirit and his Church, we 
are invited to participate in the life of the Trinity. However, as Cessario later states, 
this power to live the ‘elevated life’ is premised in the Hebrew Scriptures: 
Christ promises his disciples and, through them, his Church that the 
power of the Holy Spirit – a divine power – will be bestowed 
efficaciously on them, so that they and every member of Christ’s Body 
                                                 
396 This is one of a number of topics where there is conjecture pertaining to natural and supernatural 
goods. Angela Knobel provides a useful summary of the issue. As she discusses, there are schools of 
thought that suggest that, according to the Thomistic scheme at least, pagans cannot be perfectly 
virtuous because without active grace operating, even the acquired virtues become at least somewhat 
obscured to the agent. Angela Knobel, "Ends and Virtues," Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 1 (2014). 
397 ST, I-II, 51.4. 
398 Romanus Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 106. 
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can fulfil man’s divinely appointed vocation to holiness of life. In the Old 
Testament, this divine power is identified as divine wisdom, an active 
principle in creation, which according to the Book of Wisdom399 abides 
as the source of everything that man needs to pursue a complete human 
life.400 
Taken as a whole, this concept of the ultimate human good and the natural human 
good echoes the discussion earlier on Proverbs. Relying on human wisdom alone is 
problematic if the fullness of wisdom properly understood (which necessarily 
includes the divine imagery) is to be grasped. As discussed to this point, this is well 
established in both Proverbs and in Thomistic thought. However, there is a greater 
depth to be had in this topic and this can be illuminated when we examine the key 
theological virtue of charity as it relates to the other cardinal virtues and to prudence 
in particular. 
All three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity have their place, but charity is 
particularly important in the Thomistic scheme for a number of reasons. Most 
notably it is closely associated with the beatific end described above as it concerns 
the love of God as the object directly.401 Further, the love of God that is captured in 
the virtue of charity is an all-encompassing one. What is meant by this is, being a 
love from and for God, charity is a love that, through God, extends to all for all. As 
such, the virtue of charity, working through the infused moral virtues, concerns the 
totality of human beings as they act within lived reality including with each other. As 
Kent discusses, one might inaccurately regard a Christian life to be “mostly a private 
relationship between the individual conscience and God—chiefly a matter of one’s 
heart and mind, so that one’s everyday behavior might be hard to distinguish from 
the behavior of non-Christians.” However, this is not in keeping with a complete 
                                                 
399 The Book of Wisdom is being cited here. However, such a concept of divine wisdom is found in 
Proverbs as well. Cessario refers to the Book of Wisdom in particular as it does find some prominence 
in Aquinas’s deliberations on the topic of the infused virtues (e.g. ST, I-II 110.1; De Veritate, q. 22, 
art. 1, where Aquinas quotes Wis 8:1). Of particular pertinence Aquinas on two occasions as part of 
the sed contra statements cites Wis 8:7. The first (ST, I-II, 57.3) regards whether prudence is 
necessary for the good life and in the second (ST, I-II, 63.3) the question pertains to whether moral 
virtues are infused. On both occasions Aquinas responds in the affirmative. Though a detailed analysis 
of Aquinas’s use of Scripture is not an essential part of this project, it seems safe to say that Aquinas 
did see a resonance between the Old Testament concept of wisdom and the notion of the infused 
virtue of prudence.   
400 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 163. 
401 As Aquinas describes, all virtues, formed through acts and habits, get their character from their 
objects. The object of charity is the love of God himself for love’s own sake. ST, II-II, 23.4. 
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understanding of the theological virtue of charity or the virtues in general.402 As has 
been articulated throughout and is apparent especially in the current discussion, the 
virtues, and virtuous activity included, are only virtues in an integrated mode and, 
further, the human being is also necessarily communal and so any sense of the 
virtuous life must account for such integration. As such, the virtue of charity, though 
pertaining to one’s individual relationship with God, will have a necessary influence 
on the day-to-day lives of human beings as they act with each other and within 
created reality.  
Given that, for all the virtues and their activity to realise the ultimate end (as opposed 
to the connatural ends alone), it will need to be shaped by the ‘mother’ of all virtues, 
charity.403 The question is how does this occur? Aquinas himself used the example of 
fasting and temperance.404 Balanced regular meals are considered a well-reasoned 
approach to food, useful for human flourishing if approached in that way. It would 
not be considered intemperate to eat as such at any given time. However, the 
believer, infused with charity, with a love for the ultimate good would be exercising 
the same virtue (temperance) but to a different end in the exercise of fasting. The 
virtue does not change in its proximate object (that being a healthy exercise of bodily 
appetite), nor does the activity in the general sense (it still pertains to eating food), 
but the end (natural human fulfilment in the cardinal virtue compared to union with 
God in the infused virtue) changes the virtue as it is exercised in the life of the 
believer.405  
The same reckoning is applied to our particular virtue of interest in prudence, in fact 
even more so given that prudence is so central to coordinating the other virtues.406 
Taking the above example, later in the Summa Theologiae Aquinas stresses that if we 
were to fast to a point where we are harming our natural bodies, then it is a 
perversion of the spiritual act and thus sinful.407 As such, infused prudence is one 
that is able to direct temperance (in this case) towards an end that is true to one’s 
                                                 
402 Kent, "Habits and Virtues," 125. 
403 ST, I-II, 62.4; II-II 23.8 ad 2. 
404 ST, I-II, 64.4. 
405 For Aquinas, this points to infused virtues being entirely differing species of virtue, something 
assumed in this discussion but not elaborated on for the sake of space. 
406 ST, I-II, 65.1. 
407 ST, II-II. 147.1-2; esp. 147.1 ad 2.  
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entire being – to find a fullness of life that draws our natural activity into right 
relationship with our fullest end.  
This brings another aspect of prudence into focus. Central to our understanding of 
prudence is that it concerns the ability to see reality rightly (see the previous 
discussion on ‘truthful vision’) and to use such vision to reason rightly in matters of 
the particular and move the agent towards the telos of fullness of life. Charity as a 
virtue, the cultivated gift of “friendship with God”408 necessarily changes the scope 
of this vision. Further, it does this in the most substantial way. To expand, charity in 
the Thomistic tradition is not simply associated with attaining knowledge of God in 
the cognitive sense. As far as the theological virtues are concerned, for Aquinas, this 
rests in the virtue of faith which is operative in the intellect; a virtue that allows one 
to grasp the truth of God. Over both the theological virtues of faith and hope (and all 
other virtues for that matter), Aquinas teaches that charity is primary as it grasps the 
dynamism of God’s very being drawing humanity to God’s self – an operative for 
and in God.409 Thus, in the virtue of charity, we come to know God; not simply to 
know truths about God, but to know the place where our desires as human beings are 
entirely satisfied. 410  Further, as Aquinas states it, charity is most important in 
conceiving the virtue of prudence in its fullest capacity as illuminating means to 
ultimate ends, i.e. charity works through infused prudence to provide it with a vision 
of what the ultimate telos for the agent is: 
For it has been stated that the other moral virtues cannot be without 
prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because 
these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the 
starting point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed 
aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his 
ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed 
in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue … It is 
therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; 
                                                 
408 A term developed by Aquinas himself, particularly in Commentary on the Sentence (see Thomas 
Aquinas, On Love and Charity: Readings from the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 
trans., Peter A. Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, and Joseph Bolin (Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2008), especially d. 27, q. 2, a. 1. Also ST, II-II, 23.1. 
409 ST, II-II, 23.6. 
410 Being alluded to here is the faculty of the will where, for Aquinas, the virtue of charity sits. The 
will is the ‘intellective appetite’ expressed as a desire for the good, not in the particular (which is 
sensory), but the good as a universal concept (ST, II-II, 24.1). This notion is unpacked to some extent 
below (4.2.1). See also Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love, 11-24. 
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nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without 
prudence.411 
In examining this concept Pinches describes the effect of infused prudence as 
“adding more ‘realities’ to know.”412 Moreover, as he goes on to state:  
Since we receive full knowledge of God in the communion of charity 
rather than in the intellectual apprehension of faith, it follows that infused 
prudence is the result not so much of apprehending but of communing. In 
short, we know God and God’s world in communion, in friendship.413 
As such, the elevated concept of infused prudence not only changes what we know in 
the faculty of the intellect which is where prudence sits, but it allows the believer to 
exercise truthful vision with a whole new perspective, one only found in God. As 
Pieper puts it, “by grace-given love, man may become one with God to such an 
extent that he receives, so to speak, the capacity and the right to see created things 
from God’s point of view and to “relativize” them.”414 Pieper here is commentating 
on I-II, 26.5 of the Summa where Aquinas writes that perfect prudence “sees nought 
else but the things of God.” As Pieper well points out, it is only through infused 
prudence that we see creation accurately as it is put in right perspective relative to 
God’s self. Thus, one can have such a perspective “without at the same time 
repudiating [created things] or doing injustice to their nature.” In contrast, contempt 
for the world that “springs from man’s own judgments and opinions” is unfounded 
arrogance and is unable to recognise created things rightly.415  
4.2.1 Infused Prudence as a Hermeneutical Aid for Proverbs 
If we hold such notions and step into our wider examination of wisdom in Proverbs, 
a new depth of hermeneutical understanding is made available. It was noted above 
that the theological imagery of Proverbs adds to how we might engage with 
prudential wisdom. Throughout Proverbs there are admonitions and insights based 
                                                 
411 ST, I-II, 65.2. 
412  Charles Pinches, "Pagan Virtue and Christian Prudence," in Christians Among the Virtues: 
Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997), 106. 
413 Pinches, "Christians Among the Virtues," 106; citing ST, II-II, 26.6. One of the key ways that the 
virtue of prudence operates in the theological sense is through the gift of counsel, that being, 
according to Aquinas the gift of the Holy Spirt associated with the virtue of prudence. Through such a 
gift, one is able to take “counsel from God” in discerning right action. ST, II-II, 52.1. 
414 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 38-39. 
415 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 39. 
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not on revealed truths in the prophetic or covenantal mode but, rather, in the lived 
experience of created reality. Nonetheless, prudential wisdom that is called to be 
exercised within created reality is most fully conceived as a wisdom that is ultimately 
found in God alone. Holding that in mind, the image of charity as it works with 
prudence to build an infused prudence in the human experience gives a technical 
shape to how we can more fully comprehend this theologically informed prudential 
wisdom found in Proverbs. There is, as articulated above, an acquired prudence 
operative that is virtuous, it will rightly recognise created goods as such and will lead 
to a natural flourishing. That is not taken away, but the theological background in 
Proverbs and the notion of infused prudence in Aquinas expands acquired prudence 
to contemplate and engage in the lived experience of created reality with a 
penetration that allows one to navigate life not only toward the good of the human in 
nature and of itself, but for the good in totality. This is not to claim that sages who 
wrote and redacted Proverbs had in mind the notion of infused virtues in the 
technical sense. As with the discussion on natural law earlier, such technicality is 
clearly not its mode and one is cautious that we do not ‘read into’ Proverbs that 
which is not there. However, as demonstrated previously and developed further here, 
there is an ‘ultimate vision’ of wisdom that is borne out in God alone yet invites 
human participation such that the fullness of life, including life in God, can be found. 
We recall from the earlier discussion that when Proverbs calls out and ties the 
gaining of wisdom with a ‘fear of the Lord’, the call is not to suggest that prudential 
wisdom necessarily requires pious activity for its own sake.416 It is, rather, to enter 
into dwelling in God in both heart and action. The Thomistic vision of infused 
virtues gives a greater shape as to why – because without such a development of 
virtue, the ability to live virtuously to the ultimate end is frustrated. Moreover, it 
harkens to the relational dimension necessary if one is to gain the fullness of vision 
that prudential wisdom allows. Recall the invitation of Woman Wisdom (Prov 8); 
imbued in it is a call to encounter a ‘creative force’ and gain the things of good 
sense, deep understanding and prudence. But this invitation, with the above in mind, 
is not simply a cognitive exercise. As is found by many interpreters, the call of 
Woman Wisdom is couched in relational terms. 417  This is not simply a literary 
                                                 
416 See in particular section 2.2.4. 
417 For example Clifford, Book of Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom, 23-28. 
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instrument, rather it is indicating the approach one is to have if one is going to 
engage the fullness of life that is on offer. In short this approach is a dynamic of 
love; to love and be loved (Prov 8:17).  
This touches on a notion implied in the above discussion, and it pertains to the 
importance of our desires and will. It is not a dimension that can be analysed 
extensively here but it is useful to grasp the importance of desires of the will as it 
operates with prudence in the virtuous life. 418  Cessario in his examination of 
prudence notes that, “Christian prudence … combines both the intellectual emphasis 
of classical philosophy, for example, Aristotle’s doctrine of phronesis, with the quest 
of the Christian tradition – ‘amor meus, pondus meum,’ my love, my inclination.”419 
He then goes on to quote Aquinas from the Summa Theologiae: 
Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the 
Philosopher [Aristotle] states that it is easy to do what a righteous man 
does; but that to do it in the same way, viz., with pleasure and 
promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. Accordingly we 
read also [1 John 5:3] that His commandments are not heavy: which 
words Augustine expounds by saying that they are not heavy to the man 
that loves; whereas they are a burden to him that does not love.420 
As Cessario discusses, this points to how a fuller comprehension of morality is found 
in an integrated vision of the moral life and how prudence provides a “unitive 
function.”421 Party to this is the importance of our appetitive makeup. Prudence (as 
the ability to move from rational deliberation about what is to be done through a right 
grasp of reality to moral activity) is necessarily shaped by what we desire as our 
ultimate end. It is this which sits as a major plank in how charity (as a communing in 
friendship) impacts the virtues, not only in its broadening of vision but by also 
directing, through prudence, all the virtues to their fullest end. This is so because 
prudence operates not only in deliberation about things, but by enacting our desire 
for the good which is kernelled in us in creation and present in the natural law; to 
                                                 
418 ‘Will’ here is referring to what Aquinas terms as the intellectual appetite. The will functions in 
drawing one to what one can apprehend in the intellect. A full discussion is not pertinent here, 
however, the importance of the desire and will in the conception of prudence and as understood in this 
project can be found in Porter, Nature as Reason, 248-267; Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason: 
Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 43-61. See also 
1.2.2 above. 
419 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 79. 
420 ST, I-II, 107.4. 
421 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 80-90. 
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desire good and avoid evil. This includes what we would understand as our emotions, 
and Aquinas recognises that our affective desires (what is included in notion of 
appetitus) are essentially created to seek and find goodness, and the fullness of life is 
thus possible only if our desires are ordered to their proper ends.422 The virtue of 
charity is the ultimate expression of this. It allows our being to not only express our 
desires rightly for proximate goods, but to desire the ultimate good at the same time. 
These rightly ordered desires of the will, what Aquinas terms a rectitude of the 
appetite (rectitude appetitus), allows prudence to integrate right desire into right 
action.423 Cates captures the impact of Charity regarding our appetites well: 
Charity is partly a change in one’s appetite that becomes possible when 
one apprehends (by faith) that one stands in a fitting relationship to God 
and to all that God loves. It is a change that becomes possible when one 
realizes that one has been granted by God, a special capacity to relate to 
God, not only as the first cause of one’s being and goodness (as evident 
to natural reason) but as an intimate Friend with whom one shares one’s 
life.424 
The sage authors of Proverbs also seem to have had an awareness of the importance 
of desires in shaping the character of one’s moral life. Prov 10:23 sates that;  
Doing wrong is like sport to a fool,  
but wise conduct is pleasure to a person of understanding. 
 
The key term here is śāḥaq, what the NRSV translates as ‘sport’. It captures the idea 
of delight and pleasurable desire and works elliptically with the second line (hence 
NRSV inserts the word ‘pleasure’). A number of places in Proverbs points out that 
fools and the immoral find pleasure in evil and their lack of ‘good sense’. For 
example: 
Folly is a joy to one who has no sense, 
but a person of understanding walks straight ahead. (Prov 15:21).425 
 
                                                 
422 For a recent treatment of the importance of appetites as they relate to the modern concept of the 
emotions in Thomistic thought, see Nicholas E. Lombardo, Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012); Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the 
Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). As 
both these recent authors articulate, the affective dimension of Thomistic thought as it relates to the 
virtues is not an entirely settled matter. What can be said is that the desire for the good (as an 
expression of our appetite) is integral for the virtuous life. 
423 ST, I-II, 57.4-5; 58.2.  
424 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 198. 
425 Other examples include Prov 1:16; 2:14; 26:19. 
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What seems prevalent here is the understanding that what we love (desire) sets the 
character and direction of moral formation. It is not simply a case of knowing ‘good 
things’ as a faculty of the intellect which is the drive of prudence. Rather, it finds 
fullness as a virtue in conjunction with our desires operating towards proper ends. It 
is not surprising then that Prov 8:17 states, “I [divine Wisdom] love those who love 
me, and those who seek me diligently find me.” This pertains to the type of 
attitudinal stance (in the natural sense) one should have if they are to attain 
wisdom,426 however, as the discussion had in 2.2.4 on Prov 8:22-36 indicates, there 
is also a distinctly theological dimension that is required.427  
4.2.2 The Natural and Supernatural in Proverbs 
The above discussion allows one to bring into focus the commonly expressed notion 
of ‘grace perfecting nature’. Proverbs does not literally articulate such an 
understanding. However, as the examination had above attests, the pathway to 
prudential wisdom found in its fullest is a meeting of two aspects, the created world 
where we experience reality and the fullness of the creative force of wisdom found 
ultimately in God alone. In the Thomistic language, the infused virtues (including the 
infused virtue of prudence) are similarly a meeting of our commonly experienced 
human nature, and the supernatural love of God - an elevation of creaturely activity 
to its fullest end.  
An issue for much of the Christian theological enterprise has been how these two 
‘natures’ relate – and for many the articulation of the dictum gratia perficit naturam 
has been less than satisfactory. As Cessario states, it has been “subject to countless 
misinterpretations and, therefore, the beneficiary of unmerited deprecation.”428 Porter 
also provides a discussion on how nature and grace as distinct concepts have 
substantive value and critiques the tendency in modern Catholic theology in 
particular to downplay the distinction.429  The downplay is usually based on two 
inaccuracies. The first pertains to over stressing the distinction of two natures. With 
such an overstating, the human person is seen as being operative in either one state of 
being or the other, or, moreover, can pursue only one eudaimonic nature or the other. 
                                                 
426 See Fox’s discussion on ‘Reciprocal Love’ in Proverbs 1-9, 275-276. 
427 See also Wis 7:14. It is also worth noting that Aquinas uses Prov 8:17 as a point of reference 
regarding the integration of faith and charity as a love of God in friendship (ST, I-II, 65.5). 
428 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 23.  
429 Porter, Nature as Reason, 378-400. 
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It holds that grace and nature, in this sense, are mutually exclusive spheres of 
existence and that the faculties of one does not necessitate engagement with the 
other. This can result in a denigration of nature as something to be suppressed for the 
sake of the moral life on the one hand or, on the other, a bifurcation of graced reality 
from created nature such that ‘pure nature’ stands as a complete paradigm of the 
moral life. Both ‘extremes’ have deficiencies particularly as far as the Christian faith 
is concerned. More the point here, as has been repeatedly illustrated above, this 
bifurcation is not necessary in utilising Aquinas. Rather, in Thomistic thought, 
supernatural grace and nature are distinct but, in the human person, they share in the 
very activity of being human, including the human faculties, wherever the human 
may be. Grace perfects nature, it does not supplant it. 
Secondly, and this is more the issue that Porter addresses, is the tendency by some to 
recognise that the supernatural impacts the natural without destroying it, but they go 
further and suggest that nature distinctively conceived is thus unnecessary. What we 
experience in a graced existence is a subsumed nature that is, thus, entirely 
supernatural. As such it is redundant to speak of distinctly natural faculties pursuing 
natural ends including the natural good.430 Most notably this is a position held by 
Karl Rahner.431 Porter contends that what is at stake if we collapse nature and grace 
into a single and ubiquitous mode of existence is that nature loses its distinct 
theological significance as an “independent witness to divine wisdom.” 432 The detail 
of this argument is not vital here, except to note that maintaining a distinction 
between grace and nature also allows scriptures such as Proverbs an avenue to speak 
to the moral life. 
Having said that, it is possible to interpret the theological and creative imagery of 
Proverbs in a Rahnerian mode where all existence shares a supernatural order. 
Roland Murphy is particularly persuasive in this regard. 433  However, this 
interpretation in the Rahnerian mode is not necessarily the only approach available 
and, in fact, it is the proposition here that the Thomistic notion that Porter defends 
can be witnessed in Proverbs. As discussed at various points through this project, the 
                                                 
430 Porter, Nature as Reason, 386-388.  
431 See Porter, Nature as Reason, 383 n. 69 for key texts. 
432 Porter, Nature as Reason, 388. 
433 Murphy, The Tree of Life, 120-124, 275-277; "Israel's Wisdom: A Biblical Model of Salvation," 
Studia Missionalia 30 (1981). See also section 1.2.3; fn. 120 above.  
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experience of creation does bear revelatory significance when Proverbs is reflected 
upon. Prudentially engaging it (as encouraged in Proverbs) is possible in its own 
right and this does not inherently equate to a mode of operation that is necessarily 
secular. Murphy’s reflections are most useful in drawing that into focus. However, 
what is being proposed here is that Proverbs can legitimately be read in such a way 
that the natural and supernatural are interrelated yet distinct and, further, that it might 
be beneficial to its interpretation to do so. Certainly, as readily conceded, Proverbs 
does not speak of grace perfecting nature in the same mode found in contemporary 
theology. Such a notion is built on the corpus of Scriptures and the great doctors of 
the Church and will not be found spelled out categorically in one book of the Old 
Testament. However, there are certain aspects of such a notion that can be affirmed 
by the examination of Proverbs undertaken in this project. 
Firstly, despite the call for the human creature to share in the particular perspective 
which only divine wisdom can provide, God and His complete perspective always 
remain distinct. For example, God has the totality of ‘truthful vision’ for He alone 
has eyes in every place (Prov 15:3). Not only is God the very source of creation 
(8:22), the very mysteries of the underworld are exposed only to Him, much less the 
depths of human existence (15:11; 20:27), and even in our moral conduct, what 
might seem right by external measure and the place of human reckoning is weighed 
accurately only before God who sees the very being of human activity (21:2-3). 
Acquiring and adhering to wisdom, as a calling infused with Godself, will cause one 
to live well, however the fullness of wisdom can only be found in God and, because 
of this very fact, its sum and end will always remain beyond human experience. As 
such, one needs something of God; that is to encounter God as God, to fully grasp 
wisdom. To collapse the natural world into the supernatural risks elevating the 
human experience to a place that it cannot possibly occupy; that is being able to hold 
a perspective of complete knowing (or complete wisdom to remain true to Proverbs). 
Proverbs seems determined to periodically remind the reader that such a perspective 
is God’s alone. We are simply encouraged to share in it in some capacity, this 
sharing we might term as a gift of grace (though Proverbs does not hold such 
terminology).  
Secondly, there seems to be within Proverbs a recognition of natural goods being 
goods in their own right. Take for example the following: 
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Better is a little with righteousness  
than large income with injustice. (Prov 16:8) 
 
and; 
Better is a little with the fear of the Lord  
than great treasure and trouble with it. (Prov 15:16) 
 
Conceptually the verses are near identical except for the ‘fear of the Lord’ motif. The 
first (16:8) can be plausibly read as concerning the good of the human being and the 
society in which she lives for her own ends. More specifically, a large income made 
by unjust activity might fill one’s treasure house, but it is immoral and, therefore, it 
is better to have less but secure one’s moral health. It is also necessary for a 
functioning society that its members operate justly, so such an approach points to 
contributing to a stable and flourishing society. One can make such claims with no 
theological input. The second reference (15:16) is the same principle but with a more 
overt theological implication. A humble and engaged respect of the Lord, is better 
than great material wealth. In fact Prov 15:16 sits in a section held together by word 
repetitions (15:13-17). 434  It lists a catalogue of goods (glad heart, prudential 
knowledge, a loving dinner table), but has at its centre the image of right relationship 
with God. The theological imagery in one does not take away from the natural good 
attested in the other, though it can be argued that it does add to it.  
Thus, and by way of conclusion, it is possible in Proverbs to witness a sense of the 
natural good that is a good in that order. The many modern interpretations that 
suggest a secular reading of large parts of Proverbs attests to that point.435 However, 
Proverbs does not stop there. There is, in addition to natural goods, a distinctly 
theological dimension (and one pertaining to the God of Israel to be more specific) 
that, while not taking anything away from the former, tunes the prudential wisdom 
being imparted toward that ‘higher’ order of wisdom that is found in God alone. 
Such reflections on the Book of Proverbs recognises those goods that might be 
termed ‘secular’ as goods but, equally, seems to hold an elevated and higher 
perspective of wisdom that escapes human natural capacity which, nonetheless, can 
be drawn upon in the natural and, further, elevates natural virtues to the goodness of 
life in its theologically informed fullest. As such, the prudential wisdom that is 
                                                 
434 Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs," 149-150. 
435 See note 93 above. 
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esteemed in Proverbs can very much imaged as an infused virtue; necessarily 
theologically sourced but operative in the human natural order for the sake of his 
good. 
What this demonstrates is that a Thomistic understanding of the infused virtues 
provides an approach to understanding how the ‘natural goods’ of wisdom expressed 
in Proverbs maintains theological relevance. Likewise, Proverbs itself can help us 
reconcile the theological issues that can arise in certain readings of gratia perficit 
naturam. Proverbs and its commitment to theological prudential wisdom attests that 
one order does not need to collapse into the other, that a distinction of both is 
possible without undermining either. As discussed, there is a theme throughout 
Proverbs that navigating life prudentially will inherently be aided by a dynamic 
engagement with God. Such an engagement elevates what are goods in the sphere of 
human activity and gives them an end that satisfies both the human good and the 
good in toto. The wisdom of Proverbs attests (though clearly does not describe in 
full) that, to the believer, all natural daily activity has supernatural implications and 
so an appropriate stance toward, and provision in response from God, allows the 





The aim of this project was to form a correlative dialogue between the virtue of 
prudence especially as it is informed by Thomas and his interpreters on the one hand, 
and the wisdom teaching of Proverbs on the other. Sitting behind this aim was the 
call, highlighted in the documents of Vatican II, for modern scholarship to draw on 
the Scriptures to more readily inform moral thought. In response to this, the approach 
in this study was not simply to use Scripture in passing, but to engage it in such a 
manner that utilises the varying tools of modern biblical scholarship where at all 
possible. As such, it is an engagement between two modern theological traditions – 
biblical study on the one hand and moral theology on the other. The aim has been to 
remain true to the scholarly standards demanded of both traditions where possible. 
The challenge has been to offer enough scholarly depth on the one hand to be 
thorough, but to do so without becoming lost in the finer detail where it does not 
serve the overall project on the other. A balance of sorts has been the aim, but 
undoubtedly certain aspects from one area of study or another could have been more 
fully explored were space available. 
With that in mind, the boundaries of what has been examined were set by where one 
scholarly tradition has been able to speak to the other in the aim of illuminating a 
certain field of moral thought – that being, the virtue of prudence and related 
concepts. For that reason, it should be pointed out that this was not an exhaustive 
study of either Proverbs or the virtue of prudence. Neither Proverbs nor what the 
Thomistic tradition has to say about the virtue of prudence exhausts all that there is 
to say.  
Despite these limitations, the project has unpacked some useful points of reflection. 
Firstly, Proverbs helps to critique the notion that natural law, as informed by 
Thomistic thought, is non-biblical or non-theological. The opening section, in 
particular, laid this groundwork by explaining how a more fruitful understanding of 
natural law (in Aquinas) and created order (in Proverbs) can be had and also set the 
context in which the virtue of prudence and Proverbial wisdom can be more fully 
grasped. Then the closer examination of Proverbs brought to the fore various modes 
where prudential wisdom is expressed. This also brought into greater focus elements 
such as the communal dimension and the theological imagery of prudential wisdom 
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found in Proverbs. Party to this is a recognition of the importance of ‘truthful vision’ 
which is so vital to living the prudent life at any time, but particularly so in our 
modern context where seeing reality rightly is arguably becoming more difficult 
despite our advancements in the accumulation and access to information. 
The final section brought to the fore two aspects where Proverbs is able to illuminate 
and add depth to Thomistic teaching. The first is the importance of the socio-political 
dimension of prudence – that the moral life is never an individuating activity in its 
entirety. We are shapers of and shaped by the societies we live in. The second drew 
into sharper focus the theological imagery of the virtues and, while drawing on 
reflections in Proverbs, unpacked the notion of the theological virtues and infused 
prudence. By drawing on the notion of ‘grace perfecting nature’, which is so 
important to the Thomistic imagery of the infused virtues, it subsequently gives 
avenue for the interpretation of Proverbs to inform a more complete image of the 
virtue of prudence; a fuller image of prudence that is able to direct human activity 
not only to the good in the natural (or ‘secular’, as often applied to Proverbs) order of 








Açar, Dilaver Arıkan, and Rüma, Inan. "External Pressure and Turkish Discourse on 
'Recognition of the Armenian Genocide'." Journal of Southeast European & 
Black Sea Studies 7, no. 3 (2007): 449-465. 
 
Aikin, Wm. Carter. Moved by God to Act: An Ecumenical Ethic of Grace in 
Community. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014. 
 
Alderman, Harold. "By Virtue of Virtue." In The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on 
Moral Character, edited by Kruschwitz, Robert B. and Roberts, Robert C.  
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1987. 
 
Ansberry, Christopher B. "What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens? The moral 
vision of the book of Proverbs and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Hebrew 
Studies 51 (2010): 157-173. 
 
________. Be Wise, My Son, and Make My Heart Glad: An Exploration of the 
Courtly Nature of the Book of Proverbs. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. 
 
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by English Dominican 
Fathers London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1924. 
 
________. Summa Theologiae. Translated by English Dominican Fathers. New 
York: Benziger Brothers, 1947. 
 
________. The Disputed Questions on Truth [Vol. 3]. Translated by Schmidt, Robert 
W. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. 
 
________. Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, 
Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries. London: Blackfriars, 1960-1974 
(reprinted by Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
________. Commentary on Aristotle's Politics. Translated by Fortin, Ernest L. and 
O'Neill, Peter D. In Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, edited by 
Lerner, Ralph New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
 
________. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Litzinger, C. I. 




________. Prudence: (2a2æ. 47-56). Translated by Gilby, T. Vol. 36 Summa 
Theologiae. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 2006. 
 
________. On Love and Charity: Readings from the Commentary on the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard. Translated by Kwasniewski, Peter A., Bolin, Thomas and 
Bolin, Joseph. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008. 
 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Irwin, Terence. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1999. 
 
Baechler, Jean. "Virtue: Its Nature, Exigency and Acquisition." In Virtue, edited by 
Chapman, John W. and Galston, William A.  New York: New York 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Barr, James. Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: The Gifford lectures for 1991, 
Delivered in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
 
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. Translated by Thomson, G.T. Vol. II. New York: T. 
& T. Clark, 1956. 
 
Barton, John. "Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the Old Testament." Journal of 
Theological Studies 30, no. 1 (1979): 1-14. 
 
Baumann, Gerlinde. "Wisdom and Ethics: The Contribution of Sapiential Ethics for 
Old Testament Ethics." Verbum Et Ecclesia JRG 30, no. 1 (2009): 15-24. 
 
Bondi, Richard. "The Elements of Character." Journal of Religious Ethics 12, no. 2 
(1984): 201-218. 
 
Boström, Lennart. The God of the Sages: The Portrayal of God in the Book of 
Proverbs. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990. 
 
Boyd, Craig A. A Shared Morality: A Narrative Defense of Natural Law Ethics. 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Publishing Group, 2007. 
 
Brown, William P. Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature 





________. "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9." In Character & Scripture: Moral 
Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, edited by Brown, 
William P.  Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2002. 
 
Brueggemann, Walter. In Man We Trust: The Neglected Side of Biblical Faith. 
Richmond, Va: John Knox Press, 1972. 
 
________. "The Social Significance of Solomon as a Patron of Wisdom." In The 
Sage in Ancient Israel and the Ancient Near East, edited by Gammie, John G. 
and Perdue, Leo G.  Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1990. 
 
Budge, E. W. Second Series of Facsimiles of Egyptian Hieratic Papyri in the British 
Museum. London: British Museum, 1923. 
 
Cantor, Harold. Clifford Odets, Playwright-poet. 2nd ed. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 
2000. 
 
Cates, Diana Fritz. Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 
 
Cessario, Romanus. The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009. 
 
Clements, Ronald E. Wisdom in Theology The Didsbury Lectures. Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1992. 
 
Clifford, Richard J. Book of Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom. Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1995. 
 
________. The Wisdom Literature. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998. 
 
________. Proverbs: A Commentary. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1999. 
 
________. "Reading Proverbs 10-22." Interpretation 63, no. 3 (2009): 242-253. 
 
________, ed. Wisdom Literature in Mesopotamia and Israel, SBL. Atlanta: Society 




Cox, Dermot. "Fear of Conscience?: Yir'at YHWH in Provers 1-9." In Studia 
Hierosolymitana III, edited by Bottini, Giovanni C.  Jerusalem: Franciscan 
Printing Press, 1982. 
 
________. Proverbs: With an Introduction to Sapiential Books OTM, Edited by 
Stuhlmueller, Carroll and McNamara, Martin. Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 
1982. 
 
Crenshaw, James L. "The Acquisition of Knowledge in Israelite Wisdom Literature." 
In Urgent Advice and Probing Questions: Collected Writings on Old 
Testament Wisdom.  Macon, GA: Mercer, 1995. 
 
________. "Proverbs." In Urgent Advice and Probing Questions: Collected Writings 
on Old Testament Wisdom.  Macon, GA: Mercer, 1995. 
 
________. "Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom." In Urgent Advice and Probing 
Questions: Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom.  Macon, GA: 
Mercer, 1995. 
 
________. Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence AYBRL. New 
Haven: Yale, 1998. 
 
________. Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction. Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2010. 
 
Curran, Charles E. "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology." In 
The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology, edited by Curran, Charles E. and 
McCormick, Richard A.  New York: Paulist Press, 1984. 
 
Davis, Ellen F. Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2000. 
 
________. "Preserving Virtues: Renewing the Tradition of the Sages." In Character 
& Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, 
edited by Brown, William P.  Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2002. 
 
Deane-Drummond, Celia. "Bodies in Glass: A Virtue Approach to Ethical 
Quandaries in a Cyborg Age." In Glass Darkly: Medicine and Theology in 
Further Dialogue, edited by Jones, D. Gareth and Elford, R. John.  Oxford: 




Deferrari, Roy J., Barry, M. Inviolata., and McGuiness, Ignatius. A Lexicon of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas based on the Summa Theologica and Selected Passages of 
his Other Works. Baltimore: Catholic University Press, 1948. 
 
Dell, Katharine J. The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
________. "A Heap of Proverbial Jewels." Review of Proverbs 10-31: A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary by Michael V. Fox. The 
Expository Times 121, no. 12 (2010): 627-628. 
 
Demmer, Klaus. Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology. 
Translated by Dell'Oro, Roberto. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Dobel, J. Patrick. "Political Prudence and the Ethics of Leadership." Public 
Administration Review 58, no. 1 (1998): 74-81. 
 
Eichrodt, Walther. Theology of the Old Testament. Translated by Baker, J. A. 
Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 1967 [Ger. 1933]. 
 
Eijnden, Jan G. J. van den. Poverty on the Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on 
Evangelical Poverty. Leuven: Peeters, 1994. 
 
Elders, L. The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1990. 
 
Fox, Michael V. "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2." Journal of Biblical Literature 113, 
no. 2 (1994): 233-243. 
 
________. Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. 
Vol. 18A The Anchor Bible. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
 
________. "The Epistemology of the Book of Proverbs." Journal of Biblical 
Literature 126, no. 4 (2007): 669-684. 
 
________. "Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs." Hebrew Studies 48 (2007): 
75-88. 
 
________. "The Growth of Wisdom." In Proverbs 10-31, edited by Fox, Michael V.  




________. Proverbs 10-31: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. 
Vol. 18B The Anchor Bible. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
Frydrych, Tomas. Living Under the Sun: Examination of Proverbs and Qoheleth. 
Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
 
Fuchs, Josef. Human Values and Christian Morality. Translated by Heelan, M. H., 
McRedmond, Maeve, Young, Erika and Watson, Gerard. Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1970. 
 
Geroge, Robert, ed. Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Oxford: Claridon, 
1992. 
 
Gilby, Thomas. The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958. 
 
Guillet, Jacques. Themes of the Bible. Translated by LaMothe, Albert J. Notre Dame, 
Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1960. 
 
Harris, R. L., Archer, Gleason L., and Waltke, Bruce K., eds. Theological Wordbook 
of the Old Testament. Chicago: Moody Press, 1999. 
 
Hauerwas, Stanley. Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection. Notre 
Dame: Fides Publishers, 1974. 
 
________. The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics. London: Notre 
Dame Press, 1983. 
 
Hibbs, Thomas S. Virtue's Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence and the Human Good. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001. 
 
Janzen, Waldemar. Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1994. 
 
Jenkins, John I. Review of Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law: An Analytical 
Reconstruction by Anthony J. Lisska. The Journal of Religion 78, no. 2 
(1998): 297-298. 
 
Kay, Judith W. "Getting Egypt out of the People: Aquinas’s Contributions to 
Liberation." In Aquinas and Empowerment: Classical Ethics for Ordinary 
143 
 
Lives, edited by Harak, G. Simon.  Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 1996. 
 
Keenan, James F. Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. 
 
________. "The Virtue of Prudence (IIa IIae, qq. 49-70)." In The Ethics of Aquinas, 
edited by Pope, Stephen J.  Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002. 
 
Kent, Bonnie. "Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49-70)." In The Ethics of Aquinas, 
edited by Pope, Stephen J.  Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002. 
 
Kerr, Fergus. After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2002. 
 
Knobel, Angela. "Ends and Virtues." Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 1 (2014): 
105-117. 
 
Koch, Klaus. "Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?" In Theodicy 
in the Old Testament, edited by Crenshaw, James L.  London: SPCK, 1983. 
 
Koenen, K. "לַכָשׂ." In Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, edited by 
Botterweck, G. J., Ringgren, Helmer and Fabry, Heinz-Josef. 2004. 
 
Kossel, Clifford G. "Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90-97)." In The 
Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Pope, Stephen J.  Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Levering, Matthew. Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological 
Approach. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Lewis, Theodore J. "Abode of the Dead." In The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary, 
edited by Freedman, David Noel.  New York: Doubleday, 1992. 
 
Lisska, Anthony J. Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
 
Lombardo, Nicholas E. Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion. Washington, DC: 




Lyu, Sun Myung. Righteousness in the Book of Proverbs. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2012. 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. 
 
Mahoney, John. The Making of Moral Theology: The Study of the Roman Catholic 
Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
 
McCabe, Herbert. God Still Matters. London: Contimuum, 2002. 
 
McInerny, Ralph. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. 
Rev. ed. ed. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997. 
 
McKane, William. Prophets and Wise Men. London: SCM, 1965. 
 
________. Proverbs: A New Approach. London: SCM Press, 1970. 
 
Meyers, Carol. "The Family in Early Israel." In Families in Ancient Israel, edited by 
Perdue, L.G., Blenkinsopp, Joseph, Collins, John J. and Meyers, Carol.  
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997. 
 
Moss, Alan. "Wisdom as Parental Teaching in Proverbs 1-9." Heythrop Journal 38, 
no. 2 (1997): 426-439. 
 
________. "Proverbs with Solomon: A Critical Revision of the Pre-Critical 
Commentary Tradition in the Light of a Biblical Intertextual Study." 
Heythrop Journal 43, no. 2 (2002): 199-211. 
 
Murphy, Roland E. "Kerygma of the Book of Proverbs." Interpretation 20, no. 1 
(1966): 3-14. 
 
________. "Form Criticism and Wisdom Literature." Catholic Biblical Quarterly 31, 
no. 4 (1969): 475-483. 
 
________. "Israel's Wisdom: A Biblical Model of Salvation." Studia Missionalia, no. 
30 (1981): 1-43. 
 





________. Proverbs. Vol. v. 22 Word Biblical Commentary. Dallas: Word Books, 
1998. 
 
________. The Tree of Life: An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature. 3rd ed. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002. 
 
O'Meara, Thomas F. "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas." Theological 
Studies 58, no. 2 (1997): 254-285. 
 
Perdue, Leo G. Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature. 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1994. 
 
________. "The Household, Old Testament Theology, and Contemporary 
Hermeneutics." In Families in Ancient Israel, edited by Perdue, Leo G., 
Blenkinsopp, Joseph, Collins, John J. and Meyers, Carol.  Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997. 
 
________. Wisdom Literature: A Theological History. Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2007. 
 
Perdue, Leo G., Blenkinsopp, Joseph, Collins, John J., and Meyers, Carol, eds. 
Families in Ancient Israel. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997. 
 
Pieper, Josef. The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and 
Temperance. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. 
 
Pinches, Charles. "Pagan Virtue and Christian Prudence." In Christians Among the 
Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics.  Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. 
 
Pinckaers, Servais. "Virtue is not a Habit." Cross Currents 12, no. 1 (1962): 65-81. 
 
________. The Sources of Christian Ethics. Translated by Noble, Mary Thomas. 3rd 
ed. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. 
 
________. "Scripture and the Renewal of Moral Theology." In The Pinckaers 
Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, edited by Berkman, John and 





Pontifical Biblical Commission. The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian 
Conduct. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008. 
 
Porter, Jean. Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics. 
Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990. 
 
________. Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradtion for Christian Ethics. 
Grand Rapids: Novalis, 1999. 
 
________. "Natural Law as a Scriptural Concept: Theological Reflections on a 
Medieval Theme." Theology Today 59, no. 2 (2002): 226-243. 
 
________. Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2005. 
 
________. "The Desire for Happiness and the Virtues of the Will." Journal of Moral 
Theology 3, no. 1 (2014): 18-38. 
 
Rodd, Cyril S. Glimpses of a Strange Land: Studies in Old Testament Ethics. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. 
 
Schroer, S., and Staubli, T. Body Symbolism in the Bible. Translated by Maloney, 
L.M. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2001. 
 
Second Vatican Council. "Dei Verbum: Dogmatic Constitution on Divine 
Revelation." In The Documents of Vatican II, edited by Abbott, Walter M.  
New York: Guild Press, 1966. 
 
________. "Optatam Totius: Decree on Priestly Training." In The Documents of 
Vatican II, edited by Abbott, Walter M.  New York: Guild Press, 1966. 
 
Sherwin, Michael S. By Knowledge & By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral 
Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Of 
America Press, 2005. 
 
Shupak, Nili. Where Can Wisdom be Found? Fribourg: University Press, 1993. 
 
Sigmund, Paul E., ed. St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics: A New 




Van Leeuwen, Raymond C. Context and Meaning in Proverbs 25-27. Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988. 
 
________. "The Book of Proverbs: Introdction, Commentary and Reflections." In 
The New Interpreter's Bible, V.  Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997. 
 
Von Rad, Gerhard. Wisdom in Israel. London: SCM Press, 1972. 
 
Wadell, Paul J. "Growing Together in the Divine Love: The Role of Charity in the 
Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas." In Aquinas and Empowerment: 
Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives, edited by Harak, G. Simon.  Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996. 
 
________. Becoming Friends: Worship, Justice, and the Practice of Christian 
Friendship. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing, 2002. 
 
Waltke, Bruce K. "The Book of Proverbs and Ancient Wisdom Literature." 
Bibliotheca Sacra 136, no. 543 (1979): 221-238. 
 
________. The Book of Proverbs. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2004. 
 
Westberg, Daniel. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in 
Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Whybray, R. N. The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament. Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1974. 
 
________. Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs JSOTS. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1990. 
 
________. Proverbs: Based on the Revised Standard Version New Century Bible 
Commentary. London: Marshall Pickering, 1994. 
 
________. The Book of Proverbs: A Survey of Modern Study. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1995. 
 
________. "Slippery Words: IV. Wisdom." In Wisdom: The Collected Articles of 
Norman Whybray, edited by Dell, Katharine J. and Barker, Margaret.  




Wozniuk, Vladimir. "The Wisdom of Solomon as Political Theology." Journal of 
Church and State 39, no. 4 (1997): 657-680. 
 
Zabán, Bálint Károly. The Pillar Function of the Speeches of Wisdom: Proverbs 
1:20-33, 8:1-36 and 9:1-6 in the Structural Framework of Proverbs 1-9. 
Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. 
 
Zimmerli, Walther. "The Place and Limit of Wisdom in The Framework of the Old 
Testament Theology." In Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom, edited by 
Crenshaw, James L.  New York: Ktav Pub. House, 1976. 
 
 
